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Ukraine’s 2014 Revolution of Dignity showcases tensions between nationalism and 
internationalism in a post-Cold War era. Ukraine’s political leaders and ordinary 
citizens express opposing views about the identity and sovereignty of their nation, as 
some want closer ties with the European Union, while others seek closer relations 
with the Russian Federation. The myths and memories of Ukraine’s Cossack past, as 
well as its time in the former Soviet Union, animate discourses throughout the 
conflict. These debates result in no clear consensus about Ukrainian identity.  
The inability of Ukraine to find a unified nationalist identity in the conflict 
highlights a post-Cold War paradox. Ukraine is unable to articulate a unifying 
identity because the myths and memories of the Cold War continue to circulate in 
public discourse. International organizations are largely unable to legitimize either 
side’s claims of identity in the conflict. This chaos has invited outside intervention, as 
both the Russia Federation and the United States attempt to influence Ukraine’s 
decisions about sovereignty and identity in ways benefitting Russian or American 
  
interests. These discourses mirror Cold War debates over Soviet satellite countries, as 
a propaganda battle for the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian people rage on in 
political speeches, online forums, and in international organizations. Ukraine is thus 
mired in a cycle of unrest, as corruption and language issues continue to prevent the 
nation from articulating a unified nationalist identity. 
Ukraine’s crisis showcases the inherent conflict within notions of sovereignty, 
as both self-determination and freedom from outside intervention often contradict the 
expected obligations of nations to protect not only their citizens but also those of 
other nations whose human rights are threatened. This project challenges the notion 
that post-Cold War states can easily move beyond the legacies of the Cold War, as 
their past myths and memories continue to define their sovereignty and identity well 
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Ukrainian President Viktor Yanykovich was in serious trouble. In November 
2013, his government backed out of a trade agreement with the European Union at 
the last minute, instead promising closer ties with the Russian Federation.1 The 
crowds swelled to over 800,000 people when pro-EU “Maidan” protesters in Kiev 
were met with arrests and violence from Yanykovich’s “Berkut” riot police. 
Yanykovich responded by forcing strict anti-protest laws through parliament. On 
February 20, 2014, Kiev saw its worst day of violence in almost 70 years as 
uniformed snipers fired at protesters, killing at least 88 people.2 Yanykovich fled 
Ukraine soon after and a warrant was issued for his arrest for the crime of “mass 
murder.”3  
Yanykovich’s rapid downfall reflected decades of tensions. For Ukrainians, 
religious and linguistic traditions, conflicts over economic and military alliances, and 
the brutal legacies of the Soviet Union, all influenced the three months of protests and 
government crackdowns. A nation comparable to the size of Texas, Ukraine is 
roughly divided down the banks of the Dnieper River winding through the center of 
the country. Western Ukrainians typically speak Ukrainian and want closer ties with 
the European Union. The most vocal and aggressive Maidan protesters originated 
from these regions; for many of these protesters, the Soviet Union represents 70 years 
of violent oppression. Conversely, eastern Ukrainians typically speak Russian and 
want Ukraine to prioritize its relationship with the Russian Federation over ties with 
Europe. These individuals often remember the Soviet Union with fond nostalgia.4 





of the deeply hated Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian nationalist leader who joined the 
Nazis and fought against the Soviet Union during the “Great Patriotic War.”5   
These divisions were exacerbated by more recent conflicts between Ukraine 
and Russia. Russian-backed insurgents shot down a Malaysian Airlines passenger jet 
in eastern Ukraine as part of the ongoing military campaign between Russian and 
Ukrainian forces in the Donbas region.6 On July 17, 2014, Malaysian Airlines Flight 
17 departed Amsterdam for Kuala Lumpur. Several hours after takeoff, the plane was 
shot down 25 miles from the Ukraine-Russia border, killing all 283 passengers and 15 
crew on board.7 The loss of life was staggering. Eighty of the passengers were under 
the age of 18, and 20 were younger than 12 years of age. Over 20 entire families were 
killed.8 The fighting between Ukrainian and Russian forces intensified in the 
aftermath of this tragedy. More than a thousand Ukrainians have been killed since the 
winter of 2014. Out of such turbulence, Ukrainians struggle to find a unified 
nationalist discourse that articulates their collective identity and desired future in a 
post-Cold War era.  
The international community has watched this conflict closely because it 
reignited familiar Cold War battles over the sovereignty of former satellite nations 
entrapped by the former Soviet Union. President Vladimir Putin—Russia's 
charismatic leader—defied international pressure in his military campaign against 
neighboring Ukraine. Putin annexed Crimea, supported separatists in eastern Ukraine, 
and levied retaliatory economic sanctions against both Ukraine and the United 
States.9 This conflict also aggravated the divisions between the Russian Federation 





Nations, attacked each other in public speeches, and formed coalitions of nations to 
geopolitically battle each other throughout the world.10 In Ukraine, those divisions 
were drawn into stark contrast as Russian forces supported separatists in eastern 
regions and the United States backed the pro-western government in Kiev.11 These 
latest clashes only underscore the international battle over Ukrainian sovereignty and 
identity that involves the governments of Ukraine, Russia, and the United States in 
particular.  
Scholars have argued that the current conflict between and among Ukraine, 
Russia, the United States, and international organizations represents a new Cold War. 
As early as 2008, Journalist Edward Lucas claimed that a new Cold War between the 
United States and the Russian Federation was underway.12 Former Soviet premiere 
Mikhail Gorbachev argued that a new Cold War had started in the wake of the current 
conflict, blaming American actions in Eastern Europe.13 Journalist Philip Howard 
also suggested that this second Cold War was unique because it included elements of 
cyber warfare—arguments developed in Chapter 2 about online “troll army” 
rhetoric.14 My dissertation makes three unique contributions to this ongoing argument 
about the turn toward a Cold War II. First, I argue that the new Cold War traps former 
Soviet states in a liminal flux that prevents rearticulations of identity and sovereignty 
in a post-Cold War era. Whereas other examinations of the conflict have focused on a 
new Cold War from the bi-polar perspective of Russia and the United States, this 
study explores the implications of former states caught between these two powers and 
international organizations in a war of words over their national sovereignty. Second, 





political leaders and ordinary citizens shape and respond to articulations of Ukraine’s 
national identity and navigate tensions between nationalism and internationalism. 
Third, this project examines in-between national actors like Sergey “Goblin” 
Aksyonov and anonymous Internet “troll army” commenters, suggesting that the 
current conflict exposes limitations on traditional understandings of national 
sovereignty and identity. Such individuals participate in constructions of national 
identity sovereignty as neither political elites nor ordinary citizens, suggesting that 
conceptions limited to those perspectives are inadequate to explain a post-Cold War 
framework. Thus, the Cold War II showcases the ways in which Ukrainian identity 
and sovereignty are caught in a post-Cold War paradox between historic myths and 
memories of the Cold War and an inherent push for more international, western 
orientation. I first explore the conflict’s Cold War struggles over land and national 
identity before turning to the current war of words over Ukraine's sovereignty. 
The Cold War as a battle for land and borders 
The Cold War represented a battle over the sovereignty of nation-states, 
chiefly between the Soviet Union and the United States. These tensions existed in an 
era of deepening and strengthening internationalism in the form of institutions, laws, 
and public opinion. That battle for control played out, at least in part, over two large 
areas: a battle over land and borders and a battle over national identity.15 This section 
explores these contestations.  
At the 2015 United Nations General Assembly, President Putin was asked if 
America’s economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure had failed as a form of 





at the map.”17 Over a century earlier, Catherine the Great remarked, “I have no way to 
defend my borders but to extend them.”18 Although issued over one hundred years 
apart, these two statements reflect the centrality of land in defining Russia’s 
relationship with the west. The Cold War was shaped by moments of conflict 
reflected in physical battles over borders and land.  
Immediately following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union—echoing 
Catherine the Great’s statement—aggressively pursued land expansion across much 
of Eastern Europe. Many of what would become the 15 Republics of the Soviet 
Union were occupied immediately after the end of the war in a massive Soviet land 
grab.19 Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed in his 1946 
“Sinews of Peace” address that the Soviet Union had taken over much of Eastern 
Europe without firing a shot after the war: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has 
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the 
ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, 
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest and Sofia, all these famous cities and the 
populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are 
subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high 
and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.20 
 
Churchill was not the only one to sound the alarm after the Soviet Union’s expansion. 
Deputy American Ambassador to the Soviet Union, George Kennan, wrote in his 
1946 “Long Telegram” that the Soviet land grab would only continue due to its 
engrained nationalist drive for expansion and “instinctive fear of the outside world.” 
Kennan argued in his anonymously-published “X” article that the Soviets must “be 
contained by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of 





containment would inform American foreign policy towards the Soviet Union for the 
duration of the Cold War.  
Rather than confront the Soviet Union’s expansion militarily, the United 
States adopted this policy of containment in the aftermath of World War II aimed at 
preventing further Soviet expansion without risking direct military conflict.22 
Through the Marshall Plan, American allies spent the equivalent of $130 billion 
rebuilding European economies to combat the spread of communism.23 On March 12, 
1947, President Harry S Truman delivered his “Truman Doctrine” of economic aid to 
Greece and Turkey. He warned that Greece would most certainly fall without 
immediate American intervention because of “the terrorist activities of several 
thousand armed men, led by Communists.”24 This U.S. foreign policy doctrine 
suggested that combating Soviet land expansion was a top priority, and the United 
States would intervene to stop communism’s spread.25  
 Germany further illustrated the Cold War tension over land as both Soviet and 
American leaders hoped to re-build the destroyed nation in its own image at war’s 
end. Soviet Foreign Minister Vyacheslav Molotov explained why Berlin was at the 
center of this battle over land: “What happens to Berlin, happens to Germany; what 
happens to Germany, happens to Europe.”26 Germany was split between East and 
West, dividing Berlin in two. Joseph Stalin intended to pressure western Germany 
into capitulating to Soviet demands; he believed that western nations lacked the 
resolve to reject this territorial expansion.27 Following territorial disputes in 1948, 
Stalin instituted the Berlin Blockade, preventing food, materials, and supplies from 





underestimated western resolve in preserving the territorial integrity of West 
Germany. General Lucius Clay, commander of American forces in Berlin, explained 
his resolve to preserve western influence in the city: “We are convinced that our 
remaining in Berlin is essential to our prestige in Germany and in Europe. Whether 
for good or bad, it has become a symbol of the American intent.”29 For over a year, 
from 1948-1949, the United States and other western nations conducted a massive 
“Berlin Airlift” of food and supplies to keep West Berlin afloat and to help the city 
survive the Soviet siege. Eventually Stalin capitulated, lifting the blockade, and 
allowing the East-West division along the Berlin Wall to remain intact. The United 
States continued its massive military buildup in West Germany and fortified its 
position in Europe, while the Soviet Union did the same in its territories.30  
 The same year the Soviet Union attempted to starve West Berlin into 
submission, Soviet leaders established a communist government in North Korea.31 
Stalin again felt that the west lacked the resolve to resist his territorial expansion and 
he continued to arm the North Korean government.32 For Stalin, the goal was to 
expand Soviet-controlled territories into South Korea without risking a direct conflict 
with the United States. Similarly, President Truman was not willing to risk an open 
military engagement with the Soviet Union. Yet, he was also unwilling to let Soviet 
expansion go unchecked. In a National Security Council Memorandum, Truman 
warned Douglas MacArthur that the operation in Korea was only justified if “at the 
time of such operation there was no entry into North Korea by major Soviet or 
Chinese Communist forces, no announcements of intended entry, nor a threat to 





struggled for territorial control in Asia, neither nation was willing to do so openly 
against the other. 
Leaders of both the United States and the Soviet Union described the Korean 
battles as a struggle over territory. President Truman framed the Korean conflict as 
one of territorial expansion on the part of communism: “The attack upon Korea 
makes it plain beyond all doubt that communism has passed beyond the use of 
subversion to conquer independent nations and will now use armed invasion and 
war.”34 For Truman, the Soviets were the aggressors, gobbling up territory in Asia 
and forcing independent nations into their sphere of influence. Conversely, Stalin 
presented the conflict in terms of western territorial expansion into the region. Stalin 
drew on recent World War II history in making this argument:  
In this case it is difficult to convince the soldiers that China, who threatened 
neither England nor America, from whom the Americans stole the island of 
Taiwan, are aggressors, and that the U.S.A., having stolen the island of 
Taiwan and led their troops straight to the borders of China, is the defending 
side. It is therefore difficult to convince the troops that the U.S.A. is right to 
defend its security on Korean territory and on the borders of China, and that 
China and Korea are not right to defend their security on their own territory or 
on the borders of their states. Really, one must have lost what was left of 
conscience to maintain that the United States of America, which has stolen 
Chinese territory, the island of Taiwan, and fallen upon China's borders in 
Korea, is the defensive side.35 
 
Both sides quickly followed through on their threats to intervene in the conflict. 
Although Soviet soldiers officially stayed out of the clashes, Soviet forces trained and 
armed North Korean troops and funded Communist China’s efforts to support the 
North Korean forces.36 The United States soon committed its own troops to the 
conflict, suffering over 33,000 casualties in what the United Nations characterized as 





Soviet Union fortified into proxy-control over the pro-Soviet government in North 
Korea with a massive aid program of debt relief, logistical support, and necessary 
supplies; the Americans did the same in South Korea. As was the case in Germany, 
both Soviet and western governments fortified their military position once the conflict 
officially ended in Korea.38  
 The United States, through the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), 
went on the territorial offensive in October 1959 by reaching an agreement to put 
nuclear-tipped Jupiter missiles in Turkey. Ostensibly this was done in the name of 
defending an American ally in the region. However, by placing nuclear missiles in 
Turkey—and across the Black Sea from Nikita Khrushchev’s summer home in Sochi, 
Russia—the United States gained a first-strike capability against the Soviet Union 
and a key strategic foothold deep within the Soviet sphere of influence.39  
The United States and the Soviet Union also sparred over Cuba. Closer to 
home, President Dwight Eisenhower continued American territorial chess moves 
against the Soviet Union. In 1960 Eisenhower approved a plan by the Central 
Intelligence Agency to fund and train a group of 1,500 paramilitaries to overthrow the 
pro-Soviet Fidel Castro government in Cuba. The strategy behind this operation was 
expressed in the September 1962 number X Memorandum from the U.S. State 
Department: “[To] bring about the replacement of the Castro regime with one more 
devoted to the true interests of the Cuban people and more acceptable to the United 
States in such a manner to avoid any appearance of U.S. intervention.”40 The 
operation, launched by President Kenned on April 17, 1961, was called the “Bay of 





the Cuban forces. Castro oversaw a total victory that significantly strengthened the 
Soviet position in the country.41 In response, President Kennedy initially denied any 
American involvement in the invasion. The following day, in a letter to Soviet leader 
Nikita Khrushchev, Kennedy wrote, “I have previously stated, and I repeat now, that 
the United States intends no military intervention in Cuba.”42 Three days later, 
Kennedy acknowledged America's role in the invasion but framed the events as 
America acting in its own defense while indicting the moral authority of the Soviet 
Union:  
I want it clearly understood that this Government will not hesitate in meeting 
its primary obligations which are to the security of our Nation! Should that 
time ever come, we do not intend to be lectured on “intervention'” by those 
whose character was stamped for all time on the bloody streets of Budapest!43 
 
President Kennedy thus framed the American-orchestrated Bay of Pigs offensive, 
aimed at controlling land in America’s territorial “sphere of influence,” as a defensive 
national security measure.  
These territorial battles between the United States and the Soviet Union 
reached dangerous new levels when, in 1962, the Soviet Union covertly sent nuclear 
missiles to Cuba and publically denied doing so. President Kennedy became aware of 
Soviet duplicity and used a television address on October 22, 1962, to further the 
American narrative of Soviet wrongdoing and aggression. Speaking of the newly 
constructed missiles sites in Cuba, Kennedy argued, “The purpose of these bases can 
be none other than to provide a nuclear strike capability against the Western 
Hemisphere.”44 Kennedy framed the conflict as one of territorial aggression in an 





As was frequently the case during the Cold War, the United Nations General 
Assembly became a forum for dueling nationalist narratives over territory. Most 
notably, ambassadors Adlai Stevenson and Valerian Zorin sparred during the Cuban 
Missile Crisis; both nations used the international media coverage of the debate for 
propaganda purposes. From the perspective of the Soviet Union, American aggression 
in Cuba, Turkey, and Taiwan spurred the conflict, and the Soviet government had 
every right to defend itself and support its regional ally.45 Zorin, Soviet Ambassador 
to the UN, outlined his strategy in a telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry: “The 
USA's aggressions against Cuba cannot be evaluated as anything other than a 
provocation pushing the world to the verge of nuclear war.”46 The Soviet narrative 
was one of American overreach and territorial intrusion. Conversely, the American 
version of events emphasized Soviet aggression and over-expansion that threatened 
global security.47 Ambassador Stevenson exclaimed, “We are here today and have 
been this week for one single reason -- because the Soviet Union secretly introduced 
this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of Cuba while assuring the 
world that nothing was further from their thoughts.”48 Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union brought their rhetorical war of words to the global community in their 
battle over territorial and military expansion. 
 Such land battles reached new heights during the space race. In Yuri 
Gagarin, the Soviets found their cosmonaut, and Gagarin became an international 
celebrity following his successful 1961 space flight. Soviet leaders framed this event 
as a testament to the exceptionalism of the Soviet people. In a telegram to Gagarin 





for all Soviet people: “The flight accomplished by you opens a new page in the 
history of mankind, in the conquest of outer space, and fills the hearts of Soviet 
people with great joy and pride for their socialist country.49 Through the phrases like 
the "conquest of outer space," the Soviets used the scientific achievement to 
punctuate their further expansion of territory.  
 The United States worked to keep pace in the Cold War battle over the 
territory of space. President Kennedy rhetorically framed the American effort to beat 
the Soviet Union to the moon as one of national pride, American exceptionalism, and 
scientific superiority. Just months after the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, Kennedy 
spoke of the American motivations for participating in the space race: “We choose to 
go to the Moon in this decade and do the other things not because they are easy, but 
because they are hard; because that goal will serve to organize and measure the best 
of our energies and skills, because that challenge is one …we intend to win.”50 This 
narrative suggested that America was serving a humanitarian role in its exploration, 
and traveling to space was simply the next great frontier and a logical extension of 
manifest destiny. The implicit assumption was that America “winning” this race 
highlighted the need for territorial expansion into the heavens. 
As the Cold War progressed, other proxy-wars were waged over land disputes 
and conflicts over territories and borders. The decades-long conflict in Vietnam 
(1955-1975) and the nine-year Soviet occupation of Afghanistan (1979-1989) 
featured parallel military defeats for both the United States and the Soviet Union. In 
Vietnam, the United States resisted Soviet expansion, fighting well armed and Soviet-





it intensified rapidly following the assassination of President Kennedy. President 
Lyndon B. Johnson signaled an escalation in American foreign policy in 1963 by 
raising concerns over what had been dubbed as a “domino theory” where nation after 
nation could fall to communism. The fear, Johnson reasoned, necessitated the need to 
stop Soviet territorial expansion in all “little nations” around the world that were 
threatened by Soviet forces.51 Similarly, in Afghanistan, the Soviet Union was 
defeated in its efforts to defend its pro-Soviet regime that could expand the Soviet 
sphere of influence.52 While not directly involved, the United States covertly 
supported anti-Soviet forces in the conflict. These efforts escalated until the eventual 
Soviet retreat from Afghanistan in 1989.53 The Soviet defeat in the conflict reflected 
an increasing lack of control from Moscow. 
When the Cold War officially came to an end on Christmas day, 1991, the 15 
Soviet republics broke away from Russia and formed independent states. This 
dissolution of the Soviet Union represented the final blow in a long and intensifying 
struggle on the part of the republics to resist Soviet rule; “Popular Front” movements 
sprung up in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as early as 1988, and violent uprisings 
took place in Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan during the same time 
period.54 Protesters were seemingly emboldened by the Soviet Union’s inability to 
maintain control of its territories, and moves by Soviet leaders to offer increased 
regional autonomy to these republics only inflamed and enabled further resistance.55 
When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, these new/old nations were forced to 
redefine their own territories that they now controlled. These territorial 





helped broker these transitions. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the UN welcomed 
the newly formed Russian Federation and all of the former Soviet republics as 
member states. Sadly, the efforts by the international community were often 
unsuccessful; conflicts among competing factions often broke out during these 
territorial and border shifts. 
With the Soviet Union’s collapse, the newly minted Russian Federation 
entered a time of tremendous uncertainty. In the immediate post-Cold War period of 
the 1990s, new President Boris Yeltsin was largely unable to address issues of 
inflation, a declining population, and rampant corruption.56 The nation was no longer 
officially a Soviet country, but many of the same issues continued to plague political 
leaders in the Russian Federation; while it looked like a functioning democracy, 
behind the scenes the Russian Federation embraced Soviet-style political and 
economic corruption.57 Moreover, while it looked like western-style media, the 
Russian Federation’s state-controlled outlets adopted a neo-Soviet style of unabashed 
subjectivity in their pro-government coverage.58 Despite these changes, the myths and 
memories used to characterize these issues from the Soviet Union continued to 
circulate in Russian public life after the Cold War came to a close.59 
The tumultuous post-Cold War period saw fresh territorial divisions lead to 
brutal conflicts. Without overarching Soviet influence and military strength to put 
down internal disputes, civil and regional wars sprang up in Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia witnessed brutal genocides in Croatia, 
Kosovo, and Serbia. Georgia experienced breakaway republics in Abkhazia and 





breakaway of the Transnistria region.60 The Russian Federation also endured an awful 
war. Chechens in the north caucuses, believing they should also have been granted 
independence from Russia after the Cold War, rebelled and were violently put down 
by Russian forces in two separate conflicts.61 Such contestations illustrate how the 
Cold War and post-Cold War periods were battles between nation-states fought over 
territories and borders. Yet, the Cold War battle also played out over matters of 
national identity. The following section illustrates how these identity disputes inform 
the current Ukrainian crisis. 
The Cold War as a propaganda battle over national identities 
National identities are rhetorical notions constructed in part through 
propaganda. As Michael Lane Bruner argues, “national identities are incessantly 
negotiated,” representing “a never-ending and politically consequential rhetorical 
struggle over” the meanings “of national character.”62 Both the United States and the 
Soviet Union forged their own nation’s national identities and the identities of their 
Cold War nemesis. These constructions played out in propaganda battles throughout 
the Cold War. In 1928, Edward Bernays defined propaganda as “The conscious and 
intelligent manipulation of the organized habits and opinions of the masses.”63 In 
international disputes such as those characterizing the Cold War, propaganda 
represents information disseminated by governments for the purpose of swaying 
international opinion.64 However, in foreign policy conflicts government leaders also 






Domestic discourses often have international implications. Official 
government messages in foreign policy disputes are predominantly targeted to 
international audiences. Additionally, national myths and images that are perpetuated 
by presidents and circulate in domestic rhetoric are also promulgated in international 
propaganda.	  Thus, presidents and leaders may address their own people while 
simultaneously communicating important messages to their enemies or allies.66 Cold 
War leaders often indirectly targeted their international enemies and allies through 
messages written for domestic audiences. Both the Soviet Union and the United 
States constructed and circulated these propaganda messages throughout the Cold 
War via a variety of channels.67 This section explores the propaganda infrastructure 
of both nations.  
Soviet propaganda infrastructure  
The Soviet Union’s primary domestic propaganda apparatus was the Komitet 
Gosudarstvennoy Bezopasnosti, or the KGB—the Committee for State Security. The 
KGB disseminated propaganda narratives “in print, at endless meetings, in school, in 
mass demonstrations, on the radio.”68 Such propaganda was directed at Soviet 
citizens and touched all parts of public life in the Soviet Union. “Lenin's corners,” 
which were shrines for the display of propaganda about the God-like founder of the 
Soviet nation, were built in all public buildings, and schools conducted marches, 
songs and pledges of allegiance to Soviet leaders.69 Young Pioneers—a Soviet youth 
group—were taught to be loyal and uncompromising in their fight against the 
enemies of socialism.70 Radio was also used to reach wide audiences throughout the 





posters with simple designs were hung in every Soviet town.72 Films depicting Soviet 
heroism were shown throughout the nation, both in theatres and sometimes from 
specially designed “propaganda trains,” which would project the movie onto the sides 
of the cars whenever the train stopped.73 Following its founding in 1917, the 
newspaper Pravda regularly disseminated propaganda messages while all anti-
government newspapers were suppressed by the KGB.74 Books and plays were also 
used to spread pro-government messages from within Russia and the Soviet orbit.75 
The KGB also directed the arm of international propaganda for the Soviet 
Union. In addition, the Glavnoye Razvedyvatel'noye Upravleniye (GRU), the Main 
Intelligence Directorate of the General Staff of the Armed Forces, also played a major 
role. One Soviet tactic of foreign propaganda was to support peace movements in 
other nations that undermined American efforts at territorial expansion. For example, 
Soviet defector Stanislav Lunev claimed, “the GRU and the KGB helped to fund just 
about every antiwar movement and organization in America and abroad.”76 The scope 
of these efforts to disseminate Soviet propaganda abroad was enormous; the Central 
Intelligence Agency estimated, for example, that during the 1980s the Soviet budget 
for propaganda abroad reached between $3.5 and $4 billion.77 The Soviet Union used 
this massive propaganda infrastructure to promote narratives of Soviet exceptionalism 
and the evils of the enemy.  
American propaganda infrastructure  
Understanding the Cold War helps us understand American propaganda. 
Woodrow Wilson’s 1913 inauguration signaled a new era of propaganda in American 





Wilson’s actions during World War I.78 Wilson recognized that the United States 
needed to explain its intentions and goals directly to the peoples of the world, not just 
to their leaders and diplomats.79 To that end, Wilson founded the Committee on 
Public Information (CPI) in 1917. This organization helped convinced domestic 
audiences of the need to intervene in World War I.80 The CPI’s head, George Creel, 
stressed the importance of propaganda in his book, How We Advertised America. He 
argued that World War I “had to be fought out in the hearts and minds of people as 
well as on the actual firing line. The approval of the world meant the steady flow of 
inspiration into the trenches.”81 Popular opposition to propaganda grew after World 
War I, putting President Franklin Roosevelt in a difficult position.82 Like Wilson, 
Roosevelt believed that the federal government needed to directly inform the public 
instead of relying entirely on the press to convey essential information.83 In the pre-
Cold War era, the role of government-sponsored propaganda became increasingly 
integral to American foreign policy. 
Following World War II, American leaders recognized the need to create a 
peacetime propaganda infrastructure and overcame significant opposition in building 
one. President Truman faced stiff opposition to his proposed peacetime propaganda 
programs from journalists, political elites, and the public.84 Those in the media who 
endorsed wartime propaganda saw a foreign information program in peacetime, such 
as Truman’s United States Information Service (USIS), as unwanted competitor paid 
for by taxpayers.85 Beyond opposition from media elites, David Krugler argues that 
four major factors were working against Truman during his efforts to continue and 





First, the conservative-led drive to roll back the New Deal and discredit its 
precept of activist government; second, struggles between the legislative and 
executive branches over the proper prerogative of each in foreign affairs; 
third, the use of foreign affairs and policies to serve partisan, even personal, 
aims; and fourth, intra-executive branch disagreement over the purposes of 
propaganda.86 
 
Thus, Truman’s propaganda programs were strongly opposed by multiple forces 
following World War II. 
Two dynamics also worked in Truman’s favor in his effort to build a 
peacetime propaganda infrastructure. First, the Soviet Union was ramping up its own 
anti-western propaganda in Eastern Europe, making life increasingly difficult for 
American diplomats.87 Second, as the Cold War intensified, so did public fears of 
Soviet aggression. Events such as the Berlin Blockade, the “loss” of China to 
communism, and the Soviet Union successfully testing an atomic bomb made it 
increasingly difficult to deny a need for a large-scale American propaganda effort in 
the early years of the Cold War to match the propaganda efforts of the Soviet Union. 
In this climate of fear, President Truman, and later President Dwight Eisenhower, 
were able to frame their call for a broad, permanent peacetime propaganda program 
as a national security issue.88 On August 31, 1945, President Truman argued, “the 
nature of present-day foreign relations makes it essential for the United States to 
maintain information activities abroad as an integral part of the conduct of our foreign 
affairs.”89 Thus, from the beginning of the Cold War, the United States sought to 
define American identity and undermine the Soviet Union through propaganda 
campaigns.90  
The infrastructure of U.S. propaganda centralized the voice of the U.S. 





As Shawn J. Parry-Giles argues, “America’s commitment to a government-sponsored 
propaganda program not surprisingly parallels the rise of the rhetorical presidency.”92 
Presidents exerted control over propaganda by selecting the director of propaganda 
operations and asserting their voice into deliberations over propaganda’s content. For 
instance, Presidents Truman and Eisenhower were instrumental in setting up a 
permanent propaganda structure that continues to inform existing propaganda 
practices.93 Under them, U.S. propaganda programs were either positioned under the 
U.S. Department of State or positioned as independent agencies.94 Yet, the presidents 
nevertheless exerted an important level of authority over propaganda operations; the 
programs, in turn, served as a platform for promulgating the presidents’ political 
agendas.95  
President Kennedy also integrated propaganda into his foreign policy arsenal. 
The United States Information Agency (USIA—USIS's successor as reorganized 
under Eisenhower) served as an important agency in Cold War propaganda efforts.96 
This meant, for instance, that the USIA produced and showed propaganda films to 
both domestic and international audiences.97 The Johnson administration would 
expand the use of USIA to include still photographs to promote his agenda.98 Under 
the Reagan administration, these efforts to combat Soviet “disinformation” were 
restored to the Truman-era levels.99 With propaganda structures essentially under 
White House control from the Eisenhower administration on, presidents had 
numerous tools at their disposal for propaganda purposes. 
Presidents also used large international policy initiatives as propaganda fare 





instance, President Eisenhower’s “Atoms for Peace” (AFP) initiative in December 
1953 “provided as ideal forum to maximize worldwide propaganda appeal.”100 AFP 
was a program where the United States and Soviet Union would both contribute 
fissionable material to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA, under the 
control of the United Nations) that would then provide nuclear power for peaceful 
uses in other countries. Surrendering nuclear material would also mean both the 
United States and the U.S.S.R. would have less material for bombs. As Eisenhower 
explained in his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, “I know that the 
American people share my deep belief that if a danger exists in the world, it is a 
danger shared by all–and equally, that if hope exists in the mind of one nation, that 
hope should be shared by all.”101  
Eisenhower’s program made the United States appear peaceful and ready to 
compromise for the greater good; the Soviets rejected it because, as C.D. Jackson 
explained, the U.S.S.R. would have to “pony up some fissionable material, which 
they don’t want to do (and maybe the haven’t got so much of it), or they have got to 
sand revealed before the whole world as an enemy of mankind.”102 The Operations 
Coordinating Board (OCB) promoted Atoms for Peace in numerous ways 
domestically, including the distribution of AFP postage stamps, AFP floats in 
parades, and in positive articles in magazines like Time.103 This domestic campaign 
also included the distribution of “500,000 illustrated pamphlets” which contained 
Eisenhower’s full speech and “photographs.”104 Such proposals like Atoms for Peace 





United Nations into propaganda channels during the Cold War to undermine Soviet 
military and propaganda operations and to define American identity. 
Radio was a primary mechanism for the spread of American propaganda 
messages. Walter Hixson explains the centrality of radio as a propaganda channel 
during the Cold War, capable of penetrating the Iron Curtain: “As East-West tensions 
mounted, radio emerged as virtually the only viable means of disseminating anti-
communist propaganda.”105 Truman’s administration concluded in 1951 that radio 
was “the only significant remaining program which effectively reaches the people of 
either or both the USSR and the satellites.”106 One such radio operation was the Voice 
of America (VOA)—a relic of World War II. Austin Stevens argues that the VOA 
presented “facts abroad about international developments…setting forth the United 
States’ position in areas where it may not be known.”107 The VOA broadcasted pro-
American and anti-communist messages as an official arm of U.S. foreign policy.108 
As Krugler explains, VOA was “the nation’s ideological arm of anti-communism.”109 
VOA programs stressed “the virtues of democracies with the vices of communist 
regimes” in addition to “the inevitability of our ultimate triumph.” Such messages 
depicted the U.S.S.R. as “the scheming villain…all black and sinister,” while 
America “stands up against the powers of evil with unyielding determination and 
fierce goal-consciousness.”110 Throughout the Cold War, radio represented a 
significant channel for American propaganda.111 American leaders repeatedly used 
mass communication technologies to reach wide audiences throughout the Cold 






Not all U.S. propaganda, however, was officially connected to the U.S. 
government. Both Presidents Truman and Eisenhower built up the country's covert 
propaganda channels. The U.S. government, for instance, also influenced the content 
of other propaganda radio channels like Radio Free Europe (RFE) and Radio Liberty 
(RL) that were not officially connected to the United States publicly but CIA-
influenced privately.113 Their broadcasters spoke as if they had escaped the throes of 
communism in their search for freedom in the west. RL “existed to beam messages to 
the Soviet Union, using former Soviet citizens as broadcasters” while RFE targeted 
Eastern Europe.114 In addition, Truman created the Psychological Strategy Board 
(PSB) and Eisenhower the Operations Coordinating Board (OCB). Both were 
designed to strengthen American interests and weaken communism by conducting 
psychological warfare abroad.115 These covert channels represented significant sites 
of American propaganda throughout the Cold War. There were three themes 
associated U.S. Cold War propaganda narratives: championing capitalism, exalting 
American exceptionalism, and framing the United States as a peaceful nation.116 
Ukraine: Struggling for sovereignty   
Ukraine also faced a battle over land and identity in its history before, during, 
and after the Cold War. Understanding this history helps us comprehend Ukraine’s 
own struggle for sovereignty while caught between two world powers. This history 
also helps us understand Ukraine’s role in both American and Soviet propaganda. 
Until the most recent conflict, the Ukrainian government’s propaganda infrastructure 
has been minimal. As discussed, in foreign policy disputes, propaganda messages are 





opinion, and for much of its recent history, Ukraine represented an occupied territory. 
It had no leaders independent of Polish, Tsarist, or Soviet control who could articulate 
messages of Ukrainian identity or resist control of its territories by foreign powers. 
However, this is not to say that nationalist myths—an essential component of 
Ukraine’s current propaganda efforts—were not circulating during this time period. 
Understanding the cultural roots of those exceptionalist myths requires an 
examination of Ukrainian history. 
Pre-Soviet Ukraine 
The 1648 Cossack rebellion was an important time for Ukraine in defining its 
identity. During the rebellion in what is now central Ukraine, peasants known as 
Cossacks fiercely fought against their forced serfdom under the Lithuanian-Polish 
Commonwealth.117 Many of them were peasants from Poland and Lithuania who had 
been forced to move to the area to work in the bountiful fields.118 Their primary cause 
was simple freedom from Polish domination. Theirs was a narrative of an oppressed 
people who demanded to “breath freely,” sharing their common experiences of 
oppression and a “willingness to die” for their collective freedom.119 Cossack victory 
was imminent at the end of the 15-year war.120 Rather than accept defeat, the 
Commonwealth formed an alliance with powerful Tsarist Russia and partitioned 
Ukraine down the Dnipro River between their two larger nations.121 Many of the 
issues Ukraine currently faces can be traced in part to this geography; the Dnipro 
River divides the country in two, and the Tsarist period saw that geographic barrier 





Ukrainian, were forced into the west; those in the east more commonly viewed 
themselves as Russian and became the subjects of the Romanov Dynasty.122 
Cossack identity was fiercely opposed to outside rule. Ukrainian leader 
Hetman Zaxarcenko responded to the demands of invading Turkish forces that the 
Ukrainians surrender before a major battle in the 1670s:  
Zaporozhians -- to the Turkish Sultan 
You Turkish Satan, brother and comrade of the damned devil and secretary to 
Lucifer himself! What the hell kind of knight are you? The devil [shits] and 
you and your army swallow [it]. You aren't fit to have the sons of Christians 
under you; we aren't afraid of your army, and we'll fight you on land and sea. 
You Babylonian busboy, Macedonian mechanic, Jerusalem beer brewer, 
Alexandrian goat skinner, swineherd of Upper and Lower Egypt, Armenian 
pig, Tatar goat, Kamenets hangman, Podolian thief, grandson of the Evil 
Serpent himself, and buffoon of all the world and the netherworld, fool of our 
God, swine's snout, mare's [rectum], butcher's dog, unbaptized brow, may the 
devil steam your ass! That's how the Cossacks answer you, you nasty glob of 
spit! You're unfit to rule true Christians. We don't know the date because we 
don't have a calendar, the moon is in the sky, and the year is in a book, and the 
day is the same with us as with you, so go kiss our [butt]!123 
-Chief Hetman Zaxarcenko with all the Zaporozhian Host 
 
The Cossacks resented any foreign power coming into their lands and attempting to 
dominate them, and they were willing to die fighting for their freedom. Although the 
Cossacks would win the battle with the Turkish troops outlined here, they were 
eventually overwhelmed by the Commonwealth’s alliance with Tsarist Russian. After 
the failed rebellion, Tsarist Russia controlled what is now eastern Ukraine for 
centuries. At the same time, Poland, and eventually Hungary and Austria, controlled 
the western half of the country. This split caused this Cossack discourse of national 
identity to evolve in different ways on each side of the Dnipro over several centuries. 
 Tsarist rule further refined and bifurcated Ukrainian identity in ways reflected 





Russia cracked down on any expressions of nationalism in the eastern parts of 
Ukraine under Tsarist control throughout the 1800s.124 This ban included the use of 
the Ukrainian language in schools in particular.125 Conversely, the use of the 
Ukrainian language maintained a sufficient base in Western Ukraine where it was 
never banned.126 The language remained a prominent feature of its music, literature, 
and folklore.127 Under this climate of repression, many Ukrainophiles—usually 
Cossack descendants who promoted Ukrainian independence—fled the Tsarist-
controlled territories.128 They often settled in the far-western regions of the country 
where the independence movement was allowed to flourish under relaxed Austrian 
and Polish control.129 Those friendly to Russia, however, remained in the eastern half 
of the country. Thus, while the Ukrainian identity created by the Cossacks was 
allowed to thrive west of the Dnipro, the same political and linguistic commitments 
were more likely silenced in the east.130  
Ukraine and the Soviet Union 
These same political divisions existed for centuries until Ukraine voted to 
become one of the founding members of the Soviet Union in 1922 following a 
disputed election run by the Soviet leadership.131 Under Soviet rule, the Ukrainian 
people were only allowed one shared identity defined by an allegiance to the Soviet 
Union. Russian replaced Ukrainian as the national language and people were 
forbidden to practice their faith in the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.132 The forced 
collectivization of farmland from 1932-1933 decimated the Ukrainian peasantry, as 
millions died fiercely defending their land and refusing to give up their crops.133 As 





fought against the Soviet Union during the “Great Patriotic War.”134 These Ukrainian 
nationalists and Bandera-followers, united in the Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), 
would continue to staunchly resist Soviet rule.135 Red Army forces eventually crushed 
them in the early 1950s.136 The failure to resist collectivization and the defeat of 
Bandera’s army left Ukrainians with little recourse but to bend to Soviet rule. Their 
territory was occupied and their national identity was submerged in many ways for 
much of the Cold War.137  
Ukrainians nonetheless found ways to resist Soviet occupation. Living under 
Soviet rule meant that Ukrainians could not develop their own propaganda 
infrastructure since a uniquely Ukrainian—and non-Soviet—identity was officially 
forbidden.138 Many Ukrainians were not happy about this inability to publicly express 
their national identity; especially in western regions, frustration with Soviet rule was 
strong. Dissidents who resisted Soviet occupation needed to operate in secret because 
the KGB quickly infiltrated and destroyed numerous nationalist movements in 
Ukraine.139 The two largest Ukrainian dissident movements were the Ukrainian 
Supreme Liberation Council (zpUHVR, the political base of the future Prolog, 
discussed in the next section) and the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists loyal to 
Stepan Bandera (OUNb, also known as OUNr).140 Although Bandera had been 
assassinated, his legacy remained a powerful nationalist rallying cry. Fearing KGB 
operatives, dissidents were not able to resist openly, instead coordinating with the 
United States to undermine Soviet authority covertly. Things remained this way until, 
with the Soviet Union collapsing around them, 92 percent of Ukrainians voted for 





Ukraine and the United States during the Cold War 
The United States attempted to undermine the Soviet Union’s control in 
Ukraine throughout the Cold War.142 From 1952-1992, the United States supported 
the Prolog Research and Publishing Corporation. Taras Kuzio explains the scope of 
Prolog’s propaganda activities: 
Prolog reached out to a far wider political spectrum inside Ukraine as well as 
cooperated with a broad spectrum of Western NGO’s, academics and 
politicians as well as new Eastern European opposition movements such as 
Poland’s Solidarity. Prolog was a leader in the smuggling of literature into 
Soviet Ukraine (tamvydav, or published there), the smuggling of literature out 
of the country (samvydav [samizdat] or self-published), and maintaining 
contacts with Ukrainian underground organizations and overt dissidents and 
opposition movements.143 
 
Moreover, Prolog coordinated with U.S.-funded Radio Svoboda (the Ukrainian-
language service of Radio Liberty) throughout its existence. Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty radio programs were filled by anti-communist émigrés affiliated with 
Prolog who told stories of their wonderful lives in the west.144  
The propaganda goals of these programs were to encourage resistance to 
Soviet rule. Ross Johnson argues that the goal of supporting dissident groups and 
Radio Free Europe and Radio liberty was to encourage Ukrainians to self-liberate: 
“The aims of this strategy were to keep alive hopes of resistance [and] give 
sustenance to dissenters.” Johnson continues that the U.S.-funded programs were 
designed to “support alternatives to communist rule, promote autonomist tendencies 
in the USSR and outer Soviet empire, give air to national communist leanings, and, 
from the 1960s, provide a voice to the emerging dissidents, civil society and 
opposition.”145 As Prolog President Roman Kupchinsky explains, “All of this (Prolog 





financial base.”146 The United States thus did all it could to covertly support 
Ukrainian dissident movements and undermine Soviet authority in Ukraine during the 
Cold War.  
Post-Cold War Ukrainian identity  
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Ukrainian people were given an 
opportunity to articulate their own national identity for the first time in over half a 
century. Without the Soviet Union to submerge nationalist divisions, centuries-old 
conflicts reemerged and Ukraine quickly became polarized.  
Ukrainian presidents relied on the nation’s own propaganda infrastructure to 
navigate these tensions. Unfortunately for Ukrainians who desired closer ties with the 
west, Russian agents dominated Ukraine’s propaganda apparatuses in its Security 
Service, the SBU, since the end of the Cold War. The SBU is under the direct control 
of the Ukrainian president. However, as Philip Shishkin explains, “Unlike other 
former Soviet republics, Ukraine didn’t purge the ranks of its spy service when it 
gained independence. Many of its agents came from the former Soviet KGB’s 5th 
directorate, which had focused on rooting out domestic political dissent.”147 
Corruption was rampant in the SBU following the Cold War.148 When conflicts 
erupted between Ukrainian leadership and the Russian Federation, the SBU actively 
undermined pro-American political candidates and movements. SBU agents, for 
instance, infiltrated the 2014 Maidan protests and violently attacked other protesters 
and looted stores to discredit the movement. Virtually the entire agency subsequently 
fled to Crimea or Russia following President Yanykovich’s removal from power to 





To address this lack of propaganda infrastructure, the SBU hired a new crop 
of recruits from western Ukraine, many of whom were in their early twenties.150 The 
Ukrainian government’s revamped SBU—ostensibly free of Russian spies—operates 
in ways modeled after its western Cold War counterparts, producing and distributing 
pro-Ukrainian books, magazines, radio advertisements, cable news shows, and 
newspapers defending the current government.151 Under the direct control of 
President Poroshenko, these propaganda apparatuses publically and covertly work to 
support a pro-western political agenda and undermine Russian influence in the 
country. Ukraine’s struggle for sovereignty and control over its own identity is the 
subject of this project. This current crisis is informed by the rhetorical and political 
legacy of the Cold War. 
The present study 
Research questions 
This study will explore the battle over Ukrainian sovereignty in the current 
crisis involving Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and select international 
organizations (EU, NATO, UN). Three research questions will guide this study. First, 
I examine how Ukrainian sovereignty is constituted by officials from Ukraine, 
Russia, the United States, and international organizations (EU, NATO, UN) in the 
ongoing war of words over Ukrainian identity and territory in a post-Cold War era. 
Second, in examining the current dispute over Ukrainian sovereignty, I explore what 
happens when myths and memories of nation-states are promulgated internationally 
and collide with the myths and memories of other nation-states in a period of 





Cold War influences the debate over Ukrainian sovereignty in the post-Cold War 
world. This project explores how political leaders and ordinary citizens use myths, 
memories, and narratives to navigate the tensions between nationalism and 
internationalism in a post-Cold War world. 
Scope of the project 
First, I study the rhetoric of government officials and the ways such rhetoric 
circulates in public life.152 Disputes over Ukrainian sovereignty are represented either 
in messages targeted directly toward international audiences or in discourses that 
circulate widely across the Internet to reach international audiences. Such propaganda 
often encourages support and incites opposition. This study thus also includes 
dissenting voices and their contributions to Ukrainian sovereignty. Second, I examine 
texts written or translated into English. This project focuses on propaganda messages 
targeting international audiences and efforts by those audiences to resist such 
messages. Texts targeting international audiences are often written or translated 
primarily into English. While I also analyze speeches delivered in Russian and 
Ukrainian, official English transcripts often accompany these discourses.153  
Rhetorical lenses  
As explained, this study will examine the battle over Ukrainian sovereignty 
among Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and international organizations. The 
conflict is as much a war of words as it is a war between militaries—a conflict that is 
exacerbated by the tensions between nationalism and internationalism. As such, I will 
explore the discourses that have helped define this foreign policy struggle. All parties 





depict the comportment of other nations. Such propaganda, infused with ideologies of 
nationalism and internationalism and reliant on myths and memories, represents the 
primary critical lenses used to examine the crisis over Ukrainian sovereignty. In what 
follows, I explain the central theories that make up my critical approach for this 
study.  
I bring a rhetorical perspective to this project that reflects the commitments of 
rhetoric and public address. This means, as Francis A. Beer and Robert Hariman 
suggest, that I must “acknowledge the factors of ‘power politics’ while also 
accounting for discursive power” found in the debates over Ukrainian sovereignty.154 
First, my approach presumes that language is foundational to rhetorical study. As 
Murray Edelman argues, “political language is political reality.”155  Second, my 
approach presumes that ideology is foundational to rhetorical study. As Michael 
Calvin McGee argues, “Ideology in practice is a political language, preserved in 
rhetorical documents, with the capacity to dictate decision and control public belief 
and behavior.”156  John Thompson elaborates further that to study ideology is “to 
study the ways in which multifarious uses of language intersect with power, 
nourishing it, sustaining it, enacting it.”157 Ideology thus intersects rhetoric, values, 
ideas, and power, manifested in structures such as government propaganda.  
Third, my approach presumes that identity is central to rhetorical study. As 
Maurice Charland suggests, identities are constituted by a variety of factors, including 
culture, history, language, and religion.158 He explains, “Political identity must be an 
ideological fiction” and this “fiction becomes historically material and of 





nation-states. As Michael Lane Bruner explains, “National identities articulated by 
state leaders…proactively contribute to the construction, maintenance, and 
transformation of those identities.”160 Contestations often erupt in this battle over 
identity formation, particularly among rival nations.161  
Finally, my approach presumes that rhetoric and the ideas that texts feature 
must be situated in the historical, political, and social contexts that shape them. Ernest 
J. Wrage explains that ideas can be traced in discourse: “The word ideas, 
therefore…refers widely to formulations of thought as the product and expression of 
social incentives, which give rise and importance now to one idea, then to another.” 
Wrage’s ideas—formulations of thought—represent connected “products of their 
social environment.”162 This study recognizes the importance of historical ideas that 
continue to circulate in more contemporary discourse. Understanding the battle of 
words and ideas over Ukrainian sovereignty necessitates a robust understanding of 
the battle of words and ideas that played out among the world's Cold Warriors—the 
Americans, the Soviets and their republics, and international organizations. 
Propaganda represents an important means by which this battle plays out.163 
Propaganda serves as a type of rhetoric that is used by governments to influence 
international public opinion.164 Erin Steuter and Deborah Wills conceive of 
governmental propaganda as a form of rhetorical influence that helps “persuade the 
public of the evil of the enemy and the justness of its own cause.” As Steuter and 
Wills conclude, “Influence, after all, is propaganda’s purpose.”165 Shawn Parry-Giles 
similarly suggests that governments and leaders serve a critical purpose in 





propaganda as “Strategically devised messages that are disseminated to masses of 
people by an institution for the purposes of generating action benefiting its source.”166  
Generally speaking, there are three kinds of propaganda—black, white, and 
gray. Black propaganda has no official ties to any government making it a more 
covert form of propaganda.167 White propaganda represents an official message from 
governments or clearly identifiable sources.168 Gray propaganda is located 
somewhere between black and white, where, as Parry-Giles explains, its “source was 
concealed or attributed to a non-hostile source.”169 This study will focus on white and 
gray propaganda as I study the messages of governmental leaders and those who act 
on behalf of governments yet “camouflage” their connections to them.170 These 
messages of propaganda reflect ideologies of nationalism and internationalism and 
the tensions that arise between them in times of international conflict.  
Nationalism: connecting identity and power 
Scholars have expended considerable time defining theories of nationalism.171 
Karina Korostelina argues that nationalism is a rhetorical process of determining 
shared national identity, which is the product of both “1) ethnic history and the 
identity of continuity, values, and belief systems and 2) dominant ideologies and 
conscious manipulation, including commemoration, ideology, and symbolism.”172 For 
her, nationalism “‘invents’ nations that never existed before to imbue the newly 
created state with shared meaning.”173 Studies of nationalism thus examine the 
discourse about and by a nation-state(s) and the ideologies that construct the nation's 





The rise of the nation-state coincided with the gradual break up of colonizing 
relationships that forced nations to re-envision their identity.174 Before the twentieth 
century, world order was dominated by monarchies focused on maintaining and 
expanding their empires.175 For instance, the monarchies of England, France, Spain, 
and Holland alone conquered and ruled much of the Americas, Africa, and Asia for 
centuries. This geopolitical structure dominated for hundreds of years and “as late as 
1914, these colonizing states made up the majority of the membership of the world 
political system.”176 However, the rise of nationalist movements resisting imperial 
subjugation soon became untenable for monarchies. Several factors led to increasing 
numbers of people resisting colonial rule throughout the 1800s. Benedict Anderson 
explains these forces:  
In the course of the nineteenth century, and especially in its later half, the 
philological-lexicographic revolution and the rise of intra-European 
nationalist movements, themselves the products, not only of capitalism, but of 
the elephantiasis of the dynastic states, created increasing cultural, and 
therefore political, difficulties for many dynasts.177  
 
New nationalist communities were able to resist colonial rule because of the 
“interaction between a system of production and productive relations (capitalism), a 
technology of communication (print), and the fatality of human linguistic 
diversity.”178 People began to identify with a nation rather than with an empire, and 
political leaders started building a rhetoric reflecting this realization based in national 
tenets and commitments. Identities associated with colonial dynasties slowly gave 
way to identities associated with nation-states.  
Colonial rulers tried to adapt to these changing realities to maintain control of 





themselves in nationalist vernacular. For instance, the “Romanovs discovered they 
were Great Russians.”179 These efforts by monarchs to coopt nationalist rhetoric in 
order to sustain their dynasties all eventually failed. As Anderson explains, “the First 
World War brought the age of high dynasticism to an end. By 1922, Habsburgs, 
Hohenzollerns, Romanovs and Ottomans were gone. In place of the Congress of 
Berlin came the League of Nations. From this time on, the legitimate international 
norm was the nation-state.”180 As colonial empires receded, the people of these new 
nations needed a new discourse to define their identities, and nationalism narratives 
served that purpose. The post-Cold War era represents yet another period of 
pronounced shifts in borders and identities and Ukraine represents a classic case in 
debates over national sovereignty. The nation-state thus remains an integral feature of 
contemporary geo-politics.  
Anderson famously described nations as “imagined communities” that are 
“conceived as a deep horizontal comradeship.” As Anderson's definition implies, 
nations are fundamentally constituted rhetorically through texts and words. These 
communities are “distinguished not by their falsity/genuineness, but by the style in 
which they are imagined.”181 Thomas Cronin and Michael Genovese explain that such 
nationalist discourse serves to unite large groups of people willing to kill and die “for 
such limited imaginings” of their “national character.”182 Nationalism rhetoric 
ultimately reflects what Vanessa Beasley calls a “doubled-edged sword” by 
promoting a “shared identity” that also “encourage[s] exclusion, intolerance, and even 
inhumanity.”183 Rhetorics of nationalism thus draw on cultural and ideational 





Conceptions of nationalism can derive from a multiplicity of sources. Bruner 
argues that there are generally two helpful characterizations of nationalism—
“nationalism from above,” characterized by political and social elites, and 
“nationalism from below,” expressed by the oppressed individuals of a society.184 
When political leaders construct nationalist discourses, they can have tremendous 
influence in defining a nation's identity. For example, Vladimir Putin demonstrates 
how political elites can shape national identity in his address to the Russian Duma 
following the 2014 annexation of Crimea: “Everything in Crimea speaks of our 
shared history and pride. In people’s hearts and minds, Crimea has always been an 
inseparable part of Russia.”185 Putin suggests that incorporating Crimea into the 
Russian Federation is a point of national pride, and that his government has acted in 
ways reflecting—and constituting—the history and values of the Russian people.186 
As a political leader, Putin was uniquely positioned to make these contributions to his 
nation’s identity. Political elites accordingly have tremendous rhetorical power to 
shape and define conceptions of nationalism.187 
Nationalism from below represents efforts by often-oppressed individuals to 
resist dominant nationalist ideologies. Rather than elites generating a national ideal, 
groups of people form their own understanding of what a nationalist identity is and 
express that view rhetorically. As Bruner explains, “Intellectuals and the 
economically oppressed also seek to resurrect or maintain a particular culture when 
opposed by colonial forces.”188 The 2014 Ukrainian “Revolution of Dignity” 
highlights nationalism from below, as large groups of economically oppressed 





own nation as a free and independent nation.189 By chanting, “Ukraine is Europe” in 
massive protests and toppling statues of Vladimir Lenin, Ukrainians articulated their 
own identity that resisted the pro-Russian one championed by then-president Viktor 
Yanykovich.190 Instead of a president or political leader controlling the identity of the 
nation-state, nationalism from below suggests that the people participate in shaping a 
nation's identity. 
Internationalism: global integration through communities and organizations 
Scholars have also extended considerable effort defining theories of 
internationalism. Micheline Ishay argues that internationalism is “commonly 
perceived as an ideology that stresses universal justice and political rights regardless 
of national, ethnic, or religious origins....”191 She suggests that internationalism is “a 
process sui generis rather than a static concept, shaped and transformed by 
progressive thinkers and historical events.” For Ishay, “‘Progressive’ refers to… 
actions and ideas that challenge the status quo in pursuit of altruistic ends.”192 
Internationalism theory calls for leaders to act in ways that benefit other nations and 
international communities. As she explains, internationalism is “the historical record 
of progressive events and thoughts clustered around philosophical, political, and 
social perspectives.”193 It is an ideological commitment to a global community. Ishay 
argues that internationalism must be understood as “guidelines describing social 
relations between and within states. Internationalism assumes a dynamic between the 
global and the domestic social arrangement.”194 Because internationalism is an 
evolving process, those guidelines suggesting international relationships between 





Historically, internationalism has been used to justify colonization and empire 
building. The British, French, and Dutch efforts to control South Africa (1652-1795), 
the Spanish-American war (1898), the Eight-Nation Alliance putting down the Boxer 
Rebellion in China (1899-1901), and the U.S. war against the Philippines (1899-
1902), are all examples where leaders used internationalist arguments to validate 
colonization and extend empires. For instance, Senator Albert Beveridge called for 
America to continue its “march toward the commercial supremacy of the world” in 
his 1898 “March of the Flag” address, urging senators to look beyond their borders 
and colonize the Philippines.195 While internationalism was used to justify 
colonization, it has conversely been used as a framework for resisting such attacks on 
a global scale.   
Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson argued for a global 
system of government, shifting conceptions of internationalism from empire building 
to peacemaking, where global communities would come together to prevent future 
wars. Harold Josephson argues that Wilson tried to transform “the world from a 
warlike state of nature to an orderly global society governed by liberal norms.”196 His 
system proposed to make what N. Gordon Levin, Jr. calls a “more rational and 
orderly…world system of competing nation-states.”197 If such alliances succeeded, 
war would be prevented through the passage of international laws and enforced by an 
overarching association of nations. Such agreements would take the form of broad 
non-aggression pacts signed by associated members and non-members alike.198 The 
Wilsonian political vision included a democratic world government, diplomacy, trade, 





nations” to draw “covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of 
political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”199 
Wilson faced strong resistance at the time, and his proposal was defeated in the 
United States even though at its height, 58 other nations opted to join the League of 
Nations in its twenty-six year history (1920-1946).200  
Although Wilson’s call for a global government was unsuccessful in the short 
term, his internationalism model for global integration persisted.201 Other 
international organizations followed in the wake of the League of Nations. One such 
organization is the United Nations (UN). Founded after World War II, Article I of the 
UN Charter explains its purpose:  
Maintain international peace and security; develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination; achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 
common ends.202  
 
The UN would offer a global forum for public deliberation, conduct humanitarian 
relief efforts, and levy economic sanctions against nations violating these founding 
principles. Such actions follow Wilson’s internationalist vision. Similarly, the 
European Union’s (EU) charter expresses parallel goals: “The Union is founded on 
the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, democracy, equality, the rule of law 
and respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to 
minorities.”203 The EU often uses its comparatively strong currency, the Euro, as an 





benchmarks.204 These actions and founding documents suggest an international 
European identity defined by peace and global cooperation. 
While the UN and EU have used internationalism to focus on peaceful 
alternatives to war and to promote human rights, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s charter roots its genesis in a national security alliance. NATO was 
founded in 1949 to deter Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Founding NATO 
members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. The 
European states had good reason to fear Soviet expansion at the time, and an alliance 
made political sense. Its charter lays out NATO's mission in this way: “Parties agree 
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all.”205 All NATO members are committed to 
defending any NATO member with force.206 Thus, international organizations are 
founded on ideological commitments to internationalism, and those structures and 
ideologies have supported diverse international causes ranging from humanitarian 
missions to national security alliances. 
The tension between nationalism and internationalism  
The tension between nationalism and internationalism is central to this 
project.207 Ishay explains, “Nationalism is shaped in diametrical opposition to 
internationalism.”208 Acting in one’s own national interest often contradicts the will 
of the international community. For instance, Russian leaders framed the Russian 





UN, EU, and NATO condemned those same actions. Each instead defended 
Ukrainian sovereignty over Russian aggression.  
Many leaders standing on the world stage face a rhetorical challenge in 
navigating the ideological tension between nationalism and internationalism. In his 
examination of the relationship between China and the United States, Stephen 
Hartnett explains this tension: “when the U.S. government…ratcheted up the pressure 
on the Party, they did so in the name of a universalist version of human rights that 
supposedly transcends national boundaries and local customs…assuming to speak for 
norms that are self-evident and apolitical.”209 This internationalist rhetoric of human 
rights transcends borders of any one nation. Ideologies of nationalism rely on the 
implicit assumptions of national exceptionalism; yet, ideologies of internationalism 
assume that certain values, such as “human rights,” represent shared values for an 
alliance of nation-states. Nationalism places the focus on the one; internationalism 
places the focus on the many. Nationalism vests the power in the nation-state; 
internationalism rests the power in international alliance. Even when the sovereignty 
of the nation-state reigns, there is still a responsibility to protect the people of other 
nations, codified in international law.210 This responsibility, and its solidification in 
international communities, justifies both American and United Nations’ involvement 
in the Ukrainian crisis. The tension between theories of nationalism and 
internationalism thus must be negotiated by Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and 
international organizations in the propaganda battle over Ukrainian sovereignty. Myth 





Myth and memory 
Propaganda texts often reflect the tensions between nationalism and 
internationalism, and myths are integral features of such ideological contestations. 
David Sutton’s conception of mythos is illustrative. He argues that “under this 
umbrella term we will place a culture's corpus of sacred and secular narratives, the 
stories a people use to define themselves as separate from the rest of humanity.”211 
Myths are tremendous rhetorical resources because they are linked with ideology. 
Ben Halpern argues, "Myth and ideology are closely related conceptions.”212 McGee 
also suggests that myths and ideologies are connected: “If we are to describe the 
trick-of-the-mind which deludes us into believing that we ‘think’ with/through/for a 
‘society’ to which we ‘belong,’ we need a theoretical model which accounts for both 
“ideology” and “myth…”213 Therefore, myths can give voice to nationalism and 
internationalism ideologies. 
Myths are central components of national identities and international 
orientations. As Keith Cameron explains, “myth is inexorably linked with the concept 
of national identity.”214 This identity can create idealized visions of national 
character. Trevor Parry-Giles and Shawn J. Parry-Giles argue, “Texts of nationalism 
typically offer a mythic ideal of individual and collective identity.”215 Myths can 
therefore help bolster key aspects of national identity. However, in establishing 
collective identity, the myths of one nation often conflict with the myths of others. As 
Michael Brown explains, “…the tendency to breed conflicts is inherent to typical 
nationalist myths.”216 Ernst Cassirer agrees that the link between myths and 





theory was nothing less than a struggle over myths and their proper use.217 Myths thus 
can create collective identity that can function to unite nations and divide them as 
they simultaneously shape perceptions of global communities.  
Myths have been an essential tool for defining Ukrainian, American, and 
Russian post-Cold War identity. Tatiana Zhurzhenko explores Ukrainian efforts to 
create a unifying national myth after the Soviet Union’s collapse. She argues, “The 
process of nation-building is pursued by drawing the cultural heritage and traditions 
into the ideological struggle and creating historiographic myths concerning the 
origins, national character and destiny of the newly emerging nation.”218 Hiroaki 
Kuromiya delineates the Cossack myth of patriotic warriors as resisting foreign 
invaders. These warriors serve as “the core of modern Ukrainian nation building” for 
Presidents Kuchma and Kravchuk after the Cold War.219 American leaders have 
similarly relied on myths to articulate conceptions of national identity. The myth of 
American exceptionalism is a frequent trope in presidential discourse, linking a 
present moment to America’s pre-revolutionary founding aboard John Winthrop’s 
Arbella in 1630; Winthrop’s “Shining City on a Hill” comment about an exceptional 
destiny was used by President Reagan to showcase the superiority of American 
identity over its Cold War nemesis.220 Similarly, the Soviet myth of Stakanovite 
exceptionalism expressed by fiercely defending the Russian people is often used by 
Vladimir Putin to project an identity of strength. Putin’s “Outhouse” speech was in 
reaction to the ongoing Chechen war. He announced that all terrorists would die by 
Russian hands, even if troops found them in the outhouse. Putin’s speech thus 





Myths can also purvey internationalist visions. As Bruner argues, “the 
rhetorical dimension of national belonging remains a very powerful force 
in…international relations.”221 Internationalism myths often rely on past narratives of 
collective action to address shared problems. For example, President Putin called on 
the United States to obey international law and avoid unilateral intervention in Syria 
in his 2013 New York Times editorial. His argument used an international myth of 
allied American and Soviet forces collectively and heroically winning World War II: 
“We were also allies once, and defeated the Nazis together!” Because defeating Nazi 
Germany was a shared experience between multiple nations, the myth functioned to 
form a collective, international identity that encouraged leaders to think beyond their 
borders. Putin then uses this shared myth of communal victory and heroism to call for 
American support of international law in Syria: “The universal international 
organization — the United Nations — was then established to prevent such 
devastation from ever happening again.” Here, Putin championed internationalism by 
recalling the time in history where this shared alliance was forged to address 
international disputes; he used this mythic strategy to support his foreign policy 
agenda.222 Myths can serve as a crucial propaganda strategy for encouraging nation-
states to think and act more globally in addressing international problems.   
Ideologies of nationalism and internationalism also rely on public memories. 
Bruner argues that public memory is an essential tool in articulating national identity: 
Rather than assuming that national identity is a purely ‘natural’ process from 
the bottom up, or a purely manipulative process from the top down, national 
character is more appropriately conceptualized as a constant tension between 







The process of uncovering this tension is what Bruner calls “strategies of 
remembrance” or “politicized forms of public memory.”224 He explains, “national 
identities are created and transformed through…a wide variety of specific strategies 
for public memory.”225 Ideologies of internationalism are also promulgated through 
public memories in the attainment of propaganda aims. Bruner argues that through 
memory, “critics are better positioned to critique the strategies and their likely impact 
on state formation and international arrangements.”226 Thus, public memories 
represent integral components of nationalist and internationalist ideologies.  
 One such strategy of remembrance is commemoration through monuments. In 
studying public memorials, Carole Blair, Marsha Jepperson, and Enrico Pucci argue, 
such visual representations “select from history those events, individuals, places, and 
ideas that will be sacralized by a culture or a polity.”227 Schwartz explains that, 
“Commemoration lifts from an ordinary historical sequence those extraordinary 
events which embody our deepest and most fundamental values.”228 Such shared 
values serve to unite people behind common beliefs and assumptions, articulating 
notions of identity.229 For instance, public memorials of national heroes, such as those 
to Ukrainian poet Taras Shenchenko, can unite Ukrainians behind a shared national 
identity while remembering his accomplishments for the nation.230 Similarly, 
memorials can articulate international orientations and collective efforts to combat 
shared problems. For example, on September 11, 2006, the Russian Federation, 
through the Artist’s Foundation in St. Petersburg, donated a “Tear Drop Memorial” in 
New Jersey, across the Hudson River from the Statue of Liberty. The monument is 





“Monument to the struggle against world terrorism, artist Zurab Tesereteii.”231 This 
monument commemorates the 9/11 terrorist attacks, but it also frames terrorism as a 
problem of global significance demanding collective attention.232 Given the Russian 
Federation’s history of surviving its own violent terrorist attacks, this goal makes 
sense.233 Public memory is thus a force of nationalism and internationalism reflected 
in the propaganda 
 of world leaders. 
This study assumes that all nation-states use propaganda to promote their 
foreign policy goals on the international stage. In the process, nation-states 
promulgate their individual myths and memories to the international community as 
they simultaneously negotiate the myths and memories of internationalism. 
International organizations in response seek to broker peaceful compromises among 
estranged nations. The result is a war of words for the sovereignty of nation-states 
seeking to assert their power and recalibrate their national identity in a shifting global 
environment.  In battling over Ukraine sovereignty in a post-Cold War world, these 
clashes of nationalism and internationalism, myths and memories play out in the 
propaganda of Ukraine, Russia, the United States, and the international organizations.  
This study will examine this complex and contentious war of words. 
The present study 
This project questions the actual shift in 1989 between a period of Cold War 
and a period of post-Cold War, especially for former Soviet satellite regions like 
Ukraine. As countries like Ukraine try to assert their own sovereignty and identity in 





paradox over their identity and sovereignty in the nearly forty-five-year war. Even 
when a war ends, the animosities that animated the war do not dissipate. From a 
history of ideas perspective, the ideas that produced and then fueled the conflict do 
not burn out. This study shows how much of the Cold War and the ideas that defined 
it continue to define and confine the identity and sovereignty of nations struggling to 
gain independence and authority in the post-Cold War context. A battle thus 
continues to play out over the hearts and minds of these former Soviet states. 
Focusing on the ideas that continue to constitute Ukrainian identity and sovereignty 
helps challenge the existence of “post” when attached to this war—a second Cold 
War—that is still raging. This post-Cold War paradox serves as the umbrella paradox 
that frames all other paradoxes addressed in each of the subsequent chapters.  
Chapter 1 explores the paradox of Ukraine’s splintered identity divided by 
geography and ideology over a pro-Russian east vs. a pro-European west. Ukraine is 
European and Russian, east and west, and each identity is seemingly incompatible 
with the other. This tension between and among political elites and ordinary citizens 
restricts interpretations of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty as the nation struggles 
to articulate a unified nationalist discourse. Political leaders like Ukrainian President 
Petro Poroshenko deploy myths and memories to define Ukrainian nationalism. The 
intractable failure of Ukrainians to find a unifying interpretation of their sovereignty 
and identity owes a debt to the Cold War, resulting in the splintering of the nation’s 
borders. Such contestations have left Ukraine vulnerable to outside interference.  
Chapter 2 explores the paradox of the Russia’s construction of Ukrainian 





the USSR to Russia following the Cold War, it refused to allow Ukraine to 
reconstitute its own identity and sovereignty in a post-Cold War period. It restricted 
the sovereignty of Ukraine by taking back the land and identity that it controlled 
during the Cold War. This chapter examines the Russian Federation’s perspective on 
Ukrainian identity, with a focus on how Russian myths and memories of the Cold 
War influenced conceptions of Ukraine’s identity and sovereignty in a post-Cold War 
world. When Vladimir Putin returned to the presidency in 2012, he stepped back in 
time and reclaimed the ideas that defined the Cold War as a means to reclaim their 
past authority over Ukraine. This chapter also examines how Russian President 
Vladimir Putin navigated the commitments to internationalism in the post-Cold War 
and the tensions that exist over controversial national identities. The tensions between 
nationalism from above (from political leaders) and below (from ordinary citizens) 
help explain the Russian rhetoric. Because there were also Ukrainian citizens who 
identified as Russians, especially in Crimea and eastern regions of the country, issues 
of citizenship and borders complicate this nationalist discourse. This chapter isolates 
an “in-between nationalism” rhetoric originating from neither ordinary citizens nor 
political elites. This in-between nationalism is a national identity created by 
individuals who exist in a nationalist liminal space as neither internationally 
recognized political leaders nor as ordinary citizens. Crimean leader Sergey “Goblin” 
Aksyonov and anonymous Internet “troll army” commenters represent these groups 
who rely on the authenticity of organic social movements and the credibility and 
resources of political elites and institutions that contribute to meanings of identity. 





construction (from above and below) as non-state, and non-citizen, actors (from 
Russia rather than Ukraine) use unique perspectives to articulate visions of Ukrainian 
identity, fracturing the global order in Cold War II. 
Chapter 3 addresses two related paradoxes. First, the tensions between 
nationalism from above and below were also present in American rhetoric, but often, 
American leaders continued to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people as they 
adopted a rhetoric “from below” approach. Second, the United States defined 
Ukrainian identity in ways that were pro-western and resistant to the Russian 
Federation, while simultaneously championing popular sovereignty and self-
determination as paramount values for the Ukrainian people. This paradox of 
defending the will of the Ukrainian people while asserting the authority to direct 
those wishes in the direction of US foreign policy undermines western credibility. 
Ukraine again becomes a political football in the second Cold War that is deepening 
between the United States and Russia.  
Chapter 4 addresses the paradox of self-determination and non-intervention as 
international organizations (UN, EU, NATO) at once champion international 
collaborations while defending the sovereignty of member nations. Ukraine turned to 
the international community to legitimize its pro-European turn and condemn Russian 
actions in eastern Ukraine. But the paradox left Ukraine once again trapped as the 
United Nations failed to adjudicate Ukraine’s calls for legitimation or even forcefully 
condemn Russian actions within Ukrainian territory because of its commitment to 
non-intervention. This dispute showcases what can happen to self-determination and 





and identities. The result is a splintering that invites outside interference in an attempt 
to help these post-Soviet satellite regions define their national identity in ways that 
most advantage external actors concerned about their own political power.  
A notion of top-down nationalism is constructed as the United States, Russia, 
and international organizations attempt to determine Ukraine’s identity and usurp its 
sovereignty. Rogers Smith frames U.S. political influences (specifically theories of 
citizenship) in terms of a multiple traditions thesis. This chapter argues that 
sovereignty and identity represent two such traditions animating constructions of 
Ukrainian nationalism and the battle over self-determination. Such disputes in the 
international community explain why Ukraine struggles to gain sovereignty, fails to 
achieve consensus in their national identity, and continues to be vulnerable to external 
aggression and internal division.  
 In sum, this project examines a major battle over the sovereignty of the 
nation-state in a in an era of shifting political alliances and borders. It considers the 
recirculation of Cold War ideologies in this post-Cold War conflict, and how Ukraine 
hopes to navigate being caught in what Simon Tisdall calls “the new Cold War” 
between Russia and the United States.234 I explore how tensions between nationalism 
and internationalism are articulated and challenged throughout this new war of words 
that contests Ukrainian territory and national identity in a changing post-Cold War 
world.
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“Last week, residents of Kharkiv installed barricades around the statue of Lenin after 
fending off an attack by Euromaidan revolutionaries.”1 
 
“In December anti-government protesters toppled a statue of the Soviet state founder 
in Ukraine's capital Kiev. Earlier this month they replaced it with a golden toilet.”2 
 
Around 2:00 a.m. on February 23, 2014, a large crowd gathered on Strebko 
Square in Iljichiovsk, a Ukrainian town near Odessa. Some local residents had come 
to tear down and smash the monument to Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin in the city 
center, while others came to protect the monument from destruction. A fight broke 
out amongst the protesters, and several shots were fired. Two men were hospitalized, 
multiple arrests were made, and the 16-ton bronze statue of Lenin survived.3 Nineteen 
months later, the newly minted president, Petro Poroshenko, passed an initiative to 
purge Ukraine of Communist symbols. This meant that officials of Iljichiovsk—a 
town named after Vladimir Illyich Lenin himself—had to change its name to 
Chornomorsk (“Black Sea” in Ukrainian), and government representatives spent six 
hours taking down the Lenin monument for good. Local activist Oleh Gladchenko—
part of the February skirmish nearly two years earlier—remarked on the monument’s 
removal, “I wanted to show that we are a Ukrainian city and we are with Ukraine.”4 
The battle over Iljichiovsk’s Lenin statue is representative of overarching 
struggles to define Ukrainian nationalism in the post-Cold War period. Monuments to 
Soviet founder Vladimir Lenin are everywhere in the former Soviet Union. They 
serve as constant reminders of the legacies shaping contemporary identities in Russia 
and the former Soviet territories. The monuments were unacceptable for Ukrainians 





Russian usurpation. The removal of the statues also afforded Ukrainians a unique 
opportunity to define their own visions of national identity—protesters could tear 
down and symbolically demolish the oppression from their nation’s tumultuous past. 
From November 2013 until February 2014, over 100 of Ukraine’s 1,500 Lenin 
monuments were torn down by protesters and destroyed across Ukraine. During the 
same period, self-appointed “defenders of history”—groups of men armed with bats 
and helmets—guarded dozens of other Lenin statues to deter such attacks.5 For them, 
tearing down the monuments was an unacceptable usurpation of Ukraine’s history as 
a Soviet republic. This is a central paradox defining Ukrainian sovereignty and 
identity—how can Ukrainians adopt a pro-western orientation steeped in Ukrainian 
nationalism while remaining loyal to their Cold War alignment with Russia? It is 
impossible to satisfy both sides; either the monuments are smashed or they remain. 
Ukraine is either part of Europe or nestled in Russia’s sphere of influence.  
The symbolism of destroying Lenin’s statues says much about the role of 
average Ukrainians in attempting to wrestle their own vision of Ukrainian identity 
from the Russians. Ukrainians struggled to find a unified nationalist discourse that 
articulated their collective history and desired future, and this struggle was reflected 
in part by the protests to smash or protect these public monuments to the nation’s 
Soviet past. This chapter places attention on efforts like these monument protests to 
define Ukrainian nationalism in the current conflict over land and identity. The 
discourses studied in this chapter targeted, at least in part, international audiences as 
Ukrainians attempted to free themselves from Russian domination and align their 





policies purging Ukraine of communist symbols served the same ends—to redefine 
Ukrainian nationalism and to ensure that the international community lined up on the 
side of Ukrainian sovereignty. This chapter examines how Ukraine constituted its 
sovereignty during the 2013-2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and in the 
aftermath of the Russian invasion. Political leaders and ordinary people sought to 
define Ukrainian nationalism in ways centered on different interpretations of the 
USSR’s legacies, attempting to resolve the paradox of their identity in different ways. 
The rhetoric surrounding this legacy, and the ways it shaped Ukraine’s future, 
coalesced around several themes, including corruption, narratives of World War II, 
revolution, and Ukraine’s place in global communities.  
This chapter will show the ways that Ukrainian leaders used nationalism from 
above narratives to define their nation’s identity through Ukraine’s past and present 
heroes. Bruner argues that there are generally two helpful characterizations of 
nationalism—nationalism from above, characterized by political and social elites, and 
nationalism from below, expressed by the society’s marginalized groups and 
individuals.6 When political leaders construct nationalist discourses, they can have 
tremendous influence in defining a nation's identity.7 Leaders deployed myths and 
memories of Ukrainian nationalism to constitute the nation’s sovereignty by returning 
to remembrances of Cossack independence.8 More specifically, Ukrainian leaders 
deployed the memories surrounding the mythos of soldier Stepan Bandera’s heroism 
to stress the nation’s resistance to outside rule during the World War II era. Several 
major speeches delivered by President Poroshenko during the start of the conflict 





Poroshenko’s June 7, 2014 Inaugural address and his 2016 New Year address. 
Similarly, the 2015 series of Victory Day commercials and the official 
commemoration and public memorials for the “Heavenly Hundred” were steeped in 
Ukrainian heroism. These images connected remembrances of the “Great Patriotic 
War” and the nation’s defeat of Nazi Germany to the contemporary resistance against 
the Russian invasion. References to the painful memories of the Nazis during World 
War II also stood to unify the west against Russian aggression in Ukraine’s efforts to 
build support for their own national sovereignty.  
This chapter will also show the ways that Ukrainian nationalism from below 
was constituted by protesters in ways that negotiated the legacies of the Soviet Union 
and stressed Ukraine’s place in Europe and in international organizations (e.g., 
European Union). Nationalism from below represents efforts by marginalized 
members of society to resist dominant nationalist ideologies. Rather than elites 
generating a national ideal, groups of people form their own understanding of what a 
nationalist identity is and express that view rhetorically. As Bruner explains, 
“Intellectuals and the economically oppressed also seek to resurrect or maintain a 
particular culture when opposed by colonial forces.”9 The protesters also relied on the 
myths of the Cossack independence when arguing for an identity aligned with Europe 
that rejected the corrupt legacies and military occupation of the Soviet Union.10 The 
speeches from the Maidan protests also resisted Soviet allegiances by highlighting 
efforts to define Ukraine as part of Europe. How these events were depicted in 
Ukrainian media, including in the documentary “Winter on Fire” and the smashing of 





because these myths and memories circulated far and wide, they helped unite both 
international organizations and the west against the Russian invasion. 
This chapter will proceed in several stages while exploring the paradox of 
Ukraine’s inability to construct a post-Cold War identity. First, I explore the 
background of the conflict itself—the protests and counter-protests that defined these 
propaganda battles. Second, I discuss how the legacies of the Soviet Union, especially 
issues of corruption, the memory of World War II, and a desire for revolution, 
informed efforts to constitute Ukrainian identity. Third, I examine what these legacies 
suggest about Ukraine’s place in global communities. Ukrainian leaders and 
protesters used myths and memories to define Ukrainian sovereignty in ways 
reflecting a tension between nationalism and internationalism. 
Understanding the context of the Revolution of Dignity 
When the Soviet Union collapsed, the Ukrainian people were given an 
opportunity to articulate their own national identity for the first time in over half a 
century. Without the Soviet Union to submerge nationalist divisions, centuries-old 
conflicts reemerged and polarized the nation. Ukraine’s presidents often refused to 
commit to a consistent identity aligned with either a Russian or western vision.11 The 
paradox of Ukrainian sovereignty continued as these mixed messages left Ukrainian 
identity fluid in terms of the nation’s place in international communities. They were 
neither west nor east, and the political leaders were seemingly comfortable not 
choosing a side. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, there was much international 
concern regarding Ukraine’s stockpile of nuclear weapons, which were almost a third 





give up its nuclear weapons.13 To address this anxiety, the leaders of Ukraine, Russia, 
Great Britain, and the United States signed the Budapest Memorandum on December 
5, 1994 to provide Ukraine with security assurances in exchange for surrendering its 
nuclear weapons. Ukraine also agreed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of 
Nuclear Weapons (NPT) as a non-nuclear weapon state.14 Following this pro-western 
move, Ukraine and the Russian Federation signed a “Friendship Treaty” in 1997 and 
later reached an agreement on Russia’s continued use of the Black Sea Sevastopol 
Naval Base. The Ukrainian government reversed course again in 2002 when the 
Ukrainian leadership announced its decision to launch a formal bid to join the North 
Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO).15 The election of pro-western Viktor 
Yushenko following the 2004 Orange Revolution was reversed with the election of 
pro-Kremlin Viktor Yanykovich in 2010. In the over two-decades since its 
independence until the current crisis, Ukrainian leaders have been unwilling to define 
their nation’s identity in terms of international organizations.16  
This failure to articulate a unifying Ukrainian identity set the stage for the 
current crisis. President Yanykovich’s indecision on the question of Ukrainian 
identity and place in global communities brought nearly two decades of tensions to a 
head. In November 2013, his government backed out of a trade agreement with the 
European Union at the last minute, instead promising closer ties with the Russian 
Federation.17 The subsequent protests were called the Revolution of Dignity. Over 
800,000 pro-EU Maidan protesters in Kiev were met with arrests and violence from 
Yanykovich’s “Berkut” riot police. Yanykovich responded by forcing strict anti-





violence in almost 70 years as uniformed snipers fired at protesters, killing at least 88 
people.18 Yanykovich fled Ukraine soon after and a warrant was issued for his arrest 
for the crime of “mass murder.”19 Pro-western chocolate industrialist Petro 
Poroshenko was elected president soon after, promising EU membership within five 
years.20 In response, the Russian government backed a referendum in Crimea that saw 
the peninsula secede from Ukraine and officially join the Russian Federation. 
Simultaneously, the Russian government supplied separatists with weapons in eastern 
Ukraine who called for similar autonomy from Kiev. Ukrainian forces resisted 
Russian efforts to functionally annex the eastern territories; the two nations have been 
frozen in conflict ever since.  
Understanding the rhetoric of the Revolution of Dignity 
To make sense of these events and define their own identity and place in 
global communities, Ukrainians looked to the mythic heroes from their history. The 
myth of the heroic Ukrainian Cossack, defined by fierce independence and resistance 
to outside rule, characterized much of this rhetoric from the Revolution of Dignity. 
Sociologist Frank Sysyn explains, “The Cossacks and their legacy were at the center 
of political and cultural struggles in Ukraine that fundamentally determined the 
process of nation-building and state-building in modern Ukraine.”21  
When Ukrainian leaders and protesters refer to independence, they are often 
invoking the legacies of their Cossack ancestors. As Sysyn explains, “the essence of 
Ukrainian nationalism rested in the Cossacks.”22 This spirit of fierce resistance to 
foreign rule and a particular disdain for Russian occupation can be traced back to the 





against Tsarist rule, against Soviet rule, and ultimately against Russian rule. These 
myths from Ukrainian history are central tools in defining Ukrainian identity. For 
Ukrainians choosing a more European identity for their nation, these are central, 
defining myths that are not negotiable. Pro-Russian Ukrainians have a different and 
seemingly intractable set of myths rejected by half of the country and explored in the 
following section. The paradox of Ukrainian identity is reflected in their mythic 
contestations; one side’s heroes are the other side’s traitors. 
 The legacies of the Soviet Union informed the ways in which Ukrainian 
nationalism was defined in the current conflict. Three overarching themes emerged—
the corruption of the Soviet Union, narratives of World War II, and Ukraine’s place in 
global communities as a European nation. Ukrainian leaders and ordinary Ukrainians 
interacted with these themes, as nationalism from above and nationalism from below 
each articulated different visions of national identity. Understanding the ways in 
which Ukrainians constituted their own identity demands isolating both perspectives. 
The following section discusses how political leaders and ordinary people explored 
these themes during the current conflict.  
The legacies of the Soviet Union: corruption and the Great Patriotic War 
The Ukrainian paradoxical struggle to achieve a unifying national identity is 
perhaps best seen in the protests to smash or protect the public monuments to Soviet 
founder Vladimir Lenin. From November 2013 until February 2014, over 100 of 
Ukraine’s 1,500 Lenin monuments were torn down by protesters and destroyed 





armed with clubs—guarded several other Lenin monuments to prevent attacks on the 
statues.23  
Such images of the Lenin monuments being toppled and protected by 
protesters represent larger contested narratives defining Ukrainian identity. Vladimir 
Lenin’s legacy problematizes both sides of these protests. Lenin believed in the 
character of the Ukrainian people. Unlike Joseph Stalin, whose collectivization 
campaign killed 7.5 million Ukrainians in the forced famines of the early 1930s, 
Lenin thought the Tsars had treated Ukrainians especially unfairly during the Imperial 
Russia era, arguing that the Ukrainian people deserved relative autonomy and 
respect.24 In 1917, when articulating his vision for Ukraine’s role in the Soviet Union 
and its relationship with Russia, he stressed this need for Ukrainian autonomy: “No 
democrat can deny the Ukraine’s right to freely secede from Russia. This cannot be 
done without full recognition of the Ukraine’s rights, including the right to free 
secession.”25 It is thus ironic that Lenin himself would have presumably agreed with 
those tearing down his statues and disagreed with those protecting them. Examining 
these images allows for a more thorough explication of these deep cultural 
contradictions and contestations that are thoroughly immersed in national and 
regional history. Ukrainians literally fought each other over their public memory 
visually embodied in the Lenin monuments. These narratives as shown in the rhetoric 
of the protests reflect nationalist discourses in the current conflict and Ukraine’s 
intractable identity paradox.  
Over 100 Lenin monuments were toppled around Ukraine during the Maidan 





country. These pro- and anti-Lenin protests took place over a period of several weeks, 
in every region, involving thousands of people. This analysis does not attempt to 
explicate the events at every toppling or discuss each attempt by protesters to keep the 
Lenin monuments upright. Rather, after reviewing Russian and western mainstream 
media coverage of the events, I isolate representative examples of how the memorials 
were characterized by both sides before and during the protests. In this case, the 
nationalism from below vision of Ukrainian identity was far from unified. 
“Defenders of History”: “Lenin” as the Embodiment of Soviet “Great Patriotic 
War” Nostalgia   
The individuals defending the Lenin monuments frequently invoked the 
“Great Patriotic War” narrative as a rhetorical tool in constructing this myth of Soviet 
heroism. Lenin himself died 15 years before the outbreak of World War II, so 
understanding Soviet military history as embodied by Lenin is essential in exploring 
these identity constructions.  
There was no part of Soviet society that was not touched by the devastation of 
the fight against Nazi fascism. Soviet military commander Georgy Zhukov—the most 
decorated soldier in the history of the Soviet Union—explains in his memoirs what 
the Soviet victory, and the enormous loss of life it took to earn it, meant to the Soviet 
people:  
The Great Patriot War was a supreme armed clash between Socialism and 
Fascism. It was a nation-wide war against a pernicious class enemy who 
encroached upon what is dearest of all to all Soviet men and women—the 
gains of the Great October Socialist Revolution and the Soviet way of life. 
The Communist Party raised our country and the entire multinational Soviet 






In his 1956 “Secret Speech” at the twentieth Communist Party Conference, Soviet 
Premiere Nikita Khrushchev’s address took place over a decade after the war’s end. 
Khrushchev—a native Ukrainian—refers to these sacrifices with reverence: “After 
the conclusion of the Patriotic War, the Soviet nation stressed with pride the 
magnificent victories gained through great sacrifices and tremendous efforts.”27 This 
rhetoric suggests that Soviet citizens owe it to their twenty-six million fallen 
comrades to make sure their sacrifices were not in vain. Khrushchev argues that 
wavering attitudes on the same beliefs that their loved ones died defending dishonors 
their memory and sacrifice. Thus, “fascist” is the worst possible thing that someone in 
the former Soviet Union could be called.  
In light of these deeply painful cultural legacies of World War II, the next step 
for the monument defenders was to equate the statue’s attackers with fascist Nazis in 
constructing a “Lenin” narrative. Pro-Russian Ukrainians pursued this strategy by 
linking the Maidan protesters and monument-destroyers with Stepan Bandera. During 
World War II, Bandera—a Ukrainian nationalist from the far western regions of the 
country—joined forces with the Nazis in a scheme to achieve an independent 
Ukrainian state after the war. Bandera’s plan almost immediately backfired; Germany 
lost the “Great Patriotic War,” and Bandera was assassinated while living in exile in 
Germany in 1959, under the order of Premier Khrushchev.28 Protesters who see pro-
western Ukrainians as the enemy frequently invoke Bandera’s name when defending 
the monuments. 
Various examples illustrate this rhetorical strategy. For instance, Artem, a 35-





Kiev are Bandera-following Nazi collaborators.”29 When President Putin welcomed 
Crimeans into Russia, he announced that he was saving them from new Ukrainian 
leaders who are the “ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World 
War II.”30 Echoing these statements, Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov asked, 
“Why do we not hear statements of condemnation toward those who seize 
government buildings, attack and burn police officers, and voice racist and anti-
Semitic slogans?” Such a statement implied that the Maidan protesters were violent 
fascist Nazis.31 Thus, by protecting the monuments, the pro-Russian protesters are 
contributing to a longstanding rhetoric of anti-fascism that their construction of the 
“Lenin” narrative embodies. The Lenin myth honors the collective public memory of 
Soviet and Ukrainian losses during the Great Patriotic War through heroic narratives 
of their shared experience opposing Nazi Germany and fascist collaborators. Placing 
the Maidan protests in this narrative, the monument protectors are heroes, upholding a 
long-established national ethos of the former Soviet Union. 
A second strategy reflected nostalgia for the Soviet Union in defending the 
monuments. In this narrative, the monument protectors are heroes fighting for their 
history and for an accurate depiction of Ukraine’s collective memory. The followers 
of Bandera are Nazi fascist villains, but the monument defenders are proud heroes. 
This account from Russian media expresses this narrative: 
Two Ukrainians from the town of Iljichiovsk in the Odessa region of Ukraine 
were injured from traumatic weapons, trying to defend the statue of Lenin. At 
night of February 23, a large number of local residents gathered on Strebko 
Square. The people came to defend the monument to Vladimir Lenin from the 
opposition. At about two o’clock in the morning, a conflict sparked between 
two residents. A man, born in 1978, fired a traumatic weapon at two other 





case under article “Hooliganism” of the Criminal Code of Ukraine. Earlier, a 
statue of Lenin was demolished in Dnepropetrovsk on Sunday.32 
 
This story highlights many themes of the pro-monument Lenin narrative. Crowds of 
loyal citizens were defending Russian history, the “official” memory embodied in the 
Lenin monument, from hooligans, and they were heroically wounded in the exchange. 
Just like heroic Soviet troops had defended the Lenin myth’s overarching, uniting 
principles at Stalingrad seventy years before, the memorial defenders will risk their 
lives for these collective ideals. 
Similar narratives emerge from related clashes characterized in Russian 
media: “On Sunday, December 8th, the Ukrainian protesters demolished the 
monument to Lenin on Bessarabia Square in Kiev. The following day, the vandals 
damaged the statue of Lenin in Kotovsk, the Odessa region.”33 Here, the pro-western 
protesters are characterized as “vandals” who are acting outside the law and beyond 
the acceptable official public memory of Lenin. An additional account follows this 
narrative trend: “In Kharkiv, Ukraine’s second-biggest city, local residents have 
installed barricades around a statue of Lenin after fending off an attack by 
revolutionaries late last Saturday.”34 The pro-monument citizens are literally setting 
up barricades to defend themselves against fascist aggression, just like their Soviet 
ancestors did in Stalingrad, Leningrad, Moscow, and dozens of other battles during 
the Great Patriotic War.  
Pro-monument protesters argue that they are defending their proud Soviet 
history and the overarching ideals they glean from such narratives. As one Crimean 
explained from the barricades, “For the majority in western Ukraine, their heroes are 





from Stalingrad to Berlin.”35 This statement refers to the Soviet soldiers who fought 
in the siege of Stalingrad for over five months in a battle representing a key turning 
point in World War II, and the eventual triumph in Berlin over fascist Germany.36 For 
defenders of Soviet legacies, these events represent tremendous character-defining 
victories symbolizing triumph and identity. Thus, the heroes and villains in this 
narrative, and their connections to public memory, are well established in this pro-
monument Lenin narrative. The men and women fighting valiantly against the radical 
fascist Bandera followers are heroes who understand their part in the authentic and 
justifiable official public memory of the Great Patriotic War. Fighting against 
hooligans in defense of the monument is simply a natural extension of the Stalingrad 
barricades. Their protests thus represent efforts to define Ukrainian nationalism in 
ways embracing Soviet nostalgia. For them, the resistance against mass pro-European 
protests is akin to the Soviet army resisting the superior forces of Nazi Germany at 
Stalingrad. To allow the moments to be destroyed would be to abandon this history 
and a key part of their vision for Ukraine’s national identity. Ukraine was stuck; 
paradoxically, tearing down the monuments would enrage Ukrainians nostalgic for 
the Soviet Union and fond of this history, but leaving them up would infuriate the 
people opposed to those narratives for reasons explored next.  
Defenders of Ukraine: “Lenin” as the embodiment of Soviet corruption  
 While the pro-monument defenders centered their myth’s narrative ethos in 
the collective memory of World War II, the protesters smashing the Lenin statues 
grounded their account of Ukrainian public memory in the Yanykovich 





corruption. This resistance to corruption was reflected in nationalism from both above 
and below as political leaders and protesters sought to define Ukrainian identity in 
ways free from this Soviet legacy. A first rhetorical strategy of the anti-monument 
protesters was to link Lenin with the decadent corruption that caused catastrophic 
income stratification and terrible poverty after the Soviet Union’s collapse. 
Understanding this conception of the Lenin myth as a symbol of corruption requires 
an understanding of the economic legacy of the state Lenin founded in his pursuit of 
global socialism in 1922.  
In the former Soviet Union corruption was systemic and rampant to a degree 
difficult to describe. The “nomenklatura” system ensured that a very small number of 
elites controlled every major administrative position in the Soviet state, accumulating 
massive fortunes. Communist Party “bosses” in the fifteen Soviet Republics also had 
almost complete autonomy to amass enormous personal wealth in exchange for 
loyalty to Moscow.37 Meanwhile, almost everyone else lived in a state of comparative 
poverty when measured against western nations in terms of income, availability of 
products, and quality of goods.38 During the last few years of the regime, few 
products were available for most people to buy. When the Soviet Union finally 
collapsed, every state-owned business was immediately privatized, and the same 
individuals who profited during the last regime made sure that this wealth was 
funneled to members of their own elite class of individuals. Almost overnight, Russia, 
Ukraine, and other newly independent states saw a generation of hyper-wealthy 
“oligarchs” amass enormous fortunes while the working classes suffered multiple 





gap grew exponentially in this climate of corruption and gangster-style violence. The 
result was that after the fall of the Soviet Union, most Ukrainians struggled to make 
ends meet as luxury cars zoomed past in major cites like Kiev and Odessa. Corruption 
became a sad necessity of daily life, and Ukrainians grew to increasingly resent the 
oligarchs who were robbing their country and its people.40  
 In light of this exigence, Yanykovich was forced from power in February 
2014. His bodyguards also fled the country, leaving the recently deposed president’s 
house unguarded. As Ukraine’s President, Yanykovich had earned $100,000 Griven 
annually. This was enough to make him far richer than most Ukrainians, but not 
wealthy enough to explain his opulent 340-acre Mezhyhirya estate twelve miles 
outside of Kiev; for instance, his wood paneled staircases alone cost $200,000 
Griven. The house was a “monument to national corruption.”41 Protesters 
immediately compared Yanykovich’s home to the similarly abandoned mansions of 
deposed dictators Muammar Gaddafi and Saddam Hussein and to the enormous shoe 
collection of Imelda Marcos. As hundreds of Ukrainians made the trip from Kiev to 
his estate, media was flooded with images of how the oligarch-in-chief lived:  
Pet ostriches, gold-plated golf clubs, and an odd model horse standing in the 
garden: it is all there. A replica of a Spanish galleon bobs awkwardly in a 
man-made pond. It is too big for the pond, but large enough to apparently 
house Yanukovych's own private restaurant. On arrival, protesters found many 
of his papers burnt, leaving his personalized golf bag and the towels 
monogrammed with his initials in the toilets as the most obvious signs of his 
earlier presence.42 
 
The estate’s extravagance was the clearest evidence yet of the corruption that had 






The estate, half the size of Monaco, cost hundreds of millions of dollars to 
construct, much of it coming from embezzlement and corruption, and had 
long been in the protesters' sights. The average monthly salary for a Ukrainian 
citizen is around $275, so president Viktor Yanukovych's opulent lifestyle was 
a constant slap in the face that could not be ignored.43 
 
Thus, for those defining “Lenin” negatively, Yanykovich’s extravagant taxpayer-
funded mansion was a perfect symbol of the public memory of Soviet-era corruption. 
Moreover, now protesters had visual evidence connecting the sleazy exploitation of 
the Soviet Union with its ongoing legacy, which Ukrainians faced in the economic 
depression gripping the country. The protesters’ vision for Ukrainian nationalism—
one free from corruption, embracing a European economy and civil society that holds 
leaders accountable for their choices—now had a clear example of what they were 
fighting against. 
With narratives of Yanykovich’s corruption functioning as rhetorical 
resources linking Soviet-era corruption to the current regime, protesters leapt into 
action. Days after removing the central Lenin monument from a main square in Kiev, 
it was replaced with a replica of one of the most ridiculous alleged features from the 
Mezhyhirya estate: “Protestors in the Ukraine have installed a golden toilet on a 
plinth that was once the home of a statue of former Soviet leader Vladimir Lenin. A 
student group in Kiev placed the toilet there as a scathing commentary on allegations 
of corruption among government ministers.”44 Thus, the protesters define the Lenin 
myth through a narrative that would resonate with working-class Ukrainians: the 
Soviet Union should be remembered not with any fond nostalgia or proud defense of 
the motherland during the Great Patriotic War, but rather with the daily grind of 





Ukrainians. As the overarching symbol of the former Soviet Union, the Lenin myth 
functions as a synecdoche for all corruption and all poverty. In this narrative, tearing 
down Ukraine’s Lenin statues is therefore a heroic act of defiance on the part of the 
protesters, and the counter-protests defending the monuments only perpetuate a 
deeply flawed and corrupt bureaucracy in their version of Ukraine’s public memory. 
Once elected, Petro Poroshenko would make fighting corruption a top priority. 
He joined his people in similarly resisting this mythic legacy of Soviet corruption. For 
Poroshenko, this resistance, and a desire to create a fresh start for the Ukrainian 
people free of Soviet influence, became a key part of Ukrainian identity. In his 
inaugural address, he made this point clear:  
[We] must eliminate corruption for this end. We need a national anti-
corruption pact between the government and the people. It is simple: officials 
do not take and people do not give. We won’t be able to change the country 
unless we change ourselves, our attitude to our life and the life of the country. 
Each of us shares the responsibility for the fact that Ukraine has come to a 
crisis state. Someone considered it normal not to pay taxes. Someone lived 
high at the cost of the state budget. Someone voted and held rallies for money. 
Someone received undeserved benefits and awards. Together we destroyed the 
foundation of public trust, principles of law and social organization.45  
 
Here, Poroshenko calls for both government actors and ordinary Ukrainians to come 
together with the shared goal of eliminating corruption. While he indicts the 
patriotism and loyalty of his predecessor Yanykovich, Poroshenko also disparages the 
entire legacy of the Soviet Union. He calls on everyone in the nation to embrace this 
vision for Ukraine’s national identity free from corruption. Poroshenko’s anti-
corruption discourse, steeped in anti-Soviet themes, clearly resonated with many pro-





above and below. However, many in eastern Ukraine strongly rejected these 
narratives, leaving Ukrainian identity in a paradoxical flux.  
“The Great Patriot War” and the Ukrainian Identity 
The “defenders of history” who camped out around Lenin monuments were 
not the only Ukrainians to lay claim to the heroic narratives of World War II. Both 
during and after the revolution, government leaders and protesters deployed the myth 
of the “Great Patriotic War” to define Ukrainian identity. The pro-European faction 
argued that the revolution was following in the footsteps of heroic Cossacks fighting 
for Ukraine’s freedom, just as their grandparents had done when they fought fascist 
Germany decades earlier. For Ukrainians attempting to define their national identity, 
Cossack heroism and that of the Red Army soldiers, were fundamentally linked. 
During the Revolution of Dignity, protesters deployed this Cossack/Patriotic 
War myth. The Oscar-nominated documentary Winter on Fire chronicles the protests 
and features numerous interviews with ordinary Ukrainians who took to the 
barricades to define their national identity.46  One protester tells the camera, “I came 
here to defend my future, the future of my children, compatriots, and country.” The 
tone of such a statement echoes Soviet-era propaganda about the heroic purpose of 
the Soviet soldiers resisting German invaders. As Yankyovich’s crackdown worsened 
and the protesters were murdered by sniper fire, protesters’ descriptions of the 
Maidan conflict as a “battlefield” and a “war” became reality. The film depicts police 
firing onto protesters who protected themselves with shields, an overflowing medical 
tent of wounded protesters, and ordinary Ukrainians learning military tactics to resist 





conflict became clear. The heroic narratives of the Maidan protesters would only 
grow in reverence in the days and months following the revolution. 
The Ukrainian government further developed these heroic protestor narratives 
during the aftermath of the revolution. Just as Soviet-era heroes of the “Great 
Patriotic War” were revered every year during the May 8 Victory Day parades 
throughout Kiev, the Ukrainian government sought to honor the fallen 
revolutionaries. On the one-year anniversary of “Bloody Tuesday”—the worst day of 
the protest when over a hundred protesters were killed by sniper fire—Petro 
Poroshenko commemorated their sacrifice. Journalist Sarah Chappell explains: “The 
‘Rays of Light’ display beamed spotlights up from the ground at dozens of locations 
around Independence Square where the victims, known as the ‘Heavenly Hundred,’ 
lost their lives in February 2014.”47 Ukrainian leaders were commemorating the 
Revolution of Dignity the same way the “Great Patriotic War” was remembered 
during the Soviet era, drawing on this historic myth. The expression, “Glory to 
Ukraine! Glory to the Heroes” is common among politicians, revolutionaries, and 
ordinary Ukrainians. Honoring the heroism of fallen comrades in a struggle for 
freedom is simply a repurposing of a familiar Soviet-era trope. Moreover, these 
narratives blend Soviet-style hero glorification with Cossack-style resistance and 
hostility to foreign invaders. The combination is a uniquely Ukrainian tool for 
building national identity that likely resonates with Ukrainian audiences.  This 
resonance is reflected in the “Order of the Heavenly Hundred” given out by 
Poroshenko in the aftermath of the crisis. The award was given for “civil courage, 





service to the Ukrainian people during the Euromaidan-protests; as well as any events 
related to the protection of the independence, sovereignty and territorial integrity of 
Ukraine.”48 The Ukrainian government thus extended this narrative of heroism and 
sacrifice, creating a nationalism from above identity even after the conflict ended. 
This identity, however, was one paradoxically rejected by pro-Russian Ukrainians in 
the east; heroism and villainy characterized the same events. 
Once the war between the Ukrainian and Russian forces in eastern Ukraine 
began in earnest, the Ukrainian government again sought to link the current conflict 
with the legacies of World War II. Shortly before the 2015 Victory Day celebration, 
the Ukrainian government released two advertisements expressly linking the heroism 
of Ukrainian forces during the “Great Patriotic War” with the current conflict with 
Russia. Both commercials begin with the same English text on the screen:  
Propaganda of the Russian Federation is doing its best to rewrite the history of 
World War II and misappropriate Victory Day. Ukraine’s input to World War 
II was 8,000,000 lives, 2021 Heroes of the Soviet Union were Ukrainians, 10 
of 41 marshals were born in Ukraine. Ukraine honors the Memory of the 
Victory. This film is a tribute to our heroes.49 
 
One advertisement depicts an old man in an apartment filled with old model 
airplanes, presumably from the Soviet Air Force. He dresses in a military uniform 
festooned with numerous medals. The phone rings, and a young man in a military 
uniform on the other end remarks, “Hello grandpa! I want to congratulate you!” The 
older man replies, “My jacket is ironed, my orders are on me.” The grandson 
emotionally explains that he keeps one of his grandfather’s medals in his shirt pocket, 
over his heart. The camera then cuts to the grandfather putting on his military hat who 





waiting helicopter. The advertisement concludes with the phrase, “We remember. We 
admire. We will win.” Linking the “Great Patriotic War” with the current conflict 
allows the advertisement to utilize familiar public memories for a new purpose—
support for the Ukrainian army.  
The “Revolutionary” myth of Ukrainian nationalism  
 A third theme—the mythic Ukrainian revolutionary—emerged from the 
protests’ rhetoric. Both government leaders and ordinary citizens deploy this 
narrative, creating a nationalist identity from above and below. As mentioned, fierce 
resistance to outside rule defines the Cossack identity. The process of calling for a 
revolution to overthrow an occupying force, and then launching military campaigns to 
do so, are key tropes in the Ukrainian revolutionary narrative. Instrumental leaders 
throughout Ukraine’s history embraced the mantle of revolutionary. For instance, 
Stepan Bandera during and after World War II embraced a revolutionary ethos, as did 
Viktor Yushenko after tainted election results spurred the 2004 Orange Revolution. 
Petro Poroshenko attempted to take up this mantle in the aftermath of the Russian 
invasion. 
Eighteen months after the Revolution of Dignity, President Poroshenko struck 
a similarly defiant, revolutionary tone in articulating this vision for Ukraine’s identity 
in his 2016 New Year’s address. War with Russian-backed separatists in eastern 
Ukraine had left the Ukrainian president with a challenging rhetorical situation. He 
needed to both articulate resolve and determination and also express his European 
vision for Ukrainian nationalism, reminding Ukrainians why victory was essential. 





his commitment to Ukraine’s European national identity: “We withstood and saved 
the country. Not only older did we become, but also wiser and stronger. And what is 
the most important - we became more united as a Ukrainian nation.”50 Poroshenko 
paints a heroic picture of Ukraine’s soldiers for his citizens: “Let us first of all bow to 
glorious Ukrainian warriors for making today's holiday come true. To those who are 
currently not at the festive table, but in the cold winter trench. To those who are now 
standing with guns, not wine glasses. Glory to Heroes!” In Poroshenko’s vision, the 
Ukrainian military is fighting for everyone. Poroshenko thus extends the link from 
Cossacks to Red Army soldiers to Maidan revolutionaries to the current Ukrainian 
army. For Poroshenko, the current conflict is only the latest in a long string of 
revolutionary events for Ukrainians resisting outside rule, further developing the 
nationalist myth from above. But paradoxically, for pro-Russian Ukrainians, this 
latest revolution is only the latest in a string of Bandera-like rebellions terrorizing the 
population. 
This revolutionary spirit was extended in an additional attempt to link the 
current revolutionaries with historic ones. An additional advertisement on the 
anniversary of Victory Day depicts a grandmother, wearing a decorated uniform and 
flipping through photographs of her time as a nurse. Her granddaughter also calls; she 
is also a nurse, but in the current conflict. The granddaughter tells her “grannie,” 
“Thank you for what you have done. I am very proud of you!” The grandmother 
replies, “And me of you, too. Glory to the Heroes!” as her granddaughter rushes to 
provide medical care to a soldier in a hospital. This advertisement also concludes with 





links the Great Patriotic War with the current conflict, relying on historic narratives 
and heroic myths to define Ukrainian nationalism. However, in stressing the 
Ukrainian role in resisting Nazi occupation for the Soviet Union, this commercial 
coopts Soviet heroism in the name of Ukrainian revolution. This advertisement 
suggests that the current conflict with the Russian Federation is simply the natural 
extension of the war against fascist Germany, which was itself fought in the same 
vein as Cossack revolutions. And, like the Great Patriotic War, the outcome will be 
the same—Ukraine’s heroes will triumph over the foreign invaders. Thus, Ukraine’s 
government links Ukraine’s historic revolutions with the current effort to resist 
Russian influence and overthrow the corrupt legacies of the Soviet Union. Ordinary 
Ukrainians similarly fought in ways continuing the revolutionary nationalist spirit. 
The new revolution was waged in the same spirit as previous revolutions. 
 During the protests, ordinary Ukrainians explained why they were fighting. In 
the process, they connected Ukraine’s historic revolutions with the current campaign 
in constructing a nationalism-from-below identity. One remarks, “This is the 
Ukrainian revolution!” Another explains that he just wanted to “do something for the 
revolution” and that he and his revolutionary colleagues are “together ‘til the end!” 
These revolutionary expressions, and a willingness to sacrifice for the greater cause, 
similarly mirror the Soviet-era propaganda messages of the Great Patriotic War and 
Cossack efforts to resist foreign invaders. Like their Cossack and Red Army ancestors 
before them, the Ukrainian revolutionaries were willing to shed their blood for the 
cause of freedom, and in the name of their new revolutionary identity. The protesters 





sacrifice to the current conflict in order to define Ukrainian nationalism and identity 
from the streets of the capital. 
Ukraine’s future as a European nation: freedom and alliances 
 Two additional themes emerge from the discourse when exploring Ukraine’s 
place in global communities. The first is a desire for freedom and the second is an 
alliance between nations. These themes are related to overarching revolutionary 
themes seen throughout Ukraine’s history and its current conflict. The Cossacks, 
Stepan Bandera, and the Maidan revolutionaries were all fighting for the freedom and 
self-determination of the Ukrainian people. This meant freedom from foreign 
influence—and often from Russian occupation. But Ukrainian revolutions were not 
simply against foreign presence in their lands; they were also for a free and 
independent Ukrainian nationalism. Both leaders and ordinary citizens embraced this 
national identity, defining a vision of Ukrainian nationalism steeped in discourses of 
freedom. When calling for their freedom, Ukrainians also meant the freedom to be a 
part of an alliance of European nations. Like the social contract, Ukraine freely 
entered into such European agreements. While such alliances restricted some 
freedoms, the agreements also provided the security Ukraine needed, given Russia’s 
recent land grabs in Crimea and violent colonizing practices during the Cold War. 
These alliances would bolster Ukraine’s attempts to break free from Russian 
influence, and creating these European communities also became a goal for both 
leaders and ordinary citizens in the Revolution of Dignity. These goals alienated pro-
Russian individuals desiring a closer relationship with Russia, paradoxically fostering 





communities became steeped in nationalistic discourses of freedom and alliances 
from above and below. 
The protesters during the Revolution of Dignity made it clear that they were 
fighting to depose President Yankyovich and bring the country into Europe. In the 
Winter on Fire documentary, ordinary Ukrainians are shown taking to the streets, and 
eventually to the barricades, with the goal of European integration. One protester tells 
the camera, “We’re not afraid to die for freedom! We will win and Ukraine will be 
part of Europe.” A young woman proclaims, “The people came out because the 
government promised to make an agreement with the European Union. So we finally 
have steps to live as a European country, like a part of the civil world community.” 
These expressions of a desire to be part of Europe were echoed in the chants heard 
throughout the film. “Sign the [EU Association] Agreement!” and “Ukraine is part of 
Europe” chants are shown as the crowds swell to over a million people. Protesters 
also explain what a European identity means to them. One speaker tells a crowd, 
“There are two European values: freedom and human dignity.” For many protesters, 
these European values are linked with their desired future as a nation. One protester 
expresses her disgust with the Yanykovich government’s decision to move away from 
Europe thusly: “They stole our children’s future!” Another demonstrator similarly 
adds, “We dream a better future” while holding a sign reading, “Yanykovich: Sign 
[the EU Association Agreement] or Burn in Hell!” The protesters articulated a vision 
of Ukrainian identity grounded firmly in Europe and free from Russian influence. The 





one.  They were fighting for the freedom to be independent of Russian influence, and 
an alliance with European nations would codify this identity. 
The revolutionary events allowed Ukraine’s leaders to articulate a nationalist 
vision from above steeped in freedom from Russian influence and alignment with 
European nations. Yanykovich fled Kiev in the middle of the night on February 21, 
2014, as the protests shown in Winter on Fire calling for his arrest had reached a 
violent breaking point.51  Less than a month later, the people of Ukraine’s Crimean 
peninsula declared their independence from Ukraine and soon were officially annexed 
by the Russian Federation.52 In April, the Ukrainian military began clashing with pro-
Russian separatists in eastern Ukraine.53 At the same time, the Ukrainian economy 
continued its free-fall.54 Petro Poroshenko was elected Ukraine’s fifth President in 
June 2014 in light of these cascading disasters. He relied on nationalist myths and 
memories to address these exigencies and to highlight Ukraine’s place in global 
communities.   
Poroshenko used his inaugural address to construct a nationalism from above, 
connecting Ukraine’s historic and contemporary heroes with Europe. For Poroshenko, 
Ukraine’s historic, rightful place was in Europe. He explained, “The return of 
Ukraine to its natural, European state was dreamt of throughout many generations.”55 
Poroshenko’s vision for a European Ukraine was therefore defined by its past. 
Quoting nineteenth-century Ukrainian poet Ivano Franko, Poroshenko argues that 
Ukrainians are “a living light in the family of European peoples and active 
collaborators of European civilization.” Poroshenko further constructed Ukraine’s 





Drahomanov in suggesting that Ukrainians “Plant our feet and heart in Ukraine, and 
keep our heads in Europe.” For Poroshenko, Ukrainian identity has always been a 
European one. He argued: “Ukraine’s European choice is the heart of our national 
ideal. This is the choice our ancestors and oracles have made.” Here, Poroshenko 
echoes the themes of both Ukrainian freedom and his nation’s place in formal 
alliances with European nations. For Ukraine’s new post-revolution leaders, the most 
essential benefit to earning freedom from Russia was to embrace a European alliance. 
Poroshenko then connected these origins of Ukraine’s European identity to the 
contemporary revolution. Following a moment of silence, Poroshenko explained this 
link: “Entire generations of Ukrainian patriots fought for our independence, our 
freedom. The heroes of the Heaven’s Hundred fell for it. Ukrainian soldiers and 
peaceful civilians are dying for it. The victorious Revolution of Dignity did not only 
change the government. The country became different. The people became different. 
The time for irreversible positive changes has come.” For Poroshenko, the revolution 
was only the latest iteration of Ukraine’s centuries-long struggle for independence 
and a European identity. He argued: “All of Ukraine and all the Ukrainians in the 
world have united around the ideas of independence, freedom, dignity, legitimate 
state, European integration. The people have expressed their important opinion. 
During the revolutionary events. During the fight against aggression. During the 
elections. Now it is our turn, the government’s.” Poroshenko used his inaugural 
address to articulate his nationalist vision from the position of a national leader. In 
defending what he called “Ukraine’s European future,” Poroshenko explained this 





we are returning to it. Finally and irreversibly.” The events of the Revolution of 
Dignity were only the latest in a centuries-long battle for independence in 
Poroshenko’s vision of Ukrainian nationalism. This vision also showcased the 
paradox of Ukrainian identity as pro-Russian Ukrainians likely found Poroshenko’s 
violent rejection of Russian influence frightening. 
Poroshenko, perhaps fearing that his inaugural address would isolate those 
pro-Russian factions in the eastern regions of the country, argued that this European 
identity was not meant to exclude anyone. He addressed those in the far eastern 
regions directly:  
Our dear brothers and sisters, our compatriots! What will I bring as President 
to you, when I come in the nearest future? Peace. A project for the 
decentralization of government. The guarantee of free usage of the Russian 
language in your region. A firm intention not to divide Ukrainians into right 
and wrong. Respect for the specifics of the regions. The right of local 
communities to their own nuances in issues of historical memory, pantheon of 
heroes, religious traditions.  
 
Here, Poroshenko argued that as long as the direction for Ukraine was generally 
toward Europe, the eastern regions should feel welcome. In offering language 
concessions and pledging to allow a preservation of positive aspects of Russian 
history, Poroshenko suggests that all are welcome in the new, post-revolution, 
European Ukraine. This vision for Ukrainian independence is thus an inclusive one 
that allows for reintegration of disputed territories. Poroshenko’s nationalist narrative 
for his country is one of openness, as long as European integration is the eventual 
objective. But for Ukrainians who do not want European integration, instead desiring 
closer ties with Russia, these calls for openness fall short, alienating many in Eastern 





Poroshenko used his inaugural to articulate what Ukraine’s European identity 
meant to him in practice. For Poroshenko, being European meant that Ukraine needed 
local control of government and a strong economy. He explained:  
European experience tells us that the majority of power already has to be 
delegated from the center to the local government bodies. An even distribution 
of national riches is of utmost importance today. But before we distribute 
national fortune, we have to multiply it. Ukraine has everything it needs to 
provide the people with European welfare. And what should we do, in order to 
live freely, live in prosperity, live in peace and security? All of this is written 
in the agreement for political association and the free trade zone with the 
European Union.  
 
This economic growth and local control of government could only exist, Poroshenko 
argued, if the pro-European factions in his government worked together. He 
explained: “To realize our ambitious plans, we need not only peace and unity of the 
country, but also the consolidation of all patriotic, pro-Ukrainian, pro-European 
powers.” Poroshenko reminds his colleagues of Ukraine’s history of political 
infighting and the consequences of such lack of unity: “We have to constantly 
remember the harsh lessons of the national liberation battles of the 17-20s of the 
previous century. Back then our politicians were unable to unite and counter 
aggression together. The constant arguments and conflicts between leading 
Ukrainians caused the loss of our sovereignty.” This European identity was inclusive, 
reflective of Ukraine’s history, and incredibly fragile. From the beginning of 
Poroshenko’s time in office, this Ukrainian nationalism from above identity was 
grounded in Europe and dependent on the myths and memories of Ukraine’s past. 
 In his 2016 New Year’s Eve address, Poroshenko argued that the sacrifices of 
the current conflict with the Russian Federation had made Ukraine’s European dream 





several important decisions of the EU. Next year, the paper curtain between Ukraine 
and the European Union will fall down. Citizens of our state will have an opportunity 
to freely make business and tourist trips to Europe, as well as participate in the 
humanitarian exchange.” Here, a “paper curtain” mirrors the “Iron Curtain” 
separating the west and Soviet-occupied territories, including Ukraine, for much of 
the twentieth century. Poroshenko used his inaugural address to articulate Ukraine’s 
historical struggle toward Europe, and his New Year’s address extended this struggle 
to the current conflict. He argued that this journey would soon be coming to a 
triumphant end: “Dear Ukrainians! We are looking in the future with hope and 
optimism. Ukraine will be European, strong and unique! Happy New Year! Peace, 
happiness and prosperity to all of you! Glory to Ukraine!” This arc toward Europe, 
Poroshenko’s nationalism from above suggests, would soon be coming to a victorious 
end. For many eastern Ukrainians nostalgic for the Soviet Union, this is a frightening 
prospect, showcasing the paradox of Ukrainian identity. 
Visions of Ukrainian identity  
 This chapter explored how Ukraine constituted its sovereignty during the 
2013-2014 Ukrainian Revolution of Dignity and in the aftermath of the Russian 
invasion. Ukrainian leaders and ordinary citizens relied on myths and memories from 
Ukrainian history and the legacies of the Soviet Union to construct visions of 
Ukrainian nationalism. These assemblages of national identity featured themes of 
corruption and heroic narratives from the “Great Patriotic War” that informed desires 
for Ukraine’s place in global, and European, communities. Such narratives isolate a 





of global communities and institutions, while grappling with the legacies of their 
history. Ukraine’s identity and sovereignty were thus caught between Europe and 
Russia. By definition, neither side could get what they want, since both visions for 
Ukrainian nationalism were constructed in opposition to the other, and rooted in deep 
historical myths and memories stemming from the Cold War. This paradox of 
Ukrainian identity made it nearly impossible for a unifying nationalist discourse to 
emerge, leaving Ukraine open to foreign influence. The following chapter turns to 
how the Russian Federation attempts to dictate meanings of Ukrainian nationalism in 
the second Cold War. 
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With longtime ally Yanykovich gone, the Russian Federation leapt into action 
to undermine the new pro-Western government in Kiev.1 Putin defied international 
pressure by supporting separatists in eastern Ukraine and levying retaliatory 
economic sanctions against both Ukraine and the United States.2 The Russian army 
also facilitated a referendum in March 2014 in which Crimean citizens were asked if 
they favored “reunifying Crimea with Russia as a subject of the Russian Federation” 
or pursuing even greater autonomy from Kiev.3 Maintaining the nation’s status as a 
regionally autonomous republic of Ukraine was not an option offered to voters. Amid 
allegations of fraud, an overwhelming majority chose to reunify with Russia.4 Putin 
addressed the Crimean reunification in a joint session of the Russian Duma days later. 
Russian-backed separatists in eastern Ukraine would soon resist the authority of 
Kiev’s new pro-Western government, following Crimea’s lead. By Fall 2014, 
Ukrainian and Russian-supported forces were battling in earnest over the Donbass, 
with thousands killed or displaced in the months and years that followed.5 
This chapter explores the Russian Federation’s perspective of Ukrainian 
identity, examining how Russian myths and memories of the Cold War influenced 
conceptions of Ukraine’s identity and sovereignty in a post-Cold War world. It also 
examines how Russian leaders navigated its commitments to internationalism after 
the Cold War and the tensions that exist over controversial national identities and 
newly minted borders. The tensions between nationalism from above and below are 
also present in Russian rhetoric. Because there were also Ukrainian citizens who 





of citizenship and borders complicate this nationalist discourse. Several themes 
emerge from the rhetoric of Russian leadership (from above) and the articulations of 
identity from ordinary citizens adopting a Russian identity (from below). These 
themes include nostalgia for the former Soviet Union, a loyal defense of the Russian 
people, and resistance to perceived Western aggression. The nationalism from above 
discourses are first represented through several major speeches of Vladimir Putin 
surrounding the conflict. Second, the nationalism from below discourses include 
speeches of Russian citizens in Crimea and eastern Ukraine surrounding the Crimean 
referendum and the ongoing conflict. Speeches from ordinary citizens show the ways 
that constructions of national identity emerge organically in response to political 
exigencies.  
Finally, I explore several texts isolating an “in-between nationalism” rhetoric 
originating from neither ordinary citizens nor political elites. This in-between 
nationalism is a national identity created by individuals who exist in a nationalist 
liminal space as neither internationally recognized political leaders nor as ordinary 
citizens. These people simultaneously rely on the authenticity of organic social 
movements and the credibility and resources of political elites and institutions in 
constructing a post-Cold War identity.  
In-between nationalism is deployed in two ways in the Ukrainian crisis. First, 
it exists overtly in the political campaigns and speeches of Crimean leader Sergey 
“Goblin” Aksyonov, including his March 8, 2014 interview and his October 16 press 
conference the same year. He is not the officially recognized leader of Crimea in the 





He is a “from below” rhetor pretending to be a “from above” leader in constructing a 
vision of Crimean nationalism. Second, in-between nationalism exists covertly in the 
rhetoric of Russian Internet commenters (commonly referred to as the Kremlin’s 
“troll army”) in the comment sections of Western news coverage of the downing of 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17. These individuals are acting as agents of the Russian 
government, but pretending to be ordinary citizens who adopt a “from below” ethos. 
As a form of gray propaganda, the origin of these posts is not known—though 
multiple reports strongly suggest the “trolls” are employees of the Russian security 
services.6 Their rhetorical force is fostered by the appearance of their populist 
appeals. Yet, their link to the Russian government turns them into another arm of the 
Kremlin’s propaganda program because their “from above” propaganda masquerades 
as “from below” editorializing. Regardless of the posts’ origins, they allow for the 
circulation of pro-Russian ideas about Ukraine strategized by Russian leaders.  
A central paradox dominates the Russian rhetoric on Ukrainian sovereignty. 
The rhetoric of Russian leaders and those promulgating it rely on a Cold War identity 
in framing Russia’s sphere of influence. Russian leaders draw on myths and 
memories of the Cold War to define Ukrainian identity and sovereignty nearly twenty 
years after the Cold War ended, refusing to allow Ukraine to define itself in post-Cold 
War terms. Such Cold War memories deny Ukraine its right of self-determination in 
the post-Cold War era; by resurrecting these Cold War myths and memories, Russia 





Ukraine and the Soviet Union 
Russian leaders and ordinary citizens constructed a vision of Ukrainian 
identity steeped in the rich history between the two nations. Understanding this vision 
requires exploring these historical contestations. Ukraine voted to become one of the 
founding members of the Soviet Union in 1922 following a disputed election run by 
the Soviet leadership.7 Under Soviet rule, the Ukrainian people were only allowed 
one shared identity defined by an allegiance to the Soviet Union. Russian replaced 
Ukrainian as the national language and people were forbidden to practice their faith in 
the Ukrainian Orthodox Church.8 The forced collectivization of farmland from 1932-
1933 decimated the Ukrainian peasantry, as millions died fiercely defending their 
land and refusing to give up their crops.9 Stepan Bandera, a Ukrainian nationalist 
leader, joined the Nazis and fought against the Soviet Union during the “Great 
Patriotic War.”10 These Ukrainian nationalists and Bandera followers, united in the 
Ukrainian Insurgent Army (UIA), would continue to fiercely resist Soviet rule.11 Red 
Army forces eventually crushed them in the early 1950s.12 The failure to resist 
collectivization and the defeat of Bandera’s army left Ukrainians with little recourse 
but to surrender to Soviet rule. Their territory was occupied and their national identity 
was submerged for much of the Cold War.13 Things remained this way until, with the 
Soviet Union collapsing around them, ninety-two percent of Ukrainians voted for 
Independence on December 1, 1991.14  
When the Cold War officially came to an end on Christmas day, 1991, the 15 
Soviet republics broke away from Russia and formed independent states. This 





struggle on the part of the republics to resist Soviet rule; “Popular Front” movements 
sprung up in Latvia, Lithuania, and Estonia as early as 1988, and violent uprisings 
took place in Armenia, Uzbekistan, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan during the same time 
period.15 Protesters were seemingly emboldened by the Soviet Union’s inability to 
maintain control of its territories, and moves by Soviet leaders to offer increased 
regional autonomy to these republics only inflamed and enabled further resistance.16 
When the Soviet Union finally collapsed, these newer and older nations were forced 
to define their own territories that they now controlled. These territorial 
reconfigurations were often complicated and sometimes violent; the United Nations 
helped broker these transitions. After the Soviet Union’s collapse, the UN welcomed 
the newly formed Russian Federation and all former Soviet republics as member 
states. Sadly, efforts by the international community were often unsuccessful; 
conflicts between competing factions often broke out during these territorial and 
border shifts.17 
The tumultuous post-Cold War period saw fresh territorial divisions lead to 
brutal conflicts. Without overarching Soviet influence and military strength to put 
internal disputes to rest, civil and regional wars sprang up in Armenia and Azerbaijan, 
and the breakup of the former Yugoslavia witnessed brutal genocides in Croatia, 
Kosovo, and Serbia. Georgia experienced breakaway republics in Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia declare their independence, and Moldova was unable to contain the 
breakaway of the Transnistria region.18 The Russian Federation also endured an awful 
war. Chechens in the north Caucuses, believing they should also have been granted 





by Russian forces in two separate conflicts.19 Such contestations illustrate how the 
post-Cold War period was a battle between nation-states fought over territories and 
borders. Losing these territories represented a national humiliation for the leaders of 
the new Russian Federation not accustomed to such monumental defeats. With a loss 
of land came a loss of identity; Russia was no longer an empire, and the loss of 
national pride stung for Russian leaders and ordinary citizens. The Ukrainian crisis 
ten years later offered President Putin an opportunity to reclaim some part of Russia’s 
Cold War glory. 
The origins of the Russian vision for Ukrainian identity: Territory and identity   
At the 2015 United Nations General Assembly, President Putin was asked if 
America’s economic sanctions and diplomatic pressure had failed to isolate Russia 
from the international community.20 He replied, “It’s impossible to isolate Russia. To 
understand that, just look at the map.”21 Over a century earlier, Catherine the Great 
remarked, “I have no way to defend my borders but to extend them.”22 Although 
issued over one hundred years apart, these two statements reflect the centrality of land 
in defining Russian nationalism. The Cold War was shaped by moments of conflict 
reflected in physical battles over borders and land. One such important dispute over 
borders was Russia’s annexation of Crimea. Russia and Putin lay historical and moral 
claim to Crimea’s land, insisting that Crimea’s identity is aligned with Russian 
identity. Thus, Putin claims sovereignty over Crimea’s land and identity, and 






Immediately following the end of World War II, the Soviet Union—echoing 
Catherine the Great’s statement—aggressively pursued land expansion across much 
of Eastern Europe. Many of what would become the 15 Republics of the Soviet 
Union were occupied immediately after the end of the war in a massive Soviet land 
grab.23 Former British Prime Minister Winston Churchill observed in his 1946 
“Sinews of Peace” address that the Soviet Union had taken over much of Eastern 
Europe without firing a shot after the war: 
From Stettin in the Baltic to Trieste in the Adriatic, an iron curtain has 
descended across the Continent. Behind that line lie all the capitals of the 
ancient states of Central and Eastern Europe. Warsaw, Berlin, Prague, Vienna, 
Budapest, Belgrade, Bucharest, and Sofia, all these famous cities and the 
populations around them lie in what I must call the Soviet sphere, and all are 
subject in one form or another, not only to Soviet influence but to a very high 
and, in many cases, increasing measure of control from Moscow.24 
 
Churchill was not the only one to sound the alarm after the Soviet Union’s expansion. 
Deputy American Ambassador to the Soviet Union George Kennan wrote in his 1946 
“Long Telegram” that the Soviet land grab would only continue due to its engrained 
nationalist drive for expansion and “instinctive fear of the outside world.” Kennan 
argued in his anonymously-published “X” article that the Soviets must “be contained 
by the adroit and vigilant application of counterforce at a series of constantly shifting 
geographical and political points.”25 The notion of containment, reflecting Kennan’s 
warning, would inform American foreign policy toward the Soviet Union for the 
duration of the Cold War.  
These Western responses failed to grapple with how critical territorial 
expansion was to Soviet identity. The legacies of the tsars had instilled in Soviet 





territories. Unfortunately for the republics—and for Ukraine in particular—this meant 
their borders would be subsumed by the Soviet Union and their people would bend to 
Soviet rule or be destroyed. For Soviet leaders, territory and national identity were 
linked. These connections between borders and identity would become fundamental 
rhetorical resources in constructing Russian identity in a post-Cold War era. Thus, 
understanding Vladimir Putin’s strategies in his Crimea speech requires 
understanding the themes of Russian nationalism and how such conceptions are 
rooted in Cold War myths and memories of the Soviet Union. Those myths can be 
defined as nostalgia for the Soviet Union, a defense of the Russian people, and praise 
for their nation while simultaneously condemning the United States. All three myths 
would influence Russian conceptions of Ukrainian identity in the current conflict, 
highlighting the paradox of Russian conceptions of identity in Ukraine. In denying 
Ukraine the right to move beyond Soviet conceptions of identity and rejecting its 
territorial sovereignty, Ukraine is stripped as a sovereign nation of its right of self-
determination—to define its own identity and control its own borders without Soviet 
influence and domination. These constructs reinforce the historical hold that Russia 
had over Ukrainian identity and land.  
Themes of Russian nationalism: Nostalgia, defending the homeland, and resisting the 
West 
First, Russian nationalism was built on the legacy of World War II. As chapter 
one discussed, there was no part of Soviet society that was left untouched by the 
devastating fight against Nazi fascism. The loss of life was staggering, and stories of 





victory over Nazi fascism thus made the Soviet Union exceptional in its narrative.26 
Stories of the victory helped galvanize domestic support for the Soviet regime 
decades later, becoming a central component of Soviet national identity. In today’s 
post-Cold War world, this myth of the heroic defeat of the Nazis resonated similarly 
with a range of audiences. Hence, Russian leaders use this overarching nostalgia for 
the Soviet Union to characterize current debates. 
Second, Russian nationalism relied on a “New Soviet Man” commitment to 
defending the nation. This exceptionalist myth of the Soviet soldier and the heroic 
victory of the Great Patriotic War dovetailed with the Stakanovite myth, named after 
the story of Alexey Stakanov who represented an exalted example of an ideal Soviet 
male. These individuals were called “Stakanovites” because they embodied the 
strength of Stakanov who, as a miner, hauled a seemingly impossible amount of 
coal.27 These New Soviet Men also embodied loyalty and commitment to Soviet 
communist ideals, and they were exalted as a source of Russian pride.28 
Beyond Stakanov, Yuri Gagarin served as perhaps an even clearer exemplar 
of Soviet exceptionalism. The son of a bricklayer and milkmaid, he was born in 1934 
and grew up on a collective farm and in the humble peasant working class of the 
Soviet Union.29 Gagarin’s village and home were occupied by German troops for 
almost four years and his two older brothers were sent to a Nazi labor camp. While 
this experience was traumatizing, it would give him tremendous credibility later in 
life as someone who had suffered like so many other Russians had during the “Great 
Patriotic War.”30 Gagarin excelled as a Soviet fight pilot who was chosen to be the 





to Soviet communist principles as he was for his technical skills and his short stature 
(his short stature allowed him to fit into the tiny “Vostok” cockpit).31 One of his 
evaluators, a Soviet air force doctor, described him in this way: “Modest; high degree 
of intellectual development evident in Yuriy; fantastic memory; distinguishes himself 
from his colleagues by his sharp and far-ranging sense of attention to his 
surroundings; a well-developed imagination.”32 By all accounts, Gagarin was 
handsome, smart, humble, strong, loyal, hard working, and willing to articulate and 
defend his beliefs in the Soviet Union. Gagarin’s narrative was ideal for Soviet 
propaganda purposes as Russians were encouraged to feel great pride in the new 
Stakanovite.  
Gagarin's myth was strengthened because this son of collective farmers had 
survived Nazi occupation and gone to space, powered entirely, the myth suggested, 
by communism and ingenuity. Even before his shocking death in a plane crash at age 
34, Gagarin had become a mythic symbol of Soviet superiority and a testament to 
what the Russian people could achieve together in their commitment to Marxist-
Leninist principles.33 Gagarin thus embodied the values, beliefs, and assumptions of 
the Soviet people in the same manner as Alexei Stakanov. He was heralded as an 
exemplar of the ideal Soviet citizen for propaganda purposes.34 By emphasizing his 
commitment to Soviet communism and the collective good, Gagarin became an 
exemplar of the Stakanovite myth for the Soviet citizens to follow with pride.35 Such 
exemplars became symbols of national identity. True Soviet heroes were willing to 





exemplify these rhetorical features, then they could tap into tremendous resources in 
disseminating nationalist myths. 
A third theme of Russian nationalism was a willingness to defend the Soviet 
Union and attack the West. This theme played out in the 1959 “Kitchen Debate” 
between Nikita Khrushchev and Vice President Richard Nixon. Initially, this debate 
appeared to be a mismatch. Nixon was a champion high school and collegiate debater 
before becoming a respected lawyer and veteran politician with decades of experience 
arguing successfully.36 Conversely, Khrushchev completed a total of four years of 
education across his entire life and was much more accustomed to defending his 
nation through military strength than rhetorical skill.37 Nixon could not have asked 
for a better opportunity to argue for the superiority of American capitalism through 
this media spectacle given the debate’s setting in a model home. Moreover, such a 
drubbing could have embarrassed Khrushchev in front of the international media. 
Despite these disadvantages, Khrushchev did quite well during the kitchen 
debate, earning at worst a stalemate in the West’s press coverage of the event.38 When 
the exchange was shown on U.S. television, the reaction from most Americans was 
that the debate had been a draw.39 Nixon, with all his polished rhetorical skill and 
political debate experience, seemed overwhelmed by Khrushchev for much of the 
exchange as the Soviet leader delivered several memorable lines and spoke with 
impassioned conviction.40 From a Soviet perspective, the newspaper Pravda 
continued its attacks on how unrealistic the exposition was, arguing that the average 
worker could not possibly afford all the goods on display at the exhibit.41 Thus, 





loyal, strong, and dedicated to defending the Soviet Union against the United States, 
exemplifying this strand of Soviet nationalism. His willingness to articulate and 
defend the motherland, especially in front of Western aggression, marked a key 
component of this nationalist myth. Any leader willing to do so would earn the 
respect of the Russian people. 
The Soviet Union also promoted messages about the evils of the United States 
as a key part of its nationalism. As early as 1949, the Soviet Central Committee was 
explicit in their efforts to frame the United States as evil in Document #148:  
In print news media such as “Pravda,” “Izvestiya,” “Trud,” “Literaturnaya 
Gazeta,” “Komsomolskaya Gazeta,” “Bolshevik,” and others, organize 
systematic publications of materials, articles, and pamphlets, unmasking 
aggressive plans of American imperialism, inhumane character of social and 
political order of [the] US, debunking American propaganda “fables” about 
American “prosperity,” showcasing deep controversies in US economy, 
mendaciousness of bourgeois democracy, idiocy of modern-day American 
bourgeois culture and morals…. [The] following themes should provide the 
basis for anti-American propaganda in press, radio and movies: 
 
Capitalistic monopolies of U.S. - inspirators of aggression policy ... 
U.S.A. - stronghold of colonial enslavement and colonial wars ... 
Monopolies feed fascism on American soil ... 
Democracy in U.S. - hypocritical cover-up for absolute rule of Capital 
... 
Myth of high standards of living for all social classes in U.S. ... 
Myth of universal equality and equal opportunities for everyone in 
U.S. ... 
Degeneration of American culture ... 
Decay of cinematography in U.S. ... 
Corrupt American press ... 
Crime in U.S.A. ...42 
 
These nationalist myths were designed to undermine all aspects of American social 
and political life. Such strategies continued as the Soviet Union promoted the idea 
that America was a warmongering nation responsible for the tensions of the Cold 





enemy, the Soviet Union sought to undermine America's own claims of 
exceptionalism, creating a war of words over the rights to the exceptionalism mantle 
throughout the Cold War. This hostility to the West is a central underpinning of 
Russia’s efforts to dominate Ukraine and resist Ukrainian efforts to move west. In 
undermining American character, the Soviet Union’s leaders strengthened their own 
nation’s identity. Similarly, resisting Ukraine’s western push served Russia’s foreign 
policy goals of advancing its own political status on the world stage and undermining 
both Europe and the West.  
Russian conceptions of Ukrainian identity were thus framed in Cold War 
terms. The more Russian leaders grounded their arguments in Cold War-era themes, 
the more Ukrainian identity became defined by Soviet myths and memories. In 
grounding Ukrainian sovereignty and identity in the Cold War, Ukrainians would be 
prevented from defining their identity as anything other than as a part of Russia’s 
national orbit. Whereas the Russian Federation was no longer an empire, it 
nevertheless asserted its Cold War-era control over Ukrainian sovereignty and 
identity. The following section illustrates how such themes played out in the 
nationalism from above discourses informing the current Ukrainian crisis. Those 
discourses include President Putin’s Crimea speech and his address to the Novorossia 
Militia.  
Soviet nostalgia and the legacies of the Great Patriotic War 
 Two addresses from Vladimir Putin articulated a nationalism from above 
discourse. These include his March 18, 2014, speech following the annexation of 





Ukraine’s sovereignty, Putin denies it in both addresses and instead asserts Russia’s 
sovereignty over Crimea, pulling it into the Russian orbit. Putin thus defines Crimea 
as part of the Russian nation-state, framing the Crimean referendum as a rejection of 
Ukrainian sovereignty and an embrace of Russian identity. In supporting this political 
upheaval, Putin helps create the Crimean crisis itself and uses nationalist myths and 
memories to justify Russian actions. He initially deploys a nationalism from above 
myth by turning to the Soviet victory in World War II in his Crimea speech. The 
address was given to the Russian Duma shortly after the Crimean referendum. While 
the speech was targeted to Russian and Crimean audiences, it was widely circulated 
abroad to Western audiences that mostly condemned the takeover of Ukrainian 
territory.  
President Putin’s Crimea address is his framing of the crisis in historic terms 
from World War II. Putin’s speech represents this myth of winning the “Great 
Patriotic War” by glorifying the Soviet and Russian militaries and condemning 
Ukraine’s role in World War II. Putin first champions Crimea as a symbol of Russian 
military heroism. He argues, “The graves of Russian soldiers whose bravery brought 
Crimea into the Russian empire are also in Crimea.”43 For Putin, Crimea symbolizes 
“Russian military glory and outstanding valor.” Here, Putin links past military glories 
with the current Russian Naval base at the port of Sevastopol. Putin refuses to 
surrender Crimea to Ukraine, asking, “What would this have meant for Crimea and 
Sevastopol in the future? It would have meant that NATO’s navy would be right there 
in this city of Russia’s military glory!” For Putin, giving up Crimea would dishonor 





War II to the current political maneuvers in Crimea. The symbolism of World War II 
references was likely not lost of his Russian and Russian-identifying audiences in 
Crimea and throughout the Russian Federation. By absorbing Crimea, Russia was 
again asserting its regional dominance and resisting foreign influence in ways that 
mirrored the USSR’s World War II struggles against Nazi Germany. Putin again 
defines Ukrainian identity, and the Russian land grab of Crimea, in Cold War terms, 
hindering Ukraine’s move into Europe and away from Russia’s sphere of influence. 
Putin also condemns the new, pro-Western Ukrainian government by linking 
it with the Soviet Union’s “Great Patriotic War” foe, Nazi Germany. He describes 
these leaders as “nationalists, neo-Nazis, Russophobes and anti-Semites” who 
“continue to set the tone in Ukraine to this day.” Putin argues that the current leaders 
of Ukraine ousted Yanykovich in an unconstitutional coup akin to the hated World 
War II Ukrainian leader, Stepan Bandera: “Nevertheless, we can all clearly see the 
intentions of these ideological heirs of Bandera, Hitler’s accomplice during World 
War II.” These intentions, according to Putin, are to persecute Russian speakers and 
hurt ethnic Russians in Crimea and throughout Ukraine. In linking the current 
leadership to Nazis, Putin draws on the myths of Soviet heroism during World War II 
and the nationalist memory of their treasured victory over fascism. In deploying 
nationalism from above in this way, Putin extends nationalist myths and memories 
that challenge Ukrainian sovereignty. He subsumes Ukrainian nationalism under 
Russian nationalism. Putin’s use of Cold War myths and memories mirrors Russian 
history and bolsters Russia’s current military efforts to resist Ukraine’s turn toward 





in Cold War terms thus blocks Ukraine from forging a new identity free from Russian 
influence in a post-Cold War world. 
Defending the homeland as a “New Soviet Man” ideological exemplar 
Putin constructs himself as a hero of the Soviet Union defending the homeland 
by situating the reclaiming of Crimea as a necessary step in correcting an historic 
injustice. He argues that reclaiming Crimea is a matter of historic principle: 
“Everything in Crimea speaks of our shared history and pride. In people’s hearts and 
minds, Crimea has always been an inseparable part of Russia.” Putin suggests that 
incorporating Crimea into the Russian Federation is a point of national pride, and that 
his government has acted in ways reflecting—and constituting—the history and 
values of the Russian people.44 As a political leader, Putin was uniquely positioned to 
make these contributions to his nation’s identity.45 He argues that understanding the 
referendum demands understanding “what Russia and Crimea have always meant for 
each other.” For Putin, Russia was not annexing a part of Ukraine but righting an 
historic wrong. He explains what Crimea means to the Russian people, and what the 
loss of Crimea symbolized when the Soviet Union collapsed: 
And what about the Russian state? What about Russia? It humbly accepted the 
situation. This country was going through such hard times then that 
realistically it was incapable of protecting its interests. However, the people 
could not reconcile themselves to this outrageous historical injustice….Yes, 
we all knew this in our hearts and minds, but we had to proceed from the 
existing reality and build our good-neighborly relations with independent 
Ukraine on a new basis. 
 
Here, Putin argues that addressing the loss of Crimea is essential to fixing a long-
standing national humiliation. His unwavering commitment to this belief makes him a 





nationalism from above myth celebrates Russian commitments to Soviet legacies. 
Those legacies trump Ukraine’s assertions of territorial sovereignty. For Putin, 
Ukraine is still beholden to these Soviet legacies, despite Russia itself being a post-
Cold War power. 
Putin uses memories of the Soviet Union by championing a vision of 
Ukrainian identity nostalgic for a time when Crimea and Russia were one nation. 
Putin ignores Ukrainian sovereignty in the post-Cold War period and instead focuses 
on the emotional appeal of Soviet nostalgia rooted in the Cold War period. He 
explains, “All these years, citizens and many public figures came back to this issue, 
saying that Crimea is historically Russian land and Sevastopol is a Russian city.” 
Thus, Ukraine’s post-Cold War sovereignty is framed by Russia’s own memory of its 
Cold War rule over Ukraine. Again, Putin defines Ukrainian identity as merely 
another vehicle to express Russian nationalism. For him, Ukrainian identity is defined 
by Russian identity; the mere nostalgia for a Soviet-controlled nationalism trumps 
Ukraine’s struggle to define its independence from Russia.46 Much of this argument is 
built on ethno-nationalist ties between ethnic Russians and Crimean citizens; in 
mentioning their shared history and the connections between their “hearts and 
minds,” Putin argues that Russians and Crimeans have a shared ethnicity in addition 
to their shared history.47 These ethnic connections similarly disrupt Ukrainian 
assertions of sovereignty. For Putin, Russian history and blood paradoxically trump 
Ukrainian efforts to separate identities and borders; Ukrainian identity is merely a 






Putin’s view of Ukrainian identity in his Crimea speech is also reminiscent of 
Soviet Cold War communist commitments to international law. He argues that the 
Crimea referendum was “in full compliance with democratic procedures and 
international norms” and that “more than eighty-two percent of the electorate took 
part in the vote. Over ninety-six percent of them spoke out in favor of reuniting with 
Russia. These numbers speak for themselves.” In this case, Putin highlights the vote 
itself to showcase Russia’s commitment to international law and order. This was not 
an illegal occupation on the part of the Russian Federation; the Crimean people 
invited the Russian army, Putin reasons. Thus, in Putin’s narrative, the objections of 
Western nations to Russia’s actions in Ukraine fly in the face of international law and 
notions of order and justice. Putin defines Ukrainian identity as rejecting such 
international commitments. Soviet leaders throughout the Cold War similarly 
championed international order when it fit their interests. Such mythic memories are 
likely familiar and compelling for Putin’s Russian audiences at home, and Russian-
identifying audiences in Crimea. Putin thus constructs a mythic ideological purity in 
his defense of the homeland, constituting himself as an ideological exemplar of 
Russian nationalism for his people to admire and follow. Within this vision, 
Ukrainian identity is morally and legally subordinate to Russian ethno-nationalism. In 
attempting to link Ukrainian identity with these Cold War-era themes, Russia also 
reinforces its own identity to the same Cold War constructions, justifying its authority 
over Ukraine. 
Putin similarly constructed a myth of ideological purity in defense of the 





published on the official presidential website, and was directed at Russian-backed 
insurgents in eastern Ukraine. At the time, the Ukrainian and Russian forces were 
locked in a fierce struggle for territory in the Donbass region. Neither side seemed 
able to totally displace the other, as Ukrainians and Russians fought over territory 
they believed was rightfully theirs. While the stated audience of the address was the 
Russian insurgents, the address was certainly heard by both Ukrainian leaders in Kiev 
as well as Western leaders. In the speech, Putin constructs a moral rhetoric in support 
of his pro-Russian allies: “It is clear the militia has achieved a major success in 
intercepting Kiev’s military operation, which represents a grave danger to the 
population of Donbass and which has already led to the loss of many lives among 
peaceful residents.”48 In this narrative, the Russian side of the conflict is doing all it 
can to stop the loss of life in the region. He continues this ideological purity narrative 
by offering mercy while championing Russian military might: 
I call on the militia groups to open a humanitarian corridor for Ukrainian 
service members who have been surrounded, so as to avoid any needless loss 
of life, giving them the opportunity to leave the combat area unimpeded and 
reunite with their families, to return them to their mothers, wives, and 
children, and to quickly provide medical assistance to those who were injured 
in the course of the military operation. 49 
 
In this narrative, the Ukrainian forces are about to be destroyed by the overwhelming 
skill and ability of the Russian-backed armies. Putin claims Russian forces were 
routing the Ukrainian army, implying that Ukrainian leaders and those defending 
Ukrainian sovereignty were weak. This aligns with Putin’s overarching subordination 
of Ukrainian sovereignty under Russian nationalism. Any sovereignty and 
independence that Ukrainians can claw away from the Russian Federation is simply 





constrained by these Cold War-era orientations. The Russian Federation works to 
block any attempts by Ukraine to create a post-Cold War identity. 
Putin’s narrative suggests that the pro-Russian forces are both stronger and 
more moral than their Ukrainian counterparts that were responsible for numerous 
civilian deaths. He continues this mercy/strength narrative of Russian kindness and 
Ukrainian savagery: “For its part, the Russian side is ready and willing to provide 
humanitarian aid to the people of Donbass, who have been affected by this 
humanitarian catastrophe. I once again call on the Ukrainian authorities to 
immediately stop military actions…and resolve all problems via peaceful means.”50 
His narrative champions the nationalist myth of Russian moral and military 
superiority. The Russian-supporting people in eastern Ukraine are defending 
themselves, decisively winning the battle, and acting morally and with mercy all at 
the same time. Thus, those defending Ukrainian identity are not only losing, but are 
also morally bankrupt. For Putin, Ukrainian identity is simply a vehicle to assert 
Russian superiority in terms of international law, military might, and universal 
morality. The historic and ethnic ties between Russian and Crimean people only 
cement the moral foundation of Putin’s claim; Crimea helps Putin define Ukraine’s 
post-Cold War identity in Cold War terms. 
Praising the Russian Federation while condemning the West 
Putin praises Russia while condemning the West in his Crimea speech. He 
defines Ukrainian identity as morally bankrupt while strengthening his own nation’s 
assertions of nationalist exceptionalism. First, Putin champions the values and 





argues, “Crimea is a unique blend of different peoples’ cultures and traditions. This 
makes it similar to Russia as a whole, where not a single ethnic group has been lost 
over the centuries…retaining their own identity, traditions, languages, and faith.”51 
For Putin, the referendum highlights the beautiful polyglot pluralism of the Russian 
nation. In Putin’s narrative, the new Bandera-like government in Kiev threatens this 
linguistic and cultural diversity in Crimea. Speaking of the ethnic Russians living in 
Crimea, Putin exclaims, “Time and time again attempts were made to deprive 
Russians of their historical memory, even of their language and to subject them to 
forced assimilation…we could not abandon Crimea and its residents in distress. This 
would have been betrayal on our part.”52 Here, Putin suggests that the referendum is 
Russia’s heroic attempt to save an historic ally from cultural and linguistic 
assimilation at the hands of a tyrannical government.53 Such heroism narratives are an 
essential part of nationalism myth building. Building on Soviet nostalgia, Putin 
suggests that Russian resistances to Ukrainian tyranny are heroic and brave. These 
emotional connections link current Russian efforts with Soviet myths and heroism 
during World War II.54 The eastern Ukrainians resisting Kiev’s rule and Russian 
citizens share both blood and heroic narratives from the former Soviet Union. Putin 
suggests they are ethnically and mythically connected in ways that deny Ukraine’s 
right to a post-Cold War identity. In this sense, Russian post-Cold War identity is 
mired in a Cold War memory in which the USSR controlled the identity and the land 
of Ukraine. Such rhetoric shows a yearning for a nostalgic Soviet past of Russian 
dominance and control. The more Ukraine is linked to the Soviet Union, the more 





Putin argues that Russia is not taking over Crimea but rather saving it from 
foreign powers. Such arguments about resisting foreign powers were exactly the kind 
of rhetoric used by Soviet leaders to justify the occupation of the 15 republics 
throughout the Cold War, as the republics were being saved from Western 
intervention. The occupation of these territories, often by force, was framed as a 
battle between worldviews—Soviet socialism vs. Western capitalism. The moral 
superiority of the Soviet model constructed by Stalin, Khrushchev, Andropov, and 
other Soviet leaders made victory over evil Western capitalism a necessity.55 Putin’s 
rhetoric constructs a similar binary, echoing Cold War themes of superiority and the 
essential need for absolute victory against an evil foe. He defines Ukrainian identity 
in these terms, stressing Russian superiority. 
Putin condemns the West in his Crimea speech in ways reminiscent of Cold 
War rhetoric. In response to Western criticism, Putin asks, “What do we hear from 
our colleagues in Western Europe and North America? They say we are violating 
norms of international law. Firstly, it’s a good thing that they at least remember that 
there exists such a thing as international law—better late than never.”56 Here, Putin 
attacks perceived Western hypocrisy in military invasions in Iraq and Afghanistan 
that flew in the face of international organizations. Putin reasons that if the Crimea 
referendum violates international law, Western nations are far guiltier. He continues 
his condemnation of Western handwringing over the Crimean crisis by indicting 
American exceptionalism directly:  
Our western [sic] partners, led by the United States of America, prefer not to 
be guided by international law in their practical policies, but by the rule of the 
gun. They have come to believe in their exclusivity and exceptionalism, that 





They act as they please: here and there, they use force against sovereign 
states, building coalitions based on the principle, “If you are not with us, you 
are against us.” 
 
Putin’s strategy of strengthening his own nation’s political position by weakening his 
Western rivals is a familiar one. Throughout the Cold War, Soviet leaders attacked 
the United States for various foreign policies. Thus, in weakening Western credibility, 
Putin bolsters Russian nationalism. He therefore constructs a vision of Ukrainian 
identity that is weak, immoral, and villainous. Putin constructs a nationalism that is 
zero-sum; strengthening Russian regional standing weakens Ukrainian post-Cold War 
identity, and diminishing Ukrainian sovereignty bolsters Russian power. Both 
identities are subsumed under the memory of a Soviet identity.  
Nationalism from below: Protesters, Russia-friendly Crimeans, and finding an 
identity 
Following the “Revolution of Dignity” in Kiev, the people of Crimea 
struggled to define a unified identity to help them navigate the tensions between 
Ukraine and Russia. The Crimean government did not acknowledge the new pro-
Western direction the Ukrainian government had taken. In response, between four 
and five thousand Crimean Tatars and supporters of the Euromaidan-Crimea 
movement gathered in front of the Crimean Supreme Council to protest the Crimean 
parliament’s reluctance to recognize the new Ukrainian authorities.57 Protesters held 
Ukrainian and Crimean-Tatar national flags, chanting, “Ukraine!,” and the familiar 
Maidan chant, “Glory to Ukraine! Glory to Heroes!,” adding chants of “Crimea is not 
Russia!”58 Meanwhile, six or seven hundred supporters of pro-Russian organizations 





Crimean parliament, holding Russian flags.59 These clashes were often violent, as 
bottles, stones, and flags were thrown between the two camps. At least two people 
were killed, and thirty more were injured in these exchanges.60 These conflicts reveal 
a struggle of the Crimean people to define a national identity. Just as the Ukrainian 
people were not unified in their calls for European integration, the Crimean people 
were not in complete agreement about their desire to unite with Russia. For them, 
ethno-nationalism and a shared history with Russia were primary factors in shaping 
their pro-Russian identity, rejecting Kiev’s assertions of sovereignty over Crimean 
territory. The Crimean people’s identity would ultimately redefine their sovereignty 
itself, uniting the peninsula with the Russian Federation. This section explores the 
debates over Crimean identity and nationalism from below, with a focus on Crimean 
self-determination and nostalgia for the Soviet Union, and the legacies of World War 
II.  
The initial task of Crimean people was to unite internally. The head of the 
Crimean Tatar People, Refat Chubarov, called for protesters to go home peacefully in 
response to the clashes outside parliament. He explained that the Crimean people 
would not be divided by “provocations” and its people would decide the future of the 
region on their own: “We have gathered here to ensure that the Supreme Council [of 
Crimea] is no longer a center of destabilization. We may be different in our approach, 
but we are one in blood and in our love for Crimea. We are trying to find a common 
approach to building the future of Crimea.”61 Chubarov suggests that the Crimean 
people share an ethnic heritage that defines their identity, and supersedes larger 





leader Sergey Aksyonov echoed this call for a shared vision for Crimea: “All of us 
here are Crimeans. Let us remember that, above all. Crimea is our common home, 
and we must respect each other. We must together address the outside challenges…. 
Do not let political provocateurs start clashes on this square.”62 This internal unity of 
the Crimean people challenges Ukraine’s conception of its own sovereignty in a post-
Cold War world that includes Crimea. 
The key for Crimeans was the ability to decide their own fate, and not be 
governed by a foreign power against their will. Protesters and ordinary citizens 
defined their identity first and foremost as Crimean, and while that identity aligned 
more closely with Russia than Ukraine, self-determination was a primary concern. 
Their identity was defined by shared heritage, blood, and autonomy, each of which 
shaped Crimean sovereignty, moving it into Russia’s sphere of influence and shaping 
a post-Cold War identity for the peninsula that excluded Ukraine. 
Crimeans agreed that they should be able to decide their fate free from the 
influence of Kiev or Moscow and turned to the question of what that shared identity 
should be. The Crimean people frequently characterized their struggle to define their 
identity in terms reminiscent of World War II. Some held a nostalgic view of the 
Soviet Union. This identity was aligned with the Russian Federation. As protester 
Dmitry Kovalenko bluntly told The Guardian, “We need to unite with Russia.”63 For 
most protesters, Crimean identity was primarily Russian, and the Crimean capitol of 
Sevastopol exemplified this identity. As a protester named Anotoly explained, 
“Sevastopol is a Russian town and will always be a Russian town…we will never 





comment define their identity in pro-Russian terms, echoing themes from the Cold 
War that challenge Ukraine’s sphere of influence. Olga, a retiree who took to the 
streets to express her national identity, explained, “We are not like the Kievans, we 
will not give up. We hoped there wouldn't be a split in the country, but if a fully 
Bandera regime emerges in Kiev then we will be a part of Russia.” In referring to the 
Kiev government as a Bandera regime, this protester defines her national identity 
using the myths of Soviet struggles against Nazi Germany. Sergei Bochenko, a 
commander in a local militia group, put things more bluntly: “There’s not a chance in 
hell we’re going to accept the rule of that fascist scum.”65 Thus, the Crimean people 
used shared history and myths with Russia to articulate their pro-Russian identity. For 
them, identity defines their sovereignty, challenging their government’s western push. 
When they felt their history and national identity were no longer aligned, the Crimean 
people sought to realign with the Russian Federation. Their post-Cold War identity 
was thus defined by Soviet-era nostalgia, not by Ukraine’s pro-European track.  
By defining their national identity using the myths of World War II, the next 
logical step was to secede from Ukraine altogether. In response to Kiev’s increasingly 
Western identifications, self-defense militias were formed in Crimea, and protesters 
called for the Russian military to save them from Ukrainian domination. One 
protester exclaimed, “Putin and the Black Sea fleet should come. We are not scared of 
bloodshed!”66 Dmitry Sinichkin, president of the local branch of the Night Wolves 
motorbike group, claimed that “Bloodshed is inevitable,” and boasted that his 
Sevastopol had up to 200,000 people who could be counted on to defend their 





Cold War myths and memories nostalgic for the Soviet Union. This identity is 
expressed with seemingly heartfelt conviction, making Ukraine’s calls for European 
integration extremely difficult. The Russian intrusion in post-Cold War Ukraine has 
created extreme levels of chaos that has allowed middling, shadowy actors to play an 
oversized role in the conflict.  
In-between nationalism: Sergey Aksyonov and Crimean identity 
When the Soviet Union collapsed in 1991, Sergey Aksyonov went into 
business selling black market cigarettes in Crimea, Russia, Ukraine, and Moldova. He 
was an enforcer for a criminal syndicate called “Salem,” named for the cigarettes they 
imported.68 Aksyonov’s ability to collect on debts through intimidation and violence 
earned him the nickname “Goblin” in the Russian mob.69 After building his criminal 
empire, Aksyonov used the profits to make a fortune in local real estate during the 
1990s, and then went into local politics. Campaigning on reunification with Russia, 
his Russian Unity party got four percent of the vote in the 2010 Crimean 
parliamentary elections, earning three out of the chamber’s one hundred seats.70 
When the pro-Western revolution occurred in Kiev in 2014, Aksyonov leapt into 
action by storming the parliament building in Sevastopol before dawn; his men were 
armed with assault rifles and rocket launchers. According to eyewitnesses and local 
officials, the group moved swiftly to articulate a nationalist identity for the Crimean 
peninsula:  
They let the guards go, sealed the doors, and only allowed the lawmakers 
whom Aksyonov invited to enter the building…. Those who did arrive could 
hardly have voted their conscience while pro-Russian gunmen stood in the 
wings with rocket launchers. Both of the votes held that day were unanimous. 





experience as a local parliamentarian, as the new Prime Minister of Crimea. 
The second vote called for a referendum on the peninsula's secession from 
Ukraine.71 
 
Aksyonov’s position in the conflict represents a contested nationalist space, as his 
election, and the Crimean referendum and Russian reunification he later facilitated, is 
widely rejected by the international community, particularly the West. Aksyonov is 
neither Ukrainian nor Russian, neither ordinary citizen nor official country leader; his 
rhetoric represents an in-between nationalism articulating the hybridity of Ukrainian 
and Russian national identity. The ways in which Aksyonov exists in and navigates 
this nationalist liminal space can thus illuminate unique aspects of both Russian and 
Ukrainian identity that are only possible because of Russia’s meddling in the former 
Soviet satellite country. 
 Following the referendum reunifying Crimea and Ukraine, Aksyonov acted 
like the legitimate leader of the peninsula and attempted to construct a nationalist 
identity for the Crimean people by deploying Russian myths and memories. He gave 
an interview to a Russian television station in March, and a press conference in 
Moscow seven months later. Both television appearances were in Russian, though the 
intended audiences likely included Russian, Ukrainian, and Western leaders, as well 
as international audiences and the Crimean people.72 Aksyonov deploys similar 
themes in each appearance to those President Putin used in his speeches regarding the 
Ukrainian crisis, including nostalgia for the Soviet Union, a loyal defense of the 
homeland, and resistance to Western aggression. The similarities between 
Aksyonov’s rhetoric and that of the Russian leadership might suggest deliberate 





Ukrainian dynamic of Cossack independence resistant to outside rule; in this case, the 
new government in Kiev being the “outsider” to his Crimean identity. Aksyonov thus 
weaves together aspects of both Russian and Ukrainian nationalisms to articulate an 
identity that is from neither above nor below. This section explores his March 8, 
2014, interview and his October 16 press conference the same year. 
 First, Aksyonov expresses nostalgia for the Soviet Union. In his press 
conference, he argues that rejoining Russia corrects an historic injustice: “Crimea is 
united in its understanding that joining Russia is like returning home…these people 
physically and spiritually are Russians.” This theme echoes the argument made by 
President Putin about Crimea’s territorial origins and rightful place in Russian hands. 
A Crimean identity is a Russian one in this articulation of nationalism. Similarly, 
Aksyonov characterizes the process of wrestling control over Crimea from Ukrainian 
hands in terms reminiscent of the Great Patriot War. During his press conference, he 
characterizes his Crimean self-defense forces in heroic terms: “These are people that, 
when Crimea and Russia needed, showed courage, will, character, that without any 
reward, joined barricades, participated in the blocking of military forces, and as a 
result of their patriotism and actions showed that Crimea needs them.” For Aksyonov, 
the defense forces expelling Ukrainian authorities from his peninsula were patriots, 
akin to the Red Army soldiers who fought at Stalingrad to defend the homeland from 
fascist Germany. In discussing the military crisis in eastern Ukraine, Aksyonov 
added, “What militia is doing in Donetsk and Lugansk, I understand them. I support 





Aksyonov deploys the myths and memories of Soviet heroes challenging Ukrainian 
aggression.  
Aksyonov links the current government in Kiev with foreign invaders when 
constructing a Crimean identity. In his press conference, he suggests that “revolution 
of dignity” was actually an “armed coup in Kiev.” His depiction of the current state of 
the Ukrainian government is bleak. Aksyonov relies on memories of Stepan 
Bandera’s betrayal of the Soviet Union to make his case for the moral inequivalence 
of Kiev and Crimea: 
You see what’s happening in Ukraine. Authorities are not in charge there. 
Some folks in masks are deciding who can be and who cannot be, whom to 
throw into a dumpster. Maybe someone deserves to be thrown into a dumpster 
as a way of fighting corrupted officials, it might be proper as a social measure, 
but in terms of law and order, we are not allowing such things here in 
Russia…. Representatives of the right sector, some weird folks, who are 
wearing masks in front of police, there is no law and order today. Therefore, 
the revolution in Kiev was not a revolution but an armed coup. 
 
The members of the “Right Sector” political party are from far-western regions of 
Ukraine, the same that were the last to surrender to Soviet rule, and the first to join 
forces with fascist Germany during the Great Patriot War. In characterizing the entire 
government in Kiev as an armed coup by the descendants of Hitler’s allies, Aksyonov 
deploys a myth from World War II. His forces are thus the ideological ancestors of 
the Red Army heroically defending the homeland.  
Second, to expand on this myth, Aksyonov suggests his actions in Crimea are 
simply in service of homeland defense by amplifying the ideological purity trope. As 
a component of Russian nationalism, this trope relies on ideological purity and 
commitment to law and order. In his press conference, Aksyonov explains that his 





law-enforcement officers here, no-one [sic] will be demanding extortions, I guarantee 
security for all investors all over Crimean republic.” This rhetorical strategy 
constructs Aksyonov himself as an ideological exemplar embodying the strength and 
purity of his nationalist vision; he is a modern Yuri Gagarin. Despite his own 
background in organized crime, Aksyonov suggests that the days of being ruled by 
oligarchs and mafia dons in Crimea are now over, thanks to his—and Crimea’s—
commitment to law and order. Similarly, Aksyonov argues the Crimean overthrow of 
Ukrainian authorities was in full compliance with international law: “I consider them 
people who are legally defending their rights. If you lived in Ukraine and saw how 
Russians are treated there, you would have understood that they are actually fighting 
for their rights and freedoms, freedom of expression.” Aksyonov’s self-defense forces 
were fighting for their independence, akin to Cossacks resisting foreign invaders. He 
is both Russian and Ukrainian, embodying myths and memories of both national 
identities. Aksyonov thus embodies the hybridity of Crimean identity, constructing an 
in-between nationalism made possible by Russian interference in Ukraine’s attempts 
to unify as an independent nation-state in the aftermath of the Cold War. 
Third, Aksyonov calls for Crimea to resist Western aggression and praises the 
Russian Federation. His rhetoric adapts Cold War tropes of Western violence 
common in Soviet propaganda campaigns. Aksyonov speaks of the current war in 
eastern Ukraine during his press conference, arguing that the pro-Western Ukrainian 
leaders are genocidal monsters actively committing war crimes. “Killing of Russian 
speaking people is taking place,” he claims. “In my opinion, it is a genocide of 





bombed and Lugansk is under fire.” In Aksyonov’s narrative, the West is to blame for 
the brutal violence. He repeatedly characterizes the West and Ukraine’s government 
as the instigators and causes of the current crisis. In his interview, Aksyonov argues 
that the Crimean referendum is about human rights and self-determination:  
When I was speaking on TV I was saying that we respect the choice of those 
Ukrainians who want to be a part of Europe, I was personally saying that. It is 
their right and the right to stand up for their interests. We were not saying 
anything to people from Lvov or Ternopol when they kicked prosecutors, 
policemen out of their offices, the head of the local administration, we were 
not saying that we are going to mobilize our forces to go to Lvov and teach 
those living in Lvov how to live? We were saying that it was [our] right to 
make certain decisions, participate in discussions. 
 
In this version of events, Crimea is simply searching for its freedom, and the 
Western-backed government in Kiev is fighting to prevent that self-determination. 
This trope of praising the freedom to decide a national identity is similarly Ukrainian, 
echoing calls for Cossack independence resistant to outside rule. Yet, Aksyonov 
blends this trope with the Soviet-era rhetorical myth of resisting Western aggression, 
thus offering a new articulation of the dual nationalist identities. 
 Aksyonov similarly uses Cold War tropes of condemning Western media and 
propaganda messages while praising Russia. He argues in his press conference that 
Russia will support Crimea far better than Ukraine and the West ever did: “The funds 
allocated to support retired persons make up over 10 billion rubles until 2020, this is 
ten times the amount that Ukraine was planning to allocate during all these years.” 
Here, Aksyonov makes the case that Russian leadership has stepped in to save the 
Crimean people from the relative indifference of Western leaders and Kiev 
politicians. His explanation for why these dynamics are not understood by ordinary 





When you speak to Ukrainians that only watch TV channels that belong to 
Ukrainian oligarchs, they think that there is only military personnel, tanks and 
constant combat actions in Crimea with daily shootings. As soon as people 
visit the Republic, they see that everything is safe, moreover, everyone is 
happy that they have joined Russian Federation, that the spirits are still up 
high, the rating of our president, Vladimir Putin, makes up 93%. Is there any 
European president with such approval ratings? 
 
Aksyonov suggests that the biased Western media is to blame for the ignorance of 
Ukrainian citizens regarding the situation in eastern Ukraine, in Crimea, and in their 
own government. Praising Russia while condemning the West echoes Cold War 
strategies of Soviet identity building and tropes of Russian nationalism. Yet, 
Aksyonov frames his Crimean identity around self-determination and independence 
from foreign influence—decidedly Ukrainian characteristics. His discourse represents 
a hybridity of nationalism myths and memories in constructing a Crimean identity. 
He is a Cossack, struggling against outside rule, while also loyally embracing the 
legacy of the Soviet Union. In this apparent paradox, Aksyonov articulates a unique 
in-between nationalism by defining a uniquely Crimean identity separate from 
Ukraine. This is made possible by Russian efforts to short-circuit Ukraine’s attempts 
to articulate a post-Cold War identity. 
In-between nationalism and online comment trolls 
This debate over Ukraine’s identity was more than a war of words. Russian 
rebels in Ukraine had finally gone too far. On July 17, 2014, Malaysia Airlines Flight 
17 departed Amsterdam for Kuala Lumpur. Several hours after takeoff, the plane was 
shot down twenty-five miles from the Ukraine-Russia border, killing all 283 
passengers and fifteen crew on board.73 The loss of life was staggering. Eighty of the 





years old. Over twenty entire families were killed.74 Russian insurgents were obvious 
and immediate suspects because the crash took place in the Shakhtarsk Region of the 
Donbass in eastern Ukraine, and the rebels were known to possess Buk surface-to-air 
missiles in their territory.75 U.S. sources attributed the crash to a missile fired by 
Russian rebels based on sensors tracing the path of the missile, analysis of shrapnel 
patterns in the wreckage, and voice print analysis of separatists' conversations in 
which they claimed credit for the strike.76 Immediately after the crash, a post 
appeared on Russian social media attributed to Russian Colonel Igor Girkin, leader of 
the Donbass rebels, bragging about how his men had shot down a Ukrainian transport 
plane.77 Once it became clear they had shot down the commercial passenger jet 
instead, the post was taken down and the Russian agents emphatically denied any 
involvement. For the entire world, these events seemed clear: Russian agents had 
attempted to shoot down a Ukrainian plane and instead had murdered nearly 300 
innocent people. Russia’s support of insurgents in Ukraine directly led to the 
Malaysia Airlines disaster, only the latest in a long string of brutal war crimes 
perpetrated by the Russian Federation and its president, Vladimir Putin.  
 In comment sections around the Internet, however, the conclusions were much 
less clear. Commenters blamed the crash on Ukraine for not policing its own 
airspace.78 Others suggested the crash would not have happened without Western 
provocations. Still more suggested that Ukrainian President Poroshenko was a neo-
Nazi fascist who came to power through a coup, and who would enslave or 
exterminate eastern Ukrainians for speaking Russian unless President Putin 





Airlines crash is not isolated to this incident. Seemingly every time any Western 
media outlet runs a story covering Russia in any capacity, the comment sections 
quickly fill up with posts championing the Russian government or attacking Western 
positions. Recent reports seem to confirm what was long suspected: these posts 
represent a coordinated propaganda campaign on the part of the Russian government 
to manipulate public opinion. Several reports from former employees of these “troll 
farms” have documented how the Russian government hires hundreds of people to 
comment in online forums and defend Russian policies and insult Western leaders 
and positions.79 The term “troll army” is used in these reports to characterize the paid 
pro-Russian commenters.80  
These “trolls”—people who stubbornly take offensive or incendiary positions 
in online forums—act in service of the Russian intelligence agencies, and their posts 
represent a powerful propaganda weapon in the war of words over the battle to define 
Ukrainian nationalism.81 While Putin articulates nationalism from above narratives 
and myths in his speeches, these comments represent something new. They fall into a 
middle space between officially recognized narratives and the discourse of ordinary 
Russian citizens. Their source is obscured, but their messages nonetheless articulate 
visions of Russian nationalism worthy of examination because of their pervasiveness 
and their focus on undermining Ukrainian identity. These messages capture the Cold 
War paradox in which Russia ensnares Ukraine in Cold War memories that inhibit 
Ukraine’s ability to unify around a common identity in the post-Cold War period. 
 Understanding the Russian “troll army” as a burgeoning foreign policy 





function as a form of propaganda. I am not suggesting that a paid agent of the Russian 
intelligence service pens every single pro-Russian comment on the Internet; indeed, 
some Russian patriots ardently defend their nation and/or attack Western positions in 
online communities. In fact, Russian intelligence services are counting on the fact that 
audiences are unable to distinguish between the sincere commenters and paid trolls. 
Part of their rhetorical power is that they masquerade as narratives from below. Yet, 
these messages are really narratives from above voiced by people pretending to be 
voices from below. Thus, these trolls represent an in-between nationalism. This type 
of obscured propaganda—in which the source of the message is uncertain—
represents an important strategy of Russian foreign policy efforts to undermine 
Ukrainian identity.  
Exploring the rhetorical strategies of the Russian troll army first requires 
understanding the perspective of propaganda. These propaganda messages take shape 
in ad hoc online communities of Western news websites. The posts are not public 
speeches by official representatives of any government. Russia or any other state 
actor does not officially sanction them or claim responsibility for their content. 
Because they are comments on the Internet, they are situated in a transnational space 
that is grounded everywhere and nowhere, as readers have no way of knowing where 
other commenters come from or if their stated identity is genuine. Nonetheless, these 
pro-Russian comments make clear nationalist arguments that hold the promise of 
shaping public opinion. 
These propaganda messages are targeted to large numbers of people—





scale. Messages of this nature function best if they can reach a mass audience, 
strengthening the interests of their original source. The Internet is a particularly 
unique environment for propaganda messages because it can reach mass audiences in 
shaping public opinion. Audiences perusing comment sections on Internet news 
stories likely have strong views on the subject matter. As David Willcox argues in his 
discussion of the Internet during the Kosovo War, “The Internet offered a haven for 
dissenting voices, a forum for non-mainstream opinion, and an ideological challenge 
to state-influenced traditional media.”82 The Internet therefore functions as a site for 
alternative opinions. Online news consumers and commenters are thus engaged 
communities whose members can shape public opinion more broadly. Influencing 
these audiences by either reinforcing institutional propaganda or weakening 
oppositional positions is an essential part of a transnational propaganda campaign—
especially one that involves trolls. 
 The troll army uses propaganda to bolster the expansion of Russian borders 
and the usurpation of Ukrainian territory by targeting consumers of Western news. 
These campaigns represent obscured propaganda that re-envisions the borders of the 
Russian and Ukrainian nation-states by undermining Ukrainian calls for Western 
intervention and justifying Russian aggression. This propaganda marshals the 
rhetorical power of nationalism from-below messages while actually representing the 
identity constructions of from-above Russian officials, thriving in a space of in-
between nationalism. I turn to the Malaysia Airlines crash as a case study to examine 





usurpation over Ukrainian territory in an expansive yet “obscured” propaganda 
campaign.   
“Do we think the CIA can't hack twitter accounts?” The Russian troll army in action 
This analysis examines the comment section of “Missile destroys Malaysia 
Airlines plane over Ukraine, killing 298 people,” an article from The Guardian 
published online the day of the crash.83 The Guardian is a British newspaper with a 
thriving online community that routinely debates global events in the comment 
sections of its online stories.84 In this case, that audience appears to be Western 
consumers of news commenting on the ongoing Russian-Ukrainian conflict. Its 
stories are written in English, suggesting a Western readership. This article reflects 
such participation from audiences as the piece was shared 14,000 times on social 
media and features 2,192 comments. Consumers of these messages were also 
presumably familiar with the Russian government’s annexation of Crimea and the 
Ukrainian election of Petro Poroshenko following the violent protests of former 
President Yanykovich. In other words, these audiences were likely well-informed and 
frequent consumers of news living in English-speaking Western countries.  
Comments on this article were made anonymously, as The Guardian does not 
require any genuine authentication for posting. While other online forums allow 
comments to be made only by users logged in with native or third-party social media 
accounts, Guardian commenters invent personalized handles and comment on 
multiple stories anonymously, or create single-use “burner” accounts with nothing 
more than an email address. Reports from Russian “troll farms” suggest that the pro-





fake accounts to make them seem more authentic.85 This requires posting many 
comments on other stories unrelated to Russia so that a cursory search through a 
handle’s posts will make the commenter seem like an actual person and not an 
obvious employee of Russian intelligence agencies. Taken together, the manufactured 
credibility of a post history and the anonymity of fake names further reinforce the 
invisibility of this propaganda. With each obfuscating step, audiences are less likely 
to adequately discern legitimate posters from paid troll commenters.  
These propaganda campaigns are thus collectively obvious and individually 
obscured. However, sometimes the best efforts to obscure the message source fails, 
and the trolls are too obvious in their messages, as posters are called out by fellow 
commenters. For instance, commenter DaveHodge waded into the discussion about 
Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 by saying, “Looks as though someone in Ukraine thought 
they were taking out a Russian passenger plane. Oops! Let's try to blame it on the 
rebels!!! Luckily enough of the rebels have secured the site and retrieved the black 
box so an impartial investigation can take place.”86 Several commenters immediately 
called the authenticity of this post into question. KingcnutCase replied, “Propaganda 
i’d [sic] say,” and several others suggested that Dave was not the commenter’s real 
name.87 A user who stated their name as David Watkin posted, “‘Dave.’ Yeah, of 
course you are,” while user Malkatrinho replied, “Good effort, ‘Dave.’” 88 However, 
even in the most obvious pro-Russian cases like this, some readers could not tell if 
this poster was genuine. As commenter AnaGram2 expressed, “You’re either a troll 
or incredibly stupid.”89 Being unable to differentiate between trolls and actual, 





reinforcing that the source is obscured. This obfuscation similarly makes it 
challenging for Ukrainians who genuinely want a post-Cold War identity to gain a 
foothold in their communities in English-speaking forums in Western media, as their 
legitimate posts are drowned out by an avalanche of fake posters. 
In the comment sections of this article, three basic themes become apparent, 
each undermining Ukrainian identity. First, some commenters are incredulous that the 
Russian rebels are involved, demanding that the international community withhold 
judgment until a full and impartial investigation into the crash is conducted. This 
mirrors the Russian nationalism from above theme of defending the homeland 
through ideological purity that Putin deployed in his address. For instance, 
commenter Stephan Clark argues, “I think we need to wait for more evidence on who 
exactly is behind this. I don't know and I think not many people do at the moment.”90 
Similarly, commenter girondistnyc exclaims, “Nobody knows. People shouldn't jump 
to conclusions.” 91 Commenter Exodus20 argues, “There are NO trustworthy source 
[sic] of information and data because all sources can be and probably have already 
been compromised.”92 This block of commenters suggests that no blame can be 
placed on anyone, much less on the Russian government, because it is either too soon 
after the crash to know for certain, or because the media itself cannot be trusted. Such 
propaganda characterizing all media as untrustworthy strengthens the Russian 
government’s position. Not trusting the press means no responsibility can be assigned 
to anyone, and the guilty parties can go unpunished. These messages therefore 
absolve Russia of responsibility for the attack, and blame Ukraine and the West for 





A second group of commenters blame “Western provocations” for the crash, a 
similar argument to Putin’s “resistance to the West” theme common within his 
nationalist narratives. Here, Ukrainians were the villains of this story and reckless 
assertions of Ukrainian sovereignty were to blame for the disaster. These commenters 
have no reservations about rushing to such judgment, but instead of blaming Russia 
for the downed aircraft, they blame Western nations. Commenter nfnfnf asks, “Do we 
think the CIA can't hack peoples twitter [sic] accounts?”93 in response to posts about 
Russian rebels supposedly bragging on social media about shooting down what they 
thought was a Ukrainian transport plane. This conspiracy theory suggests that the 
U.S. intelligence agencies shot down the jet and framed the Russian rebels to marshal 
public support for backing President Poroshenko. Commenter HiImTroyMcCLure 
makes this anti-Western argument even more explicitly: “The EU has been 
wrecklessly [sic] provocative in supporting the overthrow of Yanukovych [sic] just 
because he was pro Russian. Even though he was democratically elected. The EU 
doesn't want to be friends with Russia, it wants to dominate it.”94 In this narrative, the 
focus is on the ousting of former President Yanyovich months earlier, not the downed 
passenger jet. The European Union is the real aggressor and hegemon, not the 
Russian Federation. This argument suggests that the plane would not have been shot 
down if the West had not provoked Russia. Western nations are scrutinized and 
Russia is spared in this propaganda.  
A third group of commenters blamed the Ukrainian government for the crash, 
similarly mirroring Putin’s nationalism from above narrative of Western aggression. 





murders. This narrative suggests that letting the plane fly over the Donbass region 
where conflicts were ongoing was a terrible mistake on the part of the Ukrainian 
government. For instance, commenter DmitryBooing asks, “So authorities are not to 
blame for letting civil planes fly above the territory where jets and helicopters are 
used in a war and are being shot down every two or three days?”95 This question 
suggests that these events would have been avoided if only the Ukrainians had ceded 
control of their own airspace to a rebel group they did not recognize as legitimate. 
Echoing these sentiments, commenter Marko Raos exclaims, “It's called ‘war’ you 
know. That aircraft had absolutely no business there.”96 Moreover, Marko Raos 
implies that Malaysia Airlines itself was to blame for taking such a dangerous flight 
path. In other words, in this line of propaganda reasoning, all responsibility for the 
deaths of 298 people should fall on any actor except the Russian government and the 
rebels they support. This strengthens the political position of the Russian government 
and weakens its geopolitical rivals. Ukraine’s dangerous actions justify its return to 
Russia’s sphere of influence. 
In these narratives, Russian nationalism suggests that the ongoing invasion of 
Ukraine is correcting an historic injustice of long-standing Western provocations in 
the region. The reliance on Cold War memories reflects a defiant vision of Russian 
nationalism standing up to the West. In a recent documentary about his nation’s 2014 
annexation of Crimea, President Putin argued, “It’s because this has elements of 
historical justice. I believe we did the right thing and I don’t regret anything. We have 
witnessed such attempts during Russia’s entire history, dating back to tsarist times. 





centuries. There is nothing new.”97 Whether these individuals supported these 
messages out of genuine patriotism or because it was their job is simply not known.98 
President Putin and his rebels in Ukraine constituted Ukraine’s identity in Cold War 
terms, which returned the country to the power and control of the Russians who were 
bent on retaking at least some of its territory.  
As a site of this obscured propaganda, the Internet complicates the role of 
public opinion in global conflicts. This analysis suggests that obscured propaganda 
can target a diversity of audiences anywhere in the world at any time.99 This 
represents a stark shift from previous propaganda battles. During the Cold War, 
Western intelligence services sometimes had to resort to balloons to literally airlift 
their propaganda messages into the Soviet sphere of influence. Now, the Russian troll 
army’s obscured propaganda campaign shows how the Internet allows governments 
and those acting on their behalf to target the opposition’s audiences with ease. While 
the Internet can be blocked or thoroughly restricted, Western commitments to free 
speech have allowed relatively unfettered access to news websites, further enabling 
this obscured propaganda campaign.100  
This troll army campaign seeks to undermine any popular support shown to 
Ukraine's foreign policy crisis by American politicians seeking to justify assistance. 
These online commenters do not need to convince Western audiences to support the 
Russian Federation’s actions in Ukraine; rather, they simply need these consumers of 
online news to question their own government’s position on the issue, because 
indecision or indifference will allow Russia to continue to act with impunity in 





that Ukraine will default to Soviet-era frames of sovereignty and identity, and 
Russia’s interpretation will be validated. As Malaysia Airlines Flight 17 
demonstrates, the consequences of Western indifference can be brutal, and Russian 
assertions of sovereignty over Ukraine are rooted in myths and memories that 
resonate with many pro-Soviet Ukrainians. Thus, the Russian post-Cold War rhetoric 
is designed to restrict Ukraine’s ability to construct its own post-Cold War identity. 
The more Ukrainian identity is undermined using Cold War-era myths and memories, 
the less Ukraine can express its own sovereignty in the post-Cold War era.  
Implications and conclusions 
 President Putin’s address on the annexation of Crimea, the protests by 
ordinary Ukrainians in the region, and the online efforts to demonize Ukrainian 
identity each demonstrate the durability of nationalist myths and memories. The 
political and social realities facing the Russian people have shifted dramatically since 
the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, for Russian audiences, the same 
exceptionalist themes that defined their Soviet identity continue to resonate, 
functioning as comforting rhetorical tropes at moments of great uncertainty. Putin’s 
ability to marshal Cold War-era exceptionalist strategies sheds light on core 
components of Russian nationalism: military strength, mythic memories of historic 
military triumphs, and condemnation of former Cold War rivals. Putin and others use 
these resources to lay claim to Ukrainian land and identity in Crimea. These texts 
showcase the rhetorical strategies defining Russian nationalism in Cold War terms 
and in ways opposed to the West. For Russian leaders and ordinary citizens, 





War myths and memories. From Putin’s perspective, Russian identity dominates 
Ukrainian identity in the post-Cold War period in ways that the USSR dominated it 
during the Cold War. Putin’s military and propaganda efforts worked in Crimea. And, 
even if Putin’s identity theft more broadly falls short, he and his troll army cast doubt 
and spark chaos in a country vulnerable to outside interference and struggling to 
become a sovereign nation.   
 At the time of this writing, the Russian Federation is struggling. Its economy 
is collapsing between the rapidly devaluing Ruble and plummeting oil prices. 
Unemployment and inflation both continue to rise at alarming rates.101 The Russian 
military is involved in ongoing conflicts in both Ukraine and Syria with unclear 
objectives and no end in sight. Journalists and opposition leaders are arrested or killed 
with great regularity, and the persecution of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender 
individuals remains pervasive. For a Western politician, such conditions would 
seemingly make reelection difficult, if not lead to their removal from office. Yet 
Vladimir Putin will likely be reelected to his fourth presidential term in 2018. A 
Levada Center poll from October 2017 puts Putin’s popularity in Russia at eighty-
three percent.102 Putin’s rhetoric in his Crimean and Novorossiya addresses might 
offer some explanation for his political longevity. His strategies work so well that he 
is difficult if not impossible to oppose. Combined with the obscured propaganda 
campaigns in online communities, these nationalist myths remain formidable 
resources in articulating Russian nationalism that are difficult to challenge. There is 
little political dissent in Russia, so isolating a nationalism from below narrative is 





dominant definition. Until Russian opposition leaders can marshal the rhetorical 
myths and memories of Cold War nationalism in ways rivaling Putin, few challenges 
to his regime stand a chance. Russian constructions of Ukrainian identity should thus 
be read in this climate of how useful those definitions are in strengthening Russian 
identity. Nostalgia for the Soviet Union, ethno-nationalism, heroic myths of the Great 
Patriot War, and online comments echoing these themes are all tools that undermine 
Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. The more effective Russian efforts are to reify a 
Cold War identity for itself and Ukraine, the more Ukraine will struggle to construct 
its own post-Soviet identity. In the process, both Russia and Ukraine become mired in 
the past myths and memories of the Cold War—a conflict that ripples across the 
globe. 
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Ukraine’s “Revolution of Dignity” was officially over. Viktor Yanykovich 
was gone, new elections were in the books, and it was Petro Poroshenko’s 
inauguration day, June 7, 2014. Two dozen young women, dressed in traditional 
Ukrainian peasant dresses with flowers in their hair, led Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada 
parliament and honored guests in a rousing rendition of the national anthem.1 
Ukrainian Speaker of Parliament Arseniy Yatsenyuk noted that numerous foreign 
dignitaries were in attendance to witness the swearing in of Petro Poroshenko as 
Ukraine’s new president. The leaders of Austria, Albania, Belarus, Poland, Lithuania, 
and even the Secretary General of NATO watched the festivities. Russian President 
Vladimir Putin, Prime Minister Dimitri Medvedev, and Foreign Minister Sergei 
Lavrov were noticeably absent as Yatsenyuk announced that American Vice 
President Joe Biden had flown in for the festivities. Taking off his translation 
earpiece, Biden rose, grinned, and waved to the cheering audience.2 Poroshenko stood 
beaming behind a lectern, having taken the presidential oath of office moments 
earlier. The new president was festooned in a ceremonial necklace and holding the 
official Presidential Mace over his head, as members of parliament rose to applaud 
their new leader. From the gallery, Biden smiled down on Poroshenko. 
Biden and other American leaders faced challenges in articulating a vision for 
Ukrainian identity. Whereas Vladimir Putin could call on centuries of common 
cultural and linguistic traditions and the legacies of World War II and the Cold War, 
the United States had much less shared history with Ukraine to work with. And what 





War in which Ukraine was often trapped between two superpowers. Ukrainian 
identity and sovereignty, along with that of other satellite nations, were merely 
political pawns in this superpower struggle for decades. Ukrainians had little reason 
to trust that an American vision of Ukrainian nationalism was rooted in anything 
other than similar Cold War-era self-interest.  
This chapter will explore how American leaders attempted to address these 
exigencies in a post-Cold War world by articulating a vision of Ukrainian identity 
rooted in self-determination and sovereignty. The American perspective grappled 
with two related paradoxes. First, the tensions between nationalism from above and 
below were also present in American rhetoric, but often, American leaders continued 
to speak on behalf of the Ukrainian people as they adopted a rhetoric “from below” 
approach. Second, the United States defined Ukrainian identity in ways that were pro-
western and resistant to the Russian Federation, while simultaneously championing 
popular sovereignty and self-determination as paramount values for the Ukrainian 
people. This paradox of defending the will of the Ukrainian people while asserting the 
authority to speak on their behalf undermines western credibility. Several themes 
emerge from the rhetoric of American leadership (from above) and the articulations 
from ordinary American citizens adopting a Ukrainian identity (from below). Those 
include the exceptionalism of western democracy and capitalism, a sense of 
belonging to European communities, and a willingness to defend those key 
components of Ukrainian national character against Russian aggression.  
Nationalism “from above” discourse will include speeches by President 





Ambassador to Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt’s Washington Post editorial. Political leaders 
speaking from above constructed visions of Ukrainian identity echoing western calls 
for sovereignty and self-determination from the Cold War. Nationalism from below 
discourse will be explored by examining the protests in New York following 
President Putin’s 2015 visit to the United Nations. These discourses from ordinary 
citizens and from political leaders like Obama, Kerry, and Biden, show the ways that 
arguments on Ukraine’s national identity emerged from arguments about sovereignty 
and self-determination.  
The evolution of American exceptionalism 
Understanding the contemporary iteration of American exceptionalism during 
the Ukraine crisis requires explicating its origins and teasing out overarching themes 
from its evolution. This particular ideology began as a rhetorical construction before 
the United States even existed. John Winthrop’s “A model of Christian charity” 
sermon was given in 1630 aboard the Arbella as colonists made their way to the new 
world. Winthrop explains their special purpose: “We shall find that the God of Israel 
is among us….‘the Lord make it like that of NEW ENGLAND.’ For we must 
consider that we shall be as a city upon a hill. The eyes of all people are upon us.”3 
America’s ancestors believed they were chosen by God to fulfill a special mission in 
the wilderness that they alone were capable of completing; “exceptional” seems 
inadequate to characterize such a theme. As Deborah Madsen argues, this American 
nation “is to be a model, a guide, and a measure for other nations.”4 From the start, 
America was meant to be a “light” for the world to follow.  





Winthrop’s “New World.” Because the colonists lacked “a shared language, culture, 
common descent or historical territory,” they needed something else to unite them on 
their journey and as they struggled to survive.5 Their exceptionalism and divine 
mission articulated this overarching narrative: “the myth of American exceptionalism 
provided a unifying idea by distinguishing those who came to the new world from 
those Europeans who did not.”6 As Trevor McCrisken explains, “America has a 
special role to play in the world [and] America differs drastically from the ‘old 
world.’ Unlike previous nations, America will never fail.”7 In other words, Americans 
were different because they were blessed. The colonists used this shared ideology of 
American exceptionalism as a rhetorical bridge connecting their brutal frontier 
conditions to a belief in their mission from God.  
The right of intervention in the affairs of other nations was dependent on a 
missionary strand of American exceptionalism.8 As Piort Szpunar explains, “the 
missionary strand of American exceptionalism is explicitly imperialistic and sees it as 
the US’s destiny to promote and project its superior values.”9 This version of 
American exceptionalism suggests that the United States has a duty—like Samuel 
Danforth’s colonists embracing the ordained “errand into the wilderness”—to spread 
American values throughout the world.10 Advocates of the missionary strand were 
historically not satisfied with a simple colonization of the United States through 
manifest destiny. The 1823 closing of North America to European nations was also 
not enough for proponents of this strand.11 The Monroe Doctrine argued that any 
interference in North or South America would be seen at “the manifestation of an 





wanted more. Often, this strand embraces a strong military presence abroad. Albert 
Beveridge takes this approach about American expansionism in his treatment of the 
Philippines following the Spanish-American War in 1898: 
We will not renounce our part in the mission of our race, trustee, under God, 
of the civilization of the world. And we will move forward to our work, not 
howling out regrets like slaves whipped to their burdens but with gratitude for 
a task worthy of our strength and thanksgiving to Almighty God that He has 
marked us as His chosen people, henceforth to lead in the regeneration of the 
world.13  
 
The goal of the missionary American exceptionalism strand is to help the world share 
in American values, with interventionism, colonization, and militarism forming 
inevitable offshoots of this perspective. 
The missionary strand of American identity is particularly visible at the turn 
of the twentieth century as the United States became more embroiled in battles inside 
and outside of the continent. President Theodore Roosevelt expanded the Monroe 
Doctrine in his State of the Union Address in 1904 when he asserted the American 
right to intervene abroad if America’s national security were threatened:  
Chronic wrongdoing, or an impotence which results in a general loosening of 
the ties of civilized society, may in America [i.e., the Western Hemisphere], 
as elsewhere, ultimately require intervention by some civilized nation, and in 
the western hemisphere the adherence of the United States to the Monroe 
Doctrine may force the United States however reluctantly, in flagrant cases of 
such wrongdoing or impotence, to the exercise of an international policy 
power.14 
 
While framed in terms of national interest and security, this missionary strand would 
also be characterized as a national duty of the American government to intervene 
abroad. Theodore Roosevelt’s Secretary of State, Elihu Root, makes this argument:  
All sovereignty in the world is held upon the condition of performing the 
duties of a sovereign. In the parliament of man the rights of the weakest state 





protected against aggression is recognized and protected by the common 
influence of mankind. But that right is help upon the condition that the 
sovereign ruler or the sovereign people performs the duties of sovereignty; 
that the citizens of other powers are protected within the territory; that the 
rules of international law are observed; that national obligations are faithfully 
kept.15 
 
Thus, the American government reserved the right to intervene abroad not just when 
the nation’s security was threatened, but also when other nations failed to uphold their 
obligations to their own people. Sovereignty in this sense meant a commitment to 
certain global standards of human rights and a willingness to defend those rights 
abroad if needed. 
The Cold War and American exceptionalism 
The belief in the exceptionalism of American democracy and capitalism 
shaped American rhetoric during the Cold War. Godfrey Hodgson explains how these 
foundational beliefs were reflected during this period:  
After 1945 it was natural for American exceptionalism to be seen in large 
measure as the consequence of exceptional economic success….So in the 
1950s the current version of exceptionalism was a new blend of the moral 
exceptionalism of Roosevelt’s fight for the Four Freedoms and pride in 
economic recovery, material progress, and military power.16 
 
In other words, spreading American democracy and capitalism were foundational 
components of American Cold War foreign policy, and a “missionary 
exceptionalism” helped define American rhetoric from this time period. Hodgson 
defines the Cold War iteration of exceptionalism: “this is the belief that it is the 
destiny, some say the God-given destiny, of the United States to spread the benefits of 





countries as possible.”17 This kind evangelism of American democracy and capitalism 
was rooted in the core assumption that these systems were exceptional.  
The 1959 “Kitchen Debate” between Nixon and Khrushchev showcased this 
priority of defending capitalism as a centerpiece of American exceptionalism.18 
During their exchange, Nixon and Khrushchev were surrounded by numerous 
technological advances and products in an exhibit designed by American politicians 
to demonstrate the advantages of capitalism to Soviet citizens and the citizens of 
satellite nations.19 These devices included “home appliances, fashions, television and 
hi-fi sets, a model house priced to sell [to] an 'average' family, farm equipment, 1959 
automobiles, boats, sporting equipment and a children’s playground.”20 The implicit 
argument of the model home was that American capitalism was the superior 
economic model in the Cold War. As propaganda, the home itself suggested that 
Soviet citizens would and should embrace capitalism after getting one look at a 
refrigerator.21 Promoting American goods showcased the hubris of American 
exceptionalism throughout the Cold War. The assumption seemed to be that if the 
Soviet people could only see for themselves the value of American capitalism, they 
would overthrow their socialist leadership. 
American propaganda also suggested that American exceptionalism was 
defined by democracy and a willingness to defend those key components of national 
character. Several public addresses served as representative examples of this 
exceptionalism narrative. President Kennedy’s inaugural address showcased how 
defending freedom and democracy were central components of American 





granted the role of defending freedom in its hour of maximum danger. My fellow 
citizens of the world: ask not what America will do for you, but what together we can 
do for the freedom of man.”22 Kennedy defined defending freedom as a central 
component of American identity. It was as much a message of American strength as it 
was a message of deterrence in disrupting Soviet expansionism.23 Similarly, President 
Reagan highlighted how freedom represented a crucial aspect of American 
exceptionalism in his “Challenger” speech: “I've always had great faith in and respect 
for our space program, and what happened today does nothing to diminish it. We 
don't hide our space program. We don't keep secrets and cover things up. We do it all 
up front and in public. That's the way freedom is.”24 Here, Reagan framed freedom as 
a reflection of national character and transparency, implicitly distinguishing the U.S. 
space program from the Soviet program.25 The American ability to survive national 
tragedies reflected what freedom meant for this theme.26  
Framing the United States as a peaceful nation and the USSR as a warring nation 
Beyond exceptionalism, the second American theme of the Cold War was 
framing America as a peaceful nation resisting Soviet aggression in the eyes of the 
global community. President Eisenhower constructed this propaganda theme in which 
the United States peacefully led the world in response to Soviet territorial 
expansion.27 As the war between American troops and Soviet-proxies in Korea came 
to an uneasy stalemate, international organizations and diplomatic relations took on 
an increasingly important role in American propaganda. Eisenhower’s Atoms for 
Peace program encouraged both the United States and Soviet Union to give up 





United States to use international organizations as a propaganda vehicle for achieving 
its foreign policy goals abroad through Eisenhower’s “hidden hand” policies.28 More 
importantly, in launching the Atoms for Peace campaign in 1953, Eisenhower spoke 
directly to the United Nations General Assembly, showcasing the increased 
importance not only of an international community and of American leadership in 
that body. Eisenhower argued: “Never before in history has so much hope for so 
many people been gathered together in a single organization. Your deliberations and 
decisions during these somber years have already realized part of those hopes.”29 This 
address highlighted the global leadership role the United States sought to promote in 
the area of peace. It used the United Nations (U.N.) as a platform to promote its 
peaceful role as a propaganda strategy in the Cold War. Eisenhower championed the 
U.N., and in doing so, he promoted the United States for its government’s eagerness 
to work with international institutions and sacrifice for global peace and stability. In 
this propaganda narrative, the United States peacefully led the world while resisting 
Soviet aggression.  
 The United States also framed the Soviet Union as an evil force throughout 
the Cold War. As Jason Edwards argues, “The Soviet threat was the central 
organizing principle for U.S. foreign policy during this era.”30 This propaganda 
highlighted perceived vulnerabilities for communist infiltration in numerous areas of 
the United States, including labor, academia, media, the federal government, and 
national defense. By infiltrating various aspects of American life, U.S. leaders feared 
that Soviet agents were “fooling” Americans into thinking there was no communist 





these fears led to a “loyalty investigation of every person entering the civilian 
employment of any department or agency of the executive branch of the federal 
government.”32 The House Un-American Activities Committee (HUAC) hearings 
orchestrated by Senator Joseph McCarthy during the second Red Scare were the 
result of a coordinated effort on the part of the propaganda infrastructure to showcase 
the persistent and dangerous communist threat.33 In this narrative, the Soviet Union 
was everywhere, and threatened Americans even within their own borders. President 
Reagan’s “Evil Empire” speech highlighted the perceived Soviet danger: 
Yes, let us pray for the salvation of all of those who live in that totalitarian 
darkness–pray they will discover the joy of knowing God. But until they do, 
let us be aware that while they preach the supremacy of the State, declare its 
omnipotence over individual man, and predict its eventual domination of all 
peoples on the earth, they are the focus of evil in the modern world.34 
 
Reagan abandoned subtlety, arguing that the Soviet Union wanted to dominate the 
whole world, including and especially bastions of freedom like the United States.35 
Americans were thus acting in self-defense by intervening abroad and embracing an 
activist foreign policy. Such narratives of American exceptionalism and a dangerous 
Soviet enemy served as key components of American propaganda during the Cold 
War, and would inform how American leaders defined Ukrainian identity in the 
current conflict.  
United States and Ukraine 
American conceptions of Ukrainian identity are thoroughly rooted in the Cold 
War. Understanding current attempts to define Ukrainian sovereignty and borders 
demands an explication of this context. The United States attempted to undermine the 





United States supported the Prolog Research and Publishing Corporation to resist 
Soviet influence in Ukraine. Taras Kuzio explains the scope of Prolog’s propaganda 
activities: 
Prolog reached out to a far wider political spectrum inside Ukraine as well as 
cooperated with a broad spectrum of Western NGO’s, academics and 
politicians as well as new Eastern European opposition movements such as 
Poland’s Solidarity. Prolog was a leader in the smuggling of literature into 
Soviet Ukraine (tamvydav, or published there), the smuggling of literature out 
of the country (samvydav [samizdat] or self-published), and maintaining 
contacts with Ukrainian underground organizations and overt dissidents and 
opposition movements.37 
 
Moreover, Prolog coordinated with U.S.-funded Radio Svoboda (the Ukrainian-
language service of Radio Liberty) throughout its existence. Radio Free Europe and 
Radio Liberty programs were filled by anti-communist émigrés affiliated with Prolog 
who told stories of their wonderful lives in the west.38  
The propaganda goals of these programs were to encourage resistance to 
Soviet rule. Ross Johnson argues that the goal of supporting dissident groups, Radio 
Free Europe, and Radio Liberty was to encourage Ukrainians to self-liberate: “The 
aims of this strategy were to keep alive hopes of resistance [and] give sustenance to 
dissenters.” Johnson continues that the U.S.-funded programs were designed to 
“support alternatives to communist rule, promote autonomist tendencies in the USSR 
and outer Soviet empire, give air to national communist leanings, and, from the 
1960s, provide a voice to the emerging dissidents, civil society and opposition.”39 As 
Prolog President Roman Kupchinsky explains, “All of this (Prolog Activity) would 
have been impossible without the U.S. government as a secure financial base.”40 The 
United States government thus did all it could to covertly support Ukrainian dissident 





was caught between two superpowers for much of the twentieth century, and the 
rhetorical efforts by the United States contained several themes in influencing 
Ukraine’s national identity. 
The U.S. perspective toward Ukraine in the Cold War was based in the belief 
of Ukraine’s right of self-determination as a sovereign nation. The U.S. response to 
Ukraine was also grounded in a belief that powerful nations had a responsibility to 
protect vulnerable people whose rights were being violated by unscrupulous nations 
(e.g., the Soviets’ aggression toward Ukraine and other satellite regions). Luke 
Glanville explains sovereignty’s traditional meaning: “Sovereignty meant that states 
had an indefeasible right to autonomous self-government, free from outside 
interference and intervention. Sovereigns were responsible and accountable to none 
but themselves.”41 Nations, though, could lose their right of non-intervention—and 
their right of self-determination—if they encroached on the rights of their own people 
or the people of other nations without their consent. Such violations could invite 
outside intervention in order to protect the people from human rights abuses. As 
Glanville explains, the responsibility to protect derives from a basic assumption about 
nation-state responsibilities:  
[W]hile peoples have a right to govern themselves free from outside 
interference, this should be conditional on their protection of human rights. 
When a sovereign state proves unwilling or unable to protect its own 
population, it yields its sovereign right of nonintervention, and the 
responsibility to protect passes to the society of states.42 
 
America’s belief in its own exceptionalism and in the superiority of democracy and 
capitalism only deepened its commitment to a right and responsibility to intervene in 





Yet, a contradiction exists within this foreign policy logic that permeated both 
U.S. Cold War and post-Cold War rhetoric targeting the Soviet satellite regions. U.S. 
officials would treat Ukraine as a sovereign nation so long as it instituted a pro-
western democratic government. Ukraine’s self-determination thus came with clear 
conditions that laid out an American vision for Ukraine’s identity. American leaders 
would endorse Ukrainian self-determination as long as it chose a pro-western 
orientation. Such logic ultimately defied the principles of self-determination. Ukraine 
was awarded sovereignty if it aligned with the west and instituted democratic 
principles; if its leaders chose otherwise, it could forfeit its right to self-determination. 
This inherent contradiction in the U.S. treatment of Ukraine defines the paradox 
Ukraine faced in the post-Cold War where its so-called right of self-determination 
came with clear conditions.   
Nationalism from above: Ukrainian democracy and Russian aggression 
The American nationalism from above rhetoric was reflected in a series of 
discourses from political leaders. First, three addresses from President Obama 
highlight his conception of Ukrainian nationalism. His February 28, 2014, address 
allowed him to pledge American support for Ukraine following Yanykovich’s 
ousting.43 This speech was given in the White House pressroom just days following 
the conclusion of the Maidan protests and in the wake of increasing Russian 
fermentation of dissent in Crimea. Second, Obama’s July 21, 2014, speech from the 
White House was in response to the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 and in 
the wake of increased international outrage at Russian intervention in eastern 





importance of NATO in combatting Russian actions in Ukraine, and in the enduring 
power and importance of former Cold War alliances and institutions in a post-Cold 
War era.45 All three discourses highlight his nationalism from above conception of 
Ukrainian identity rooted in exemplar strands of American exceptionalism.   
Other American political leaders echo these themes in defining Ukrainian 
identity. Secretary of State John Kerry’s April 24, 2014, remarks from Washington, 
D.C., addressed Russian interventions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea as he called for 
international cooperation in resisting Russian actions.46 American Ambassador to 
Ukraine Geoffrey Pyatt wrote an April 4, 2014, Washington Post editorial similarly 
calling Russia to task for its aggression in Ukraine and calling for Ukrainian 
independence and self-determination.47 Finally, 18 months after the Maidan 
Revolution of Dignity, Vice President Biden’s December 9, 2015, speech to the 
Ukrainian parliament highlighted the current state of the crisis and called for 
Ukrainian sovereignty and independence from Russia’s sphere of influence.48 This 
section explores these themes of nationalism from above rhetoric defining Ukrainian 
identity as democratic, European, and in fierce opposition to Russian rule. 
U.S. Support for Ukrainian self-determination  
 An initial theme of American leaders was that Ukrainian sovereignty should 
be paramount in the dispute with Russia. The Ukrainian people needed to be able to 
decide for themselves what their national identity would be, and relying on 
democratic institutions was an essential component of this self-determination. This 
theme builds on the Cold War component of American democracy as the ideological 





had a right of non-intervention from other nations. Several American political leaders 
showcase this nationalist theme in their speeches surrounding the Ukrainian conflict. 
 President Obama stressed the rights of Ukrainians to choose their own place in 
the world. Immediately following the ousting of Yankyovich, before Poroshenko’s 
election and amidst the chaos of Russian interventions in Crimea, Obama argued for 
Ukraine’s independence: “The Ukrainian people deserve the opportunity to determine 
their own future.”49 This choice, free from foreign influence of Russian meddling, 
was essential in Ukraine becoming an independent nation and articulating its own 
national identity. Obama frames this self-determination as a fundamental human 
right: “The events of the past several months remind us of how difficult democracy 
can be in a country with deep divisions. But the Ukrainian people have also reminded 
us that human beings have a human universal right to determine their own future.”50 
For Obama, Ukrainian nationalism is defined by the ability to define itself. This 
discourse reflects similar Cold War themes of self-determination. In calling for the 
Ukrainian people to embrace their own sovereignty and make their own democratic 
decisions, Obama assumes that they would choose a European identity friendly to 
western interests.  
Obama promotes democracy as the ideal form of government that would 
ensure Ukraine’s future sovereignty. Self determination and democracy are linked to 
stability and territorial integrity in this strand: “We have urged an end to the violence 
and encouraged Ukrainians to pursue a course in which they have stabilized their 
country, forge a broad-based government, and move to elections this spring.”51 For 





argued that denying Ukrainians the ability to choose their own destiny would have 
terrible consequences: “But any violation of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial 
integrity would be deeply destabilizing, which is not in the interests of Ukraine, 
Russia or Europe. It would represent a profound interference in matters that must be 
determined by the Ukrainian people.”52 Here, Obama connects self-determination 
with territorial sovereignty and national survivability. The concepts are linked 
together as core components of American democracy. Obama argues: “The United 
States supports his government’s efforts and stands for the sovereignty, territorial 
integrity, and democratic future of Ukraine.”53 Obama weaves all three components 
together in ways stressing that Ukraine must control its own destiny in terms of 
democratic institutions and borders. Identity and territory are linked in this American 
version of Ukrainian nationalism. This call for self-determination again assumes the 
Ukrainian people will define their nationalism in ways resistant to Russian rule and 
friendly to American interests. 
In his speech following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17, Obama 
blames the Russian Federation for encroaching on Ukrainian territory. This discourse 
is still grounded in promoting human rights and Ukraine’s self-determination—
arguments earlier presidents made during the Cold War. Obama explains the 
consequences of Russia’s actions:  
But if Russia continues to violate Ukraine’s sovereignty and to back these 
separatists, and these separatists become more and more dangerous – and now 
are risks not simply to the people inside of Ukraine but the broader 
international community – then Russia will only further isolate itself from the 
international community and the costs for Russia’s behavior will only 






Here, Obama argues that Russia’s actions in eastern Ukraine, in supporting the 
separatists who downed the passenger jet, are putting the global community in 
danger. Ukraine’s territorial sovereignty was becoming a key part of global security 
in addition to an ongoing humanitarian crisis. He calls on President Putin to change 
course and respect Ukrainian territorial integrity: “Now is the time for President Putin 
and Russia to…get serious about trying to resolve hostilities within Ukraine in a way 
that respects Ukraine’s sovereignty and respects the right of the Ukrainian people to 
make their own decisions about their own lives.”55 The Russian denial of Ukraine’s 
independence and sovereignty deepens Obama’s claims of the importance of 
Ukrainian self-determination. This is an argument that Obama did not make after pro-
Russian president Viktor Yanykovich was elected by a clear majority of Ukrainians in 
2010. Thus, in championing Ukrainian democracy in this instance, Obama defends 
American interests in eroding Russian influence in the region.  
 This effort to undermine Russian influence echoes Cold War themes of 
humanitarianism as a legitimizing rationale for intervention. Russia’s assertion over 
Ukrainian territory was not legitimate because of its human rights abuses. Glanville 
explains the Cold War origins of this argument:  
…through the course of the Cold War, international society increasingly 
recognized that sovereign statehood entailed a responsibility to promote and 
defend the human rights of a population. Moreover, to some extent, human-
rights issues within states were understood to be beyond the scope of domestic 
jurisdiction and a legitimate matter of international concern and scrutiny.56 
 
From Obama’s perspective, the international community has a right to condemn 
Russian actions. Obama’s interpretation suggests a global, international orientation in 





themselves. Echoing sentiments from Elihu Root and Theodore Roosevelt, American 
leadership can defend its interests anywhere in the world, especially in the name of 
humanitarianism coupled with self-interests and global security. 
 Moreover, Obama’s speech took place in a post-Cold War world in which the 
international community, including the Russian Federation, had endorsed such 
intervention in the face of human rights abuses. Throughout the Cold War, despite a 
rise in assertions of human rights claims in international forums by both the United 
States and the Soviet Union, little was ever done to defend Ukraine’s the territorial 
integrity and principle of nonintervention. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, the 
international community started to act on this rhetoric. Glanville explains: 
Central to the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept is the idea that sovereign 
states are responsible for the protection of their populations from mass 
atrocities and that they are accountable not only to their own people but also 
to international society for the performance of this duty….in 2011, the 
Security Council appealed to the concept and for the first time authorized the 
use of force against a functioning sovereign state, Libya, without its consent, 
for the purpose of protecting civilians from the threat of mass atrocities. These 
developments reflect a dramatic departure from the Cold War understanding 
of sovereignty.57 
 
The rules of global diplomacy had changed. Now, when invoking claims of Russian 
human rights abuses in Ukraine, Obama’s words are more threatening. In this case, 
the global community could actually intervene with military force to stop the killing 
of civilians in eastern Ukraine. In asserting his definition of Ukrainian identity, and 
calling for the international community to agree with these claims of Ukrainian 
sovereignty, Obama’s rhetoric challenges traditional assumptions of nonintervention. 
 Nearly six months after Poroshenko’s election, the democratic, pro-western 





continued to escalate, and Ukrainian sovereignty and territorial integrity was 
increasingly threatened by Russian intervention. In the wake of this climate of fear 
and violence, Obama spoke in Estonia and took the opportunity to again champion 
the Cold War theme of American democracy and institutions: “We’re stronger 
because we’re democracies. We’re not afraid of free and fair elections, because true 
legitimacy can only come from one source—and that is the people.”58 Here, Obama 
does not speak with an authoritative tone, in a paradoxical nationalism from below 
rhetorical move. He cannot demand that the Ukrainian people move its allegiance to 
west without invoking the legacies of western Cold War interventions in the region. 
Rather than telling Ukrainians to embrace democracy, he simply joins the chorus of 
leaders and ordinary people calling for democracy in Ukraine and championing the 
benefits of self-determination.  
Obama also defends democracy as a key component of any legitimate national 
identity. He frames democracy as an exceptional form of government, the inevitable 
winner in any global struggle between ideas. Obama thoroughly deploys the Cold 
War theme of the supremacy of American democracy: 
Democracy will win—because a government’s legitimacy can only come 
from citizens; because in this age of information and empowerment, people 
want more control over their lives, not less; and because, more than any other 
form of government ever devised, only democracy, rooted in the sanctity of 
the individual, can deliver real progress.59 
 
Here, Obama relies on Cold War themes about the ideological superiority of 
American nationalism. He also argues that when given the free choice to determine 
their own identity, free from foreign influence, the people will choose democracy. 





theme of democracy as the ideological ideal for the world to follow, including 
Ukraine. He is calling for the respect of the popular sovereignty and self-
determination of the Ukrainian people. As Glanville explains, “Sovereignty may have 
been grounded in individual rights...For Americans…the protection of individual 
rights was at the heart of the idea of popular sovereignty.”60 In this vein, the 
Ukrainian people were exercising their freedom of self-determination—their 
individual rights. Obama was constructing a view of Ukrainian nationalism rooted in 
popular sovereignty. 
 Obama applies this democratic Cold War theme to the Ukrainian crisis, 
explaining why a democratic Ukraine was a better and stronger Ukraine. He explains, 
“We want Ukrainians to be independent and strong and able to make their own 
choices free from fear and intimidation, because the more countries are free and 
strong, and free from intimidation, the more secure our own liberties are.”61 Here, he 
suggests that the Ukrainian people are correct in their choice to embrace democratic 
ideals—they will be better off for having chosen western institutions. When given a 
choice between Russian interference or western democracy, the Ukrainian people 
chose wisely in embracing self-determination. In these arguments, Obama once again 
stops short of demanding that the Ukrainian people pivot to the west. He simply 
explains the values and benefits of living in a free society. This move is strategic in 
that he can avoid accusations of interference in a sovereign state’s election. Obama 
also can promote sovereignty without denying the Ukrainian people the freedom to 





Obama deepens his reliance on Cold War arguments by suggesting that self-
determination is under attack from the Russian Federation. He explains: “And yet, as 
we gather here today, we know that this vision is threatened by Russia’s aggression 
against Ukraine. It is a brazen assault on the territorial integrity of Ukraine -- a 
sovereign and independent European nation.” Echoing Cold War themes, Obama’s 
core components of America’s conception of national identity—territorial integrity 
and self-determination—are threatened by Russian actions. In defining Ukraine as 
part of Europe, Obama links his Estonian audience to the Ukraine crisis in both 
territorial integrity and identity. Ukraine’s interests are connected to Estonian 
interests, and to the interests of all of Europe.  
Obama highlights the consequences of undermining Ukrainian democratic 
choices to move towards Europe. Of Russian intervention in eastern Ukraine, Obama 
explains: 
It challenges that most basic of principles of our international system—that 
borders cannot be redrawn at the barrel of a gun; that nations have the right to 
determine their own future. It undermines an international order where the 
rights of peoples and nations are upheld and can’t simply be taken away by 
brute force. This is what’s at stake in Ukraine. This is why we stand with the 
people of Ukraine today.62 
 
For Obama, attacking Ukraine represented an attack on international order and 
stability, and on the global community. European audiences and former Soviet 
republics are likely sympathetic to this argument since the citizens of those countries 
also made a democratic choice to move away from Russia and towards European 
integration. Obama directly speaks to these democratic choices as core components of 
the European community: “Countries like Estonia and Latvia and Lithuania are not 





make your own decisions. No other nation gets to veto your security decisions.”63 
Obama stresses that the “Russian sphere of influence” and shared history and culture 
are not values that come before self-determination and national sovereignty. 
Ukrainians—as with all citizens in former Soviet republics—have the right to choose 
for their own people what their national identity will be, and to expect their territorial 
integrity will be respected by foreign powers.  
In showcasing these principles, he encourages the Ukrainian people to decide 
for themselves what their national identity will be, while stopping short of demanding 
it outright. He defines Ukrainian nationalism in ways rooted in popular sovereignty. 
Jean-Jacques Rousseau argues that sovereignty itself is grounded in the will of the 
people. For him, sovereignty is “not a covenant between a superior and an inferior, 
but a covenant of the body with each of its members.”64 He describes government 
thusly: “An intermediary body established between the subjects and the sovereign for 
their mutual communication, a body charged with the execution of the laws and the 
maintenance of freedom, both civil and political.”65 As Glanville argues, “sovereignty 
is rightfully found in the people and cannot be alienated from them.”66 Obama 
addresses this exigence by embracing a “from below” perspective, speaking broadly 
about democratic institutions and the value of freedom. 	  
 Secretary Kerry and Ambassador Pyatt echo similar Cold War themes of 
democratic institutions and the need for self-determination of the Ukrainian people. 
Both were addressing the Ukrainian crisis at the height of the Crimean takeover and 
eastern Ukrainian interventions by Russian-backed separatists in April 2014. Kerry 





Russian Federation. He explains: “This is a full-throated effort to actively sabotage 
the democratic process through gross external intimidation that has been brought 
inside Ukraine.”67 He suggests that in attacking Ukrainian military personnel, Russian 
forces are actually attacking democratic ideals. Pyatt also gives voice to the American 
position on Ukraine’s self-determination: “As President Obama emphasized… ‘We 
want the Ukrainian people to determine their own destiny. That idea has guided U.S. 
policy from the first days of this crisis.’”68 Here, Pyatt clarified that the overarching 
goal of American involvement in Ukraine was to help the Ukrainians determine their 
own national identity for themselves. Pyatt continues: “We’ve been keeping in touch 
with the legitimate government in Kiev and the people of Ukraine to ensure that they 
are the ones who choose their future.”69 The Ukrainian people—not Russian or 
American—will determine the direction Ukraine takes. This self-determination and 
commitment to a democratic electoral process suggests that American leaders 
construct a vision of Ukrainian identity rooted in Cold War democratic themes and 
popular sovereignty. Vice President Biden, speaking 18 months after the Revolution 
of Dignity, makes the case for Ukrainian nationalism rooted in democratic beliefs and 
ideals. He champions the Ukrainian people as long-time defenders of democratic 
institutions: “In the West, as here we remember, the Orange Revolution—young men 
and women who filled the Maidan a decade ago demanding that their voices and their 
votes both be respected. They refused to back down in the face of rigged elections, 
and they succeeded.”70 Biden calls attention to the willingness of Ukrainians to fight 
for their democratic freedoms once again, during revolutions a decade apart. To not 





many, would betray the democratic ideals of the revolution: “Each of you…has an 
obligation to seize the opportunity that the sacrifices made in the Maidan, the 
sacrifices of the Heavenly Hundred. Each of you has an obligation to answer the call 
of history and finally build a united, democratic Ukrainian nation that can stand the 
test of time.”71 Biden’s narrative suggests that with revolutionary gusto, the Ukrainian 
people should choose a European identity through a democratic process.  
Biden argues the United States respects Ukraine’s self-determination, 
challenging Russian influence in the region: “we will not recognize any nation having 
a sphere of influence. Sovereign states have the right to make their own decisions and 
choose their own alliances. Period.”72 If the Ukrainian people are willing to articulate 
their national identity, then Biden argues it must be respected by all parties in the 
international community: “The Ukrainian people have long struggled to direct their 
own destinies, to carve out a place besides the mighty Dnipro, to claim their own 
identity, proud and distinct.”73 In calling for Ukrainian self-determination, American 
leaders constructed a vision of Ukrainian nationalism rooted in Cold War themes of 
American democracy. 
Ukrainian identity as European 
The argument from American leaders for Ukrainian democracy implies, and 
often directly states, that when given the opportunity, the Ukrainian people would 
choose a pro-western, pro-European, and anti-Russian identity for themselves. Thus, 
in supporting Ukrainian popular sovereignty, American political leaders were 
supporting western interests in constructing a European vision of Ukrainian 





freedom, this argument suggests that there are economic benefits to this European 
identity for Ukraine. The Ukrainian people would enjoy western capitalism if only 
they could be part of Europe. American political leaders make these arguments across 
multiple speeches when defining Ukrainian nationalism as a European one. 
In his speech in Estonia, Obama argues that democratic identities are 
fundamentally linked with capitalist, European economies. Obama’s logic suggests 
that the further removed a society gets from authoritarian rule, the more capitalist and 
democratic it becomes. He warns that this transformation to a European economy free 
from corruption would not be easy: “Here in the Baltics, after decades of authoritarian 
rule, the habits of democracy had to be learned. The institutions of good governance 
had to be built. Economies had to be reformed. Foreign forces had to be removed 
from your territory.”74 Obama links democratic institutions and Cold War themes of 
American democracy with Cold War strands of capitalism and prosperity, aligned 
with self-rule and independence from foreign influence. He argues that a European 
identity is a prosperous one: “We’re stronger because we embrace open economies. 
Look at the evidence. Here in Estonia, we see the success of free markets, integration 
with Europe, taking on tough reforms.”75 For Obama, a European identity is 
connected to democratic reforms and a better quality of life for Europeans.  
Paradoxically, Obama calls for a Ukrainian identity free from foreign 
influence while trying to influence its identity himself. Obama is able to leverage a 
higher quality of life for Ukrainians against this contradiction by linking self-
determination with capitalist progress. At the same time, Obama—without calling 





vision of Ukrainian nationalism that skillfully combines a higher quality of life 
through western capitalism with self-determination. This allows Obama to potentially 
nullify some of Russia’s best arguments against American foreign influence in the 
region, and negate centuries of shared history and culture between Russia and 
Ukraine. 
 Obama frames the Ukrainian revolution and ongoing fight for independence 
as a battle for a European identity. The Revolution of Dignity protesters were calling 
out for a European economy free from corruption and crony capitalist oligarchy. He 
explains:  
The protests in Ukraine, on the Maidan, were not led by neo-Nazis or fascists. 
They were led by ordinary Ukrainians—men and women, young and old—
who were fed up with a corrupt regime and who wanted to share in the 
progress and prosperity that they see in the rest of Europe.76 
 
For Obama, the choice the Ukrainian people were making was clear. Having 
witnessed the prosperity of Europe, Ukrainians wanted to move west, closer to their 
financially prosperous European counterparts. They wanted to share in the wealth of 
Europe. This was a choice of national identity. For Obama it was a natural and 
positive one that the United States would support. He argues: “So the United States 
will continue to help Ukraine reform—to escape a legacy of corruption and build 
democratic institutions, to grow its economy.”77 In choosing to move west, the 
Ukrainian people were embracing a European identity that enjoyed a better and more 
comfortable way of life. Thus, Obama relies on the Cold War glories of capitalism to 
articulate a European identity for the Ukrainian people—one that, he argues, they 
were drawn to more naturally. He champions a “from below” perspective to simply 





the argument in this way, he blunted criticism of Cold War-era meddling in Eastern 
Europe. Obama implies that he is not interfering—he is simply encouraging a choice 
that benefits European and American interests, which also happens to follow their 
true, authentic identity. 
Secretary Kerry and Vice President Biden both argue that addressing 
corruption is a key component of Ukrainians moving closer toward Europe. These 
leaders argue that European identity is free from corruption and crony capitalism, and 
Ukrainians must make eliminating corruption a priority in reaching this nationalist 
orientation. They suggest most Ukrainians would agree that corruption was a key 
barrier in becoming integrated into Europe. Kerry mocked Russia’s mystification at 
the idea of a corruption-free society: “Now Russia claims…that Ukrainians can’t 
possibly be calling for a government free of corruption and coercion. Russia is 
actually mystified …with Ukrainians who want to build a better life...”78 However, as 
Biden explains, wanting a better life and having a better life will be challenging for 
Ukrainians because they already defeated the previous “Orange Revolution” 10 years 
earlier: “And the bright flame of hope for a new Ukraine snuffed out by the pervasive 
poison of cronyism, corruption, and kleptocracy.”79 Corruption is antithetical to the 
European identity championed by these leaders. In highlighting the “better life” in 
Europe, Biden encourages Ukrainians to make their own pro-western choice free 
from Russia’s foreign influence. In mocking Russia’s mystification at wanting to 
move west, Biden also implies that America and Ukraine are together in their laughter 





Choosing democracy will ensure that Ukraine can pursue a corruption-free 
future. Biden argues more specifically that democratic ideals and fighting against 
corruption are fundamentally linked in creating a “Ukrainian-European future.”80 
Biden makes clear that democratic choices require economic commitments from 
leaders and ordinary citizens:  
But in addition, you also have a battle, a historic battle against corruption. 
Ukraine cannot afford for the people to lose hope again. The only thing worse 
than having no hope at all is having hopes rise and see them dashed repeatedly 
on the shoals of corruption. And if the people resign themselves to 
exploitation and corruption for fear of losing whatever little they have left, 
that would be the death knell for Ukrainian democracy. We’ve taken so many 
critical steps already. But all of you know there’s more to do to finish this 
race. Not enough has been done yet. But I can tell you, you cannot name me a 
single democracy in the world where the cancer of corruption is prevalent. 
You cannot name me one. So Ukraine must be strong enough to choose its 
own future, strongly. Strong defensively. Strong economically. A strong 
system of democratic governance.81 
 
In linking democracy and economic freedom free from corruption, Biden deploys 
Cold War themes of both western democracy and American capitalism. For 
Ukrainians to enjoy the economic prosperity of Europe, they must commit to 
European democratic and economic institutions. A European identity cannot survive 
without commitments to both ideals.  
Both Obama and Biden outline what is at stake for the Ukrainian people in 
deciding whether these economic sacrifices are worth making in pursuit of a 
European identity. If the Ukrainian people fail, then democracy itself in Europe is at 
risk—an argument reminiscent of the domino theory of the Cold War. Biden 
explains: 
…you have the unwavering support of the United States of America and the 
American people—including nearly 1 million proud Ukrainian Americans. 





Europe—all invested in your democratic success because your success goes to 
the heart of an enduring commitment to a Europe whole, free, and at peace. If 
you fail, the experiment fails. It is no exaggeration to say that the hopes of 
freedom-loving people the world over are with you because so much rides on 
your fragile experiment with democracy succeeding. 
 
Biden thus elevates the consequences of Ukraine’s choice of national identity—pro-
west or pro-Russian. If the Ukrainians make the wrong choice, they could disrupt the 
power balance across Europe—destabilizing it once again and triggering another Cold 
War. Obama makes similar arguments: “Because of the work of generations, because 
we’ve stood together in a great alliance, because people across this continent have 
forged a European Union dedicated to cooperation and peace, we have made historic 
progress toward the vision we share—a Europe that is whole and free and at peace.”82 
As a nationalism from above discourse, the Cold War ideas of democracy and 
capitalist prosperity deployed by American leaders construct a version of Ukrainian 
nationalism that is European, self-determining, and economically prosperous. In 
making these arguments, Obama champions popular sovereignty that blends together 
American and Ukrainian interests. In doing so, he paradoxically defends expression 
free from outside influence while clearly endorsing one particular choice benefiting 
the United States. 
Ukrainian identity as a resistance to Russian aggression 
The Cold War themes of peace, aligned with the west, and war, aligned with 
the Soviet Union, also characterize this discourse. This idea stresses the atrocities and 
military aggression carried out by the Russian Federation in flagrant disregard for 
international law and human rights. In this narrative, the Ukrainian people are 





defenders of freedom and western-style democracy. This rhetoric encourages a free 
and independent Ukraine that establishes its post-Cold War identity, while nudging 
the nation closer to western alliances in ways reminiscent of the Cold War—where 
nations either lined up on the side of the west or the USSR. Several speeches from 
American political leaders define this theme in the events surrounding the Crimean 
crisis and Russian military interventions in eastern Ukraine. 
American leaders described the Russian Federation as the violent, militaristic 
aggressor, both in Crimea and in eastern Ukraine. This characterization of Russia 
began almost immediately after the Revolution of Dignity. Obama exclaimed at the 
time, “We are now deeply concerned by reports of military movements taken by the 
Russian Federation inside of Ukraine. It would be a clear violation of Russia’s 
commitment to respect the independence and sovereignty and borders of Ukraine, and 
of international laws.”83 Political leaders would frequently use the theme of Russia 
flagrantly violating international laws and norms throughout the crisis. In his Estonia 
speech, Obama continued this theme: “Keep in mind that, repeatedly, President Putin 
has ignored the opportunity to resolve the crisis in Ukraine diplomatically.”84 
Similarly, Ambassador Pyatt argued, “The Russian government’s illegal ‘annexation’ 
of Crimea caused this crisis.”85 Thus, a central theme in American rhetoric 
surrounding the Ukraine crisis is that Russia caused and sustained the conflict in 
violation of international laws and norms. This discourse echoes Cold War 
characterizations of the Soviet Union as an aggressive, duplicitous nation ignoring the 
international community and acting only in its national interests. In calling for a post-





This effort by American leaders to frame the Ukraine crisis in terms of 
international laws and norms fundamentally undercuts calls for Ukrainian self-
determination. It paradoxically suggests that a country’s conception of nationalism 
also has to be adjudicated and condoned by other sovereign nations and international 
organizations. As Obama explains, “The United States, the European Union, our 
partners around the world have all said we prefer a diplomatic solution.”86 Even 
though Obama seems to be arguing for a nationalism from below perspective, his 
vision is very top-down, making the case for national and international-level solutions 
to the crisis. While Obama’s rhetoric speaks from the view of the Ukraine people, 
struggling for a better life, his solutions embrace the perspective of a political leader 
who, along with other political leaders and institutions, will determine whether 
Ukraine’s identity is correct and legitimate. The United States’ leaders thus embrace 
the self-determination of the Ukrainian people while at the same time paradoxically 
trying to determine Ukraine’s self-determination for them, in ways benefiting western 
interests and undermining Russian influence. 
This undercuts Obama’s calls for Ukrainian self-determination, because 
Ukrainian sovereignty is still determined by western oversight and legitimation. Such 
determinations inherently favor western nations. Glanville explains: “Powerful states 
have for much of sovereignty’s history been able to exert unequal influence and 
successfully bend international consensus about the rules of sovereignty to their own 
will.”87 Similarly, Samuel Barkin argues: “It is usually the conceptions of legitimacy 
and sovereignty of the existing powerful states in international relations that become 





champions the popular sovereignty of the Ukrainian people while also making clear 
that western-dominated institutions must legitimize Ukraine’s choice of national 
identity. So even as U.S. leaders affirm Ukraine’s right of non-intervention 
(sovereignty), they are at once delicately (from below) and boldly (from above) 
intervening—at least rhetorically—into Ukraine’s process of self-determination. Such 
a framework turns Ukraine into a political football between Russia, the United States, 
and the international organizations, sidelining Ukraine from such decision-making. 
Thus, Ukraine is caught in the middle of nation-states and international organizations 
trying to dictate their identity and the details of their sovereignty. This too is a legacy 
of the Cold War where satellite countries were pawns in this larger political dispute 
over their political future. While Obama and others sought to undercut Russian 
legitimacy in Ukraine, their actions exposed the hollowness of American calls for 
Ukrainian sovereignty.  
These negative characterizations of the Russian Federation escalated 
following the downing of Malaysian Airlines Flight 17. President Obama carefully 
outlines the tragic loss of life, and then blames the Russian Federation’s actions in 
eastern Ukraine for the disaster. He first explains the humanitarian cost of the downed 
jet: “Over the last several days our hearts have been absolutely broken as we’ve 
learned more about the extraordinary and beautiful lives that were lost—men, women 
and children and infants who were killed so suddenly and so senselessly.”89 Dwelling 
on the brutality of the attack and on the horrific loss of life serves a rhetorical 
function; these arguments reinforce that the Russians have engaged in hostile actions 





much of the Cold War sparring between the United States and the Soviet Union, and 
characterizes the American rhetoric surrounding the Ukraine crisis. Moreover, Obama 
again speaks from a “from below” perspective in reifying the “consent of the 
governed” viewpoint, which positions the people as determining Ukraine’s future. 
The people would surely denounce such horrific acts of murder and turn away from 
Russia and toward Europe when determining the future of their nation. 
 The next step for Obama is to expressly link the atrocities of the Russian-
backed separatists with the Russian government itself. Obama makes clear that the 
separatists are merely a shadow-funded army in eastern Ukraine funded by the 
Russians. This again makes clear that the Russians are directly responsible for this 
staggering loss of life: 
Now, Russia has extraordinary influence over these separatists. No one denies 
that. Russia has urged them on. Russia has trained them. We know that Russia 
has armed them with military equipment and weapons, including anti-aircraft 
weapons. Key separatist leaders are Russian citizens. So given its direct 
influence over the separatists, Russia, and President Putin in particular, has 
direct responsibility to compel them to cooperate with the investigation. That 
is the least that they can do.90 
 
Obama suggests that without the support and political cover from the Russian 
government, Malaysian Airlines Flight 17 would not have been shot down. He 
reasons that the Russian leadership, and President Putin, is therefore directly 
responsible for this loss of life. He accuses the Russian government as murdering 
warmongers responsible for the deaths of innocent people. Biden similarly 
characterizes the Russian government as responsible for the instability and violence 
in Ukraine: “And as Russia continues to send its thugs, its troops, its mercenaries 





are organized, commanded and directed by Moscow.”91 The worse the 
characterization of Russia, the more Obama can nudge the Ukrainians toward the 
west in the second Cold War. Obama thus paradoxically embraces the perspective of 
Ukrainian citizens while speaking in his capacity as a political leader; he calls for 
Ukraine to condemn Russia while paradoxically championing their freedom from 
outside interference.  
 A second component of this Cold War theme is to characterize the west and 
its allies as peaceful in contrast to the warring, violent Soviet Union. In this case, 
Kerry argues that the Ukrainian leadership had done everything in its power to 
facilitate a peaceful solution to the conflict in eastern Ukraine: “We met in Geneva 
with a clear mission: to improve security conditions and find political solutions to the 
conflict threatening the sovereignty and unity of Ukraine. The world has rightly 
judged that Prime Minister Yatsenyuk and the government of Ukraine are working in 
good faith…”92 Kerry argues that the Russian leadership is the single biggest 
impediment to finding peace in Ukraine. Beyond characterizing the Russian 
leadership as responsible for the conflict, Kerry suggests that the Russian leaders 
enabled its continuation. Kerry explains:  
The world, sadly, has rightly judged that Russia has put its faith in distraction, 
deception and destabilization….Russia has refused to take a single concrete 
step in the right direction. Not a single Russian official—not one—has 
publicly gone on television in Ukraine and called on the separatists to support 
the Geneva Agreement, to support the stand-down, to give up their weapons 
and get out of the Ukrainian buildings.93 
 
Whereas the Ukrainian leadership had complied with peace agreements, the Russian 





contract between the peaceful Ukrainians and warring Russians, Kerry deploys this 
Cold War theme to define Ukrainian nationalism. 
 Biden summarizes this idea by exploring the ways in which Russia instigated 
and maintained the conflict, and how the United States would continue to resist this 
nefarious geopolitical maneuvering. For Biden, Russian aggression could only be met 
with heroic western force. In this theme, the western nations rallying to Ukraine’s 
side were doing so in defense of a smaller, vulnerable nation under attack from a 
regional hegemon. Biden explains:  
Russia has violated these ground rules and continues to violate them. Today 
Russia is occupying sovereign Ukrainian territory. Let me be crystal clear: 
The United States does not, will not, never will recognize Russia’s attempt to 
annex the Crimea. It’s that simple. There is no justification….So the United 
States will continue to stand with Ukraine against Russian aggression. We're 
providing support to help and train and assist your security forces, and we’ve 
relied on and rallied the rest of the world to Ukraine’s cause.94  
 
“Russian aggression” and characterizations of American heroism echoes Cold War 
themes and rhetorical strategies. American leaders use these strands of a peaceful 
west and a warring Russia bent on regional domination of satellite nations during the 
Ukraine conflict. In the process, these political leaders construct a vision of Ukrainian 
nationalism that is democratic, European, and peaceful, while also willing to defend 
these core values against Russian aggression. American leaders paradoxically urge 
Ukraine to look west while also defending Ukraine’s right to self-determination free 
from outside interference. U.S. leaders put pressure on Ukraine to choose a 
democratic future while also condemning Russia for meddling in their neighbor’s 
affairs. The following section explores the rhetoric of ordinary Ukrainians in the 





Nationalism from below: Russian atrocities and Ukrainian freedom 
Protests broke out in New York following President Putin’s 2015 visit to the 
United Nations. These responses from ordinary citizens reflect the vision “from 
below” of Ukrainian nationalism. When Biden spoke of “nearly 1 million proud 
Ukrainian Americans” during his 2015 address to the Ukrainian parliament, he was 
speaking of a community in a complicated nationalist liminal space. Many recent 
immigrants still had family in Ukraine, and were presumably watching the escalating 
violence characterizing the crisis with shock and alarm. When Vladimir Putin visited 
New York City and the United Nations for the first time in 10 years, only 18 months 
after the Revolution of Dignity, various Ukrainian American groups jumped at the 
chance to protest the Russian leader. Newsweek explains: “The protest was organized 
by the Ukrainian Congress Committee of America, American European Solidarity 
Council and United Ukrainian American Organizations of New York.”95 Through 
media coverage of the event, themes from the protest represented calls for Ukrainian 
freedom and a condemnation of perceived Russian atrocities in Ukraine. These 
protests by ordinary Ukrainian Americans constructed a vision of Ukrainian 
nationalism from below that was independent of Russian influence and heroically 
resisting Russian occupation.  
Hundreds of protesters gathered outside the United Nations, many wearing 
traditional Ukrainian attire, with flowers in their hair. The Ukrainian Weekly explains 
the protest: “While Ukrainians were being escorted from inside the main hall for 
holding aloft a Ukrainian flag, a united mix of nationalities and human rights 





MH17” from across the street.”96 One pointed protest sign likely summarized the 
feelings of some in attendance:  
#PutinKills 
Don’t Believe 
A War Criminal97 
 
This rhetoric suggests that Russia is committing a perpetual act of war in Ukraine 
through its occupation of Crimea and ongoing engagements in the Donbas region. 
Moreover, such protest rhetoric extends Cold War assumptions from the era of the 
Soviet Union—an aggressive, dishonest, warlike nation bent on dominating its 
republics, including Ukraine. In characterizing the Russian government in this 
manner, while also stressing, “Crimea is Ukraine,” protesters constructed an image of 
Ukrainian nationalism similar to those of U.S. and Ukrainian political leaders. Russia 
was a warlike nation in violation of numerous international laws, responsible for the 
murder of innocent civilians, and actively subverting the democratic process and 
institutions in Ukraine. Conversely, these messages suggest that Ukrainians the world 
over simply wanted basic democratic freedoms and self-determination to secure a 
firm place in Europe, and to enjoy the economic prosperity that comes with being a 
part of those communities.  
 This protest contributes to our understanding of Ukrainian identity by 
suggesting that notions of popular sovereignty extend beyond traditional conceptions 
of borders. In an international climate, national identities can transcend territorial 
boundaries. Voters who endorsed the Poroshenko regime’s pro-European agenda 
articulate the “will” of the Ukrainian people. However, in the protest in New York, 





in the matter. This protest thus isolates the intersection of different sources of 
legitimization for sovereignty—the will of the people and how that will is expressed 
through the people’s representatives in parliament.  
Implications and conclusions 
The United States constructed a vision of Ukrainian nationalism that was 
democratic and dependent on the self-determination of the Ukrainian people to 
choose their own destiny. This nationalist articulation was also grounded in a 
European orientation and the prosperity of a capitalist economy free from Soviet-era 
corruption and post-Soviet crony capitalism. Such an American conception of 
Ukrainian nationalism was fiercely resistant to the brutal, violent Russian occupation 
of Ukrainian territory. All of these features reflect themes from the Cold War. For 
much of the twentieth century, the United States relied on the exceptionalism of 
democracy and American capitalism to construct an image of the west as peacefully 
resisting violent aggression from the Soviet Union. The reliance on Cold War themes 
to characterize Ukrainian nationalism in the current crisis reflects the durability of 
these ideologies to characterize political events in a post-Cold War world.  
There are vulnerabilities to this American nationalist imaginary for Ukraine. 
Whereas Russian rhetoric can rely on a shared history, culture, language, and religion 
to appeal to the Ukrainian people, the United States has no such advantages. The 
themes of the Cold War echo a time in which the United States and Ukraine itself had 
a complicated relationship given that Ukraine—by force—existed in the Soviet orbit. 
Ukrainians were subjected to anti-American rhetoric for decades from the Soviet 





iron curtain. Ukrainians have shown both affinity and hostility toward the United 
States and the west in general. Thus, the same divisions that make fostering a 
unifying Ukrainian nationalism so challenging make it increasingly complicated for 
non-Ukrainian actors to find a broadly appealing message that galvanizes Ukrainian 
identity around a western democratic vision. The similarities between the “from 
above” and “from below” characterizations of Ukrainian nationalism—an identity 
that is democratic, enjoying the prosperity of Europe, and fiercely resistant to Russian 
rule—might struggle to appeal to anyone who did not already agree with this 
characterization of Ukrainian identity and the direction of the country. When many of 
these rhetorical strategies call for Ukrainians to make great personal financial 
sacrifices in the fight against corruption, American leaders will need to do more to 
appeal to a wider swath of Ukrainians.  
These paradoxical American visions of Ukrainian nationalism are also 
vulnerable to accusations of hypocrisy and self-interest. Glanville argues: “It is 
generally accepted by students of international relations that sovereignty is 
constituted through recognition.”98 In the case of Ukraine, American leaders 
frequently assert or imply the right to do the recognizing. The United States 
champions self-determination and independence for Ukrainians to determine their 
own destiny. However, this is an argument that only seems to appear when the 
Ukrainian people choose a closer alliance with the west, and in ways benefiting 
American interests in the region. When pro-Russian candidate Viktor Yanykovich 
legitimately and convincingly won the 2010 presidential election, pulling Ukraine 





self-determination and democracy. Ukraine is thus caught between two global 
superpowers who are eager to stoke nationalist fervor in the name of self-interest. 
Building lasting relationships and joining global communities is therefore challenging 
without a foundation of mutual trust and respect. The Cold War battles over 
sovereignty and identity are officially over, though Ukraine remains trapped. 
Recent political developments in the United States significantly complicate 
matters. Newly confirmed secretary of state and former oil company executive Rex 
Tillerson, in one of his first diplomatic trips abroad, waded into questions about 
Ukrainian nationalism and America’s role in the current crisis. Bloomberg Politics 
reports: “‘Why should U.S. taxpayers be interested in Ukraine?’ Tillerson asked 
foreign ministers discussing Russia’s intervention there at a Group of Seven gathering 
Tuesday in Lucca, Italy.”99 Whereas the Obama administration championed global 
and regional alliances and the value of folding Ukraine into these communities, the 
Trump administration’s foreign policy—while unpredictable—appears much less 
interested in fostering Ukrainian democracy, economic prosperity, and its ability to 
resist Russian intervention in its territory. During the 2016 presidential campaign, 
President Trump insisted, “Putin is not going to go into Ukraine,” despite occupying 
Crimea for two and half years at the time.100 The future of America in fostering 
Ukrainian nationalism, and Ukraine’s place in Europe, therefore remain in doubt.101 
The following chapter explores the ways in which international organizations 
articulated and challenged conceptions of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty.
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When the United Nations General Assembly convened on March 27, 2014, 
the global community was in crisis. The Russian government had facilitated a 
referendum in Crimea that reunified the peninsula with the Russian Federation 11 
days earlier. The Ukrainian government was in chaos and could do little to resist 
Russian actions. Two months before Petro Poroshenko would be elected, the nation 
was under the interim leadership of Oleksandr Valentynovych Turchynov because 
ousted former President Viktor Yanykovich had fled the country.1 Western nations 
were seemingly powerless to stop Russian intervention into Ukrainian territory, while 
much of Eastern Europe reasonably feared they might be the next targets of a Russian 
land grab.2 Representatives from 169 countries gathered at the United Nations to 
debate the Crimean annexation and discuss a proposal calling on nations to not 
recognize the referendum. The scene was reminiscent of Cold War disputes between 
the United States and the Soviet Union; once again, the two global superpowers 
sparred on the world stage, using international institutions to make their case while 
condemning the actions of their geopolitical foe.3  
This dispute showcases what can happen to self-determination and 
sovereignty when nation-states like Ukraine paradoxically embody diverse historical 
allegiances and identities. The result is a splintering that invites outside interference 
in an attempt to help these post-Soviet satellite regions define their national identity 
in ways that most advantage external actors engaged in power plays. A notion of top-
down nationalism is constructed as the United States, Russia, and international 





Smith frames U.S. political influences (specifically theories of citizenship) in terms of 
a “multiple traditions thesis.” This chapter argues that sovereignty and international 
law represent two such traditions animating constructions of Ukrainian nationalism 
and the battle over self-determination. Both traditions function paradoxically in this 
conflict. Sovereignty is interpreted both as non-intervention and an obligation to 
violate the territorial integrity of a nation-state when human rights are threatened 
there; such interpretations obligate the international community to leave Ukraine 
alone and intervene to stop Russian actions within its borders. Similarly, international 
law is used by political states to justify their vision of foreign policy and is 
disregarded when it no longer serves the needs of global powers like Russia and the 
United States. Such disputes in the international community explain why Ukraine 
struggles to gain and maintain sovereignty, fails to achieve consensus in its national 
identity, and continues to be vulnerable to external aggression and internal division.  
Leaders of the United States, the Russian Federation, and Ukraine each seek 
to use international organizations in ways that legitimize their interpretation of 
Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. Similarly, the leaders of international 
organizations attempt to exert influence over the actions of individual nations in the 
conflict by defining Ukrainian identity in different ways. While previous chapters 
isolated tensions between political leaders and ordinary citizens in defining Ukrainian 
nationalism from above and below, such a relationship is less applicable when 
exploring the rhetoric of international organizations. This tension between national 





the relationship between nationalism and internationalism in adjudicating questions of 
identity and sovereignty on the world stage. 
This chapter examines the response of international institutions to the current 
Ukrainian conflict. This chapter explores how international organizations 
(specifically the European Union, the North Atlantic Treaty Organization, and United 
Nations) grapple with meanings of sovereignty in Ukraine and how nations use those 
same institutions to define Ukrainian nationalism. I first analyze related United 
Nations resolutions passed since the current conflict began in 2014. Second, I 
examine the speeches delivered by Vladimir Putin and Petro Poroshenko in the U.N. 
General Assembly on September 2015. Third, I explore the 2015 deliberations of the 
Ukrainian parliament over passage of a non-discrimination bill as a condition for 
visa-free travel to the European Union. Fourth, I examine the European Union’s 
official responses to the crisis, including speeches by EU leaders. Finally, I explore 
the speeches by NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen surrounding the 
crisis. 
The Cold War and internationalism  
Understanding the relationship between international institutions and nations 
in the current conflict demands an explication of the Cold War origins and ideological 
underpinnings. Scholars have also extended considerable effort defining theories of 
internationalism. Micheline Ishay argues that internationalism is “commonly 
perceived as an ideology that stresses universal justice and political rights regardless 
of national, ethnic, or religious origins....”4 She suggests that internationalism is “a 





progressive thinkers and historical events.” For Ishay, “‘Progressive’ refers to… 
actions and ideas that challenge the status quo in pursuit of altruistic ends.”5 
Internationalism theory calls for leaders to act in ways that benefit other nations and 
international communities. As she explains, internationalism is “the historical record 
of progressive events and thoughts clustered around philosophical, political, and 
social perspectives.”6 It is an ideological commitment to a global community. Ishay 
argues that internationalism must be understood as “guidelines describing social 
relations between and within states. Internationalism assumes a dynamic between the 
global and the domestic social arrangement.”7 Because internationalism is an 
evolving process, those guidelines suggesting international relationships between 
nations have evolved over time. 
The notion of a global commitment to a collective decision-making process 
can be traced back to the Peace of Westphalia in 1648. International relations scholars 
often see that treaty as a turning point in global communities. Ian Clarke explains: 
“[The treaty was a] development of a sense of international society, grounded in 
shared concepts of international legitimacy...constituted by mutual recognition and a 
procedural principle of international consensus.”8 Luke Glanville argues that this 
collective national and international consciousness was revolutionary: “There was a 
belief that states would comply with the settlement because it was the mediated 
expression of their collective will.”9 Hedley Bull makes the case that the very 
sovereignty of individual nations was given to them by international communities:  
Whatever rights are due to states or nations or other actions in international 
relations, they are subject to and limited by the rights of the international 
community. The rights of sovereign states, and of sovereign peoples or 





are limited by them…The idea of sovereign rights existing apart from the 
rules laid down by international society itself and enjoyed without 
qualification has to be rejected in principle.10 
 
Under this Westphalian philosophy, collective national communities were not only 
possible, but also beneficial for global order. Glanville continues: “Among the 
provisions negotiated in 1648 were enforceable responsibilities of statehood.”11 Such 
responsibilities are at the core of internationalism. 
Historically, internationalism has been used to justify colonization and empire 
building. The British, French, and Dutch efforts to control South Africa (1652-1795), 
the Spanish-American war (1898), the Eight-Nation Alliance putting down the Boxer 
Rebellion in China (1899-1901), and the U.S. war against the Philippines (1899-
1902), are all examples where leaders used internationalist arguments to validate 
colonization and extend empires.12 For instance, Senator Albert Beveridge called for 
America to continue its “march toward the commercial supremacy of the world” in 
his 1898 “March of the Flag” address, urging senators to look beyond their borders 
and colonize the Philippines.13 While internationalism was used to justify 
colonization, it has conversely been used as a framework for resisting such attacks on 
a global scale.   
Following World War I, President Woodrow Wilson argued for a global 
system of government, shifting conceptions of internationalism from empire building 
to peacemaking, where global communities would come together to prevent future 
wars. Harold Josephson argues that Wilson tried to transform “the world from a 
warlike state of nature to an orderly global society governed by liberal norms.”14 His 





orderly…world system of competing nation-states.”15 If such alliances succeeded, 
war would be prevented through the passage of international laws and enforced by an 
overarching association of nations. Such agreements would take the form of broad 
non-aggression pacts signed by associated members and non-members alike.16 The 
Wilsonian political vision included a democratic world government, diplomacy, trade, 
labor protections, disarmament, and the formation of a “general association of 
nations” to draw “covenants for the purpose of affording mutual guarantees of 
political independence and territorial integrity to great and small states alike.”17 
Wilson faced strong resistance at the time, and his proposal was defeated in the 
United States even though, at its height, 58 other nations opted to join the League of 
Nations in its twenty-six year history (1920-1946).18  
Although Wilson’s call for a global government was unsuccessful in the short 
term, his internationalism model for global integration persisted.19 The League of 
Nations did operate for a number of years without American involvement, and other 
international organizations followed in its wake. One such organization is the United 
Nations (UN). Founded after World War II, Article I of the UN Charter explains its 
purpose:  
Maintain international peace and security; develop friendly relations among 
nations based on respect for the principle of equal rights and self-
determination; achieve international cooperation in solving international 
problems of an economic, social, cultural, or humanitarian character, and in 
promoting and encouraging respect for human rights and for fundamental 
freedoms for all without distinction as to race, sex, language, or religion; and 
to be a centre for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment of these 






The UN would offer a global forum for public deliberation, conduct humanitarian 
relief efforts, and levy economic sanctions against nations violating these founding 
principles. Such actions follow Wilson’s internationalist vision.  
At the April 1945 United Nations Conference on International Organizations 
in San Francisco, world leaders articulated the purpose of the new organization. At its 
core was a fundamental paradox: a simultaneous commitment to the sovereignty of 
the nation-state—support for self-determination and a belief in the principle of non-
intervention—and an expectation that sovereign nations had a responsibility to protect 
the human rights of vulnerable populations against unscrupulous governments and 
unwanted attacks from aggressor nations. President Truman exclaimed, “We must 
build a new world—a better world—one in which the eternal dignity of man is 
respected.”21 Glanville explains, “The Soviets had also warmed to the idea of human 
rights…” as part of this new international organization.22 However, while the 
preservation of human rights was a stated goal of the UN, so was the adherence to the 
principle of non-intervention. As Glanville argues:  
On the one hand, the UN Charter established what have become known as the 
“traditional” rights of state sovereignty. The rights of sovereign peoples to 
govern themselves and to be free from outside interference that has been 
gradually consolidated as legal rules since the eighteenth century were now 
firmly established in international law. On the other hand, the charter hinted at 
an alternative and sometimes-competing conception of popular sovereignty 
that insists that the enjoyment of these rights to self-government and freedom 
from interference requires the promotion and protection of the rights of 
individuals within the state. We find the endorsement of both human rights 
and nations and state rights in the charter’s preamble.23  
 
In that preamble, the charter endorses the choices of “the Peoples of the United 
Nations…to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights” and also “respect for the 





the international community was left to construct ways to navigate tensions between 
national borders and the universal protection of human rights around the world.  
 Throughout the Cold War, this tension between human rights and non-
intervention were used as rhetorical tools by both the United States and the Soviet 
Union. Glanville explains practices of non-intervention: “Soviet bloc states and 
Western states also championed this conception of sovereignty when it was in their 
political and strategic interests to do so.”25 However, human rights were also 
deployed when it served the interests of global powers. As was frequently the case 
during the Cold War, the United Nations General Assembly became a forum for 
dueling nationalist narratives over territory. Most notably, ambassadors Adlai 
Stevenson and Valerian Zorin sparred during the Cuban Missile Crisis; both nations 
used the international media coverage of the debate for propaganda purposes. From 
the perspective of the Soviet Union, American aggression in Cuba, Turkey, and 
Taiwan spurred the conflict, and the Soviet government had every right to defend 
itself and support its regional ally.26 Zorin, Soviet Ambassador to the UN, outlined his 
strategy in a telegram to the Soviet Foreign Ministry: “The USA's aggressions against 
Cuba cannot be evaluated as anything other than a provocation pushing the world to 
the verge of nuclear war.”27 The Soviet narrative was one of American overreach and 
territorial intrusion. Conversely, the American version of events emphasized Soviet 
aggression that threatened global security.28 Ambassador Stevenson exclaimed, “We 
are here today and have been this week for one single reason—because the Soviet 
Union secretly introduced this menacing offensive military buildup into the island of 





the United States and the Soviet Union brought their rhetorical war of words to the 
global community in their battle over territorial and military expansion. However, as 
Glanville explains: “…despite these profound developments, international 
enforcement of human rights in the internal affairs of sovereign states remained for 
the most part illegitimate through the last decades of the Cold War.”30 While human 
rights were increasingly understood as a global problem, traditional conceptions of 
sovereignty as non-intervention prevailed for much of the Cold War, as human rights 
alone were rarely a sufficient justification for violating the borders of nation-states.31  
Following the Cold War, a global shift towards an increasing acceptance of 
human rights as a defining feature of sovereignty superseding claims of non-
intervention began to take shape. Human rights began to function as a rationale for 
intervention. Glanville explains: “This was facilitated by the ending of bipolar 
conflict. The end of the Cold War profoundly changed the dynamics of international 
relations and made possible an increase in Security Council activities in pursuit of 
international peace and security.”32 UN Secretary General Perez de Cuellar defined 
the meaning of the Cold War’s end for international relations in his 1991 General 
Assembly address: “The extinction of the bipolarity associated with the Cold War has 
no doubt removed the factor that virtually immobilized international relations over 
four decades. It has cured the Security Council’s paralysis and helped immensely in 
resolving regional conflicts.”33 Mary Stuckey argues that this shift towards “Human 
Rights” can be traced to the Carter administration: “Carter did help put human rights 
on the national agenda, and over time he helped make the issue a persistent theme in 





increasingly viewed as possessing a responsibility to protect the human rights of 
vulnerable peoples in other countries.35 
In 2005, the United Nations endorsed a “responsibility to protect” for the first 
time. Glanville defines this concept: “Central to the ‘responsibility to protect’ concept 
is the idea that sovereign states are responsible for the protection of their populations 
from mass atrocities and that they are accountable not only to their own people but 
also to international society for the performance of this duty.”36 The United Nations 
had departed from Cold War understandings of sovereignty as primarily grounded in 
principles of non-intervention, and instead reserved the right to intervene, with force, 
in the name of human rights. When this principle was applied in Libya in 2011, it 
represented a stark departure from traditional understandings of sovereignty. 
Glanville explains: “Never before had the principle of international enforcement of 
sovereign responsibilities been so clearly endorsed by international society as it was 
in the 2005 summit agreement.”37 The agreement outlines these principles and 
obligations: 
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations 
against genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against 
humanity…. 
139. The international community, through the United Nations, also has the 
responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful 
means, in accordance with Chapters VI and VII of the Charter, to help protect 
populations from genocide, war crimes and crimes against humanity. On this 





The international community acknowledged both the inherent obligation to act in 
accordance with international norms regarding human rights within a nation’s own 
borders, but also an obligation to enforce those principles worldwide. 
Similarly, the European Union’s (EU) charter expresses goals parallel to those 
of the UN: “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, liberty, 
democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities.”39 The EU often uses its comparatively strong 
currency, the Euro, as an incentive to get potential member states to meet these 
foundational human rights benchmarks.40 These actions and founding documents 
suggest an international European identity defined by peace and global cooperation. 
While the UN and EU have used internationalism to focus on peaceful 
alternatives to war and to promote human rights, the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization’s charter roots its genesis in a national security alliance. NATO was 
founded in 1949 to deter Soviet aggression during the Cold War. Founding NATO 
members were Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Iceland, Italy, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, Norway, Portugal, the United Kingdom, and the United States. At the 
time, the European states had good reason to fear Soviet expansion, and an alliance 
made political sense. NATO’s charter lays out its mission in this way: “Parties agree 
that an armed attack against one or more of them in Europe or North America shall be 
considered an attack against them all.”41 All NATO members are committed to 
defending any NATO member with force.42 Thus, international organizations are 





ideologies have supported diverse international causes ranging from humanitarian 
missions to national security alliances. 
International organizations thus have been used as vehicles for both 
internationalist and nationalist ideologies and interests. Nations have used 
international institutions to legitimize and justify their actions and attack their 
geopolitical rivals. Gaining the endorsement of international communities of nations 
for actions lends credibility to the foreign policy actions of nations and to the 
articulations of identity and sovereignty that political leaders and ordinary citizens 
offer. However, such institutions have also pressured individual nations to alter their 
behavior and follow international norms. The goals and actions of international 
organizations differ greatly, and their role in global politics must be accounted for in 
understanding the current Ukrainian crisis. Several themes emerge from debates at the 
United Nations, including the support for international law, internationalist values and 
global norms, and self-determination. 
International law and Ukrainian identity  
 The international community met during the 68th United Nations General 
Assembly to debate how to respond to the Russian annexation of Crimea and the 
subsequent referendum that saw the peninsula reunify with the Russian Federation. 
The Acting Minister for Foreign Affairs of Ukraine, Andrii Deshchytsia, introduced 
the draft resolution calling for the body to denounce Russian aggression in the 
Crimean region. He argued that the measure was essential for both Ukraine and for 
“every United Nations Member State, even more so for the United Nations and the 





“What has happened in my country is a direct violation of the United Nations Charter. 
Many struggle to grasp the reality—it happened in Ukraine, in the very heart of 
Europe.  It happened in the twenty-first century.”44 The measure eventually passed on 
a vote of 100 in favor, 11 against, with 58 abstentions; Russia would later veto the 
resolution. An overview of the resolution provided by the United Nations explains the 
meaning of the results: “The General Assembly today affirmed its commitment to 
Ukraine’s sovereignty, political independence, unity and territorial integrity within its 
internationally recognized borders, underscoring the invalidity of the 16 March 
referendum held in autonomous Crimea.”45 The vote was thus a decisive victory for 
the pro-western interpretation of Ukrainian identity, despite the Russian veto as a 
permanent member of the Security Council.  
International law quickly emerged as a central theme in the debates, as both 
sides argued over whether Russian actions were legal. Questions of legality reflect a 
legitimizing function when defining Ukrainian identity. Glanville explains the role of 
legitimization of sovereignty by international communities: “In both domestic and 
international societies, sovereignty has historically been constructed by the successful 
legitimation of authority claims…”46 One of the principle ways to legitimate claims 
of sovereignty was through international law. Glanville argues: “In both natural law 
and treaty law, then, sovereignty was understood to entail externally enforceable 
responsibilities for the protection of subjects.”47 If the Russian referendum were to be 
seen as “legal” by the global community, then the Russian interpretation of Ukrainian 
sovereignty would have won the argument. If the actions by Russia were deemed 





nation would have prevailed. Thus, framing Russian actions in terms of their legality 
called on the international community via the United Nations to adjudicate Russian, 
Ukrainian, and American interpretations of Ukrainian nationalism. 
 Multiple nations framed Russian actions in Crimea as a flagrant violation of 
international law. Vlad Lupan, the representative of the Republic of Moldova, argued 
that the Crimean referendum violated Ukraine’s Constitution and international law.48 
Similarly, Ibrahim O. A. Dabbashi of Libya said he had voted for the resolution for 
“its commitment to the principles of international law and the Charter.”49 The 
Ukrainian delegation presented the legality of the issue in similar and more concrete 
terms: 
After two weeks of military occupation, an integral part of Ukraine had been 
forcibly annexed by a State that had previously committed itself to guarantee 
that country’s independence, sovereignty and territory integrity in accordance 
with the Budapest Memorandum; by a State which happened to be one of the 
permanent members of the United Nations Security Council, entrusted by the 
Organization’s membership with primary responsibility for the maintenance 
of international peace and security.50 
 
 Here, Ukrainian representatives also said that Russian actions violated the Budapest 
Memorandum, written as a condition of Ukraine surrendering its nuclear weapons 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Similarly, Russia was violating the Minsk 
Agreement in occupying Crimea, which called for: “Withdrawal of all foreign armed 
formations, military equipment, as well as mercenaries from the territory of Ukraine 
under monitoring of the OSCE. Disarmament of all illegal groups.”51 Deshchytsia 
thus argues that the Russia Federation violated international law on several counts, 
both at the international and bilateral levels, in flaunting the Budapest Memorandum 





their identity in international law and called on the global community to legitimize 
their national sovereignty while condemning Russian actions. 
Others in attendance agreed with the Ukrainian interpretation. Thomas Mayr-
Harting, Head of the European Union Delegation, concurred, stating that the 
European Union did not recognize the illegal referendum in Crimea. He argued 
Russian actions were a clear violation of Ukraine’s Constitution and he strongly 
condemned the illegal annexation of Crimea and Sevastopol to the Russian 
Federation, which the EU equally would not recognize.52 Liechtenstein’s 
representative, Christian Wenaweser, also concurred with the Ukrainian 
interpretation, exclaiming that the Russian Federation’s annexation of Crimea and 
Sevastopol represented a very serious violation of international law. Wenaweser 
explained his vote for the measure, arguing that United Nations Charter committed 
the international community to the principle of territorial integrity and the right of 
self-determination of peoples in conformity with international law.53 
These representatives suggest that the Russian actions violated international 
law on its face. If there is to be a global community of nations, they reasoned, the rule 
of law must be respected. From the perspective of pro-western representatives and 
especially those bordering the Russian Federation, the consequences of violating this 
compact are dire, as the security and peace of every nation is seemingly threatened. If 
the Russian Federation could annex part of Ukrainian territory, then they could 
seemingly ignore the borders of other nations. The theme of international law thus 
reflects a sense of self-interest from the nations voting in favor. Ukraine’s 





polycentric world order, equal and indivisible security in full conformity with the 
United Nations Charter basic principles of sovereign equality, territorial integrity of 
any State.”54 The notion that any state is protected by international law was a 
powerful rhetorical tool for the proponents of the measure. In passing the resolution, 
the majority of U.N. delegations legitimized Ukraine’s own interpretation of their 
identity as pro-western and European, and delegitimized Russian acts of intervention 
in the sovereign Ukraine. 
 International law was also used as a rhetorical tool for the measure’s 
opponents. They argued that the law was on the Russian Federation’s side, and that 
the referendum was conducted in accordance with international rules. Ja Song Nam of 
the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea argued that Crimea’s reunification with 
the Russian Federation had been conducted legitimately through a referendum and in 
accordance with the UN Charter.55 Moreover, they claimed that it was the Ukrainian 
Maidan revolutionaries who were to blame for the current crisis by illegally 
overthrowing democratically-elected president Viktor Yankyovich. Samuel Moncada 
of Venezuela voted against the measure because his Government opposed the 
overthrow of the democratically-elected President.56 Moncada warned that it was “the 
overthrow of constitutional governments by extremist groups linked to foreign 
powers that had unleashed the Second World War.” He pivoted from this historical 
argument to the contemporary context in stressing how essential it was to re-establish 
the constitutional order in Ukraine.57 Nam similarly added that he was voting against 
the measure because the North Korean government “opposed attempts to overthrow 





and the illegality of Ukrainian actions in the Revolution of Dignity, the measure’s 
opponents conceded the importance of international law as a legitimizing force. 
Although they failed to stop the measure’s passage, they refused to concede the 
legitimacy of Russian interpretations of Ukrainian identity. 
While both the pro-western and pro-Russian delegations relied on the theme 
of international law to legitimize their interpretations of Ukrainian identity, a 
collection of 58 nations questioned the applicability of this theme altogether. Inga 
Rhonda King of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines said “the draft resolution and the 
arguments of its chief proponents called into question the universal applicability of 
international law in the current situation.”59 Although her government remained very 
concerned about the events in Crimea and eastern Ukraine, King argued that her 
government “viewed the text as motivated more by ‘principals’ than principles” and 
regretted that the Assembly “had failed to consider the historical context of the 
geopolitical dispute and the nature of the regime change.”60 A large percentage of the 
representatives thus argued that the situation in Crimea was less about international 
law and overarching democratic ideals than about a Cold War battle between the 
United States and the Russian Federation. When asked to adjudicate the legitimacy of 
Ukrainian, American, and Russian versions of Ukrainian identity in accordance with 
international law, many nations simply refused. Like many nations during the Cold 
War who simply wanted to stay out of the way, this debate suggests that there are 
likely many nations who do not want to be caught between global superpowers over 





Eighteen months after the adoption of the resolution condemning the Crimean 
referendum, the United Nations General Assembly would again be the site of intense 
debate in ways reminiscent of the Cold War. At the seventieth general assembly, both 
Ukrainian President Poroshenko and Russian President Putin addressed the 
delegations. Both also relied on the theme of international law to legitimize their 
interpretations of Ukrainian identity. Poroshenko argued that Russian actions flaunt 
international law: “[Ukraine] is now suffering from a brutal violation of the 
fundamental norms and principles of the UN Charter. But, today, I have to recall that 
my country has become the object of external aggression.”61 Poroshenko elaborates 
his argument that Russia’s actions in Ukraine are especially egregious because they 
undercut the fundamental goals of the United Nations, taking advantage of Russia’s 
position of power on the Security Council to flaunt international laws: 
Moreover, this state is a permanent member of the UN Security Council, 
which is entrusted by the UN Charter with maintaining international peace 
and security. 70 years ago the creators of the UN Charter have envisaged the 
mechanism of the UN Security Council sanctions to be one of the restraining 
tools applied in response to the breaches of peace and acts of aggression. 
However, they couldn’t even imagine that this tool will be needed against the 
Aggressor State that is a Permanent member of the UN Security Council. 
Since the beginning of the aggression, Russia used its veto right twice, while 
the UN Security Council was considering questions related to Ukraine. At the 
outset, Russia blocked a draft resolution condemning the “fake referendum” 
on Crimea’s annexation in March 2014. The second time Russia put its 
shameful veto on the draft resolution on establishment of the International 
Tribunal to investigate and bring to justice all responsible for Malaysian 
MH17 plane crush. By imposing its disgraceful veto on this draft resolution, 
Russia clearly demonstrated to the whole world its defiance in establishing the 
truth. 62 
 
For Poroshenko, Russian actions are not only illegal, but they also short-circuit the 
international community’s ability to function as a legitimizing tool for Ukrainian 





member states in the UN from endorsing Ukraine’s move to the west, or to stop 
Russia’s violations of Ukrainian sovereignty, Russia has broken the ability of global 
communities to adjudicate claims of identity.   
As with the debate of the Crimean annexation, Poroshenko does not rely only 
on international law to make his case. He refers to bilateral agreements between 
Ukraine and Russia that are in shambles because of Russian actions:  
This time, the aggressor is Russia—neighboring country, former strategic 
partner that legally pledged to respect the sovereignty, territorial integrity and 
inviolability of the borders of Ukraine. This country used to be a guarantor of 
Ukraine's security under the Budapest Memorandum, whereby security 
guarantees were provided to my country in exchange for a voluntary 
renunciation of the world’s third nuclear arsenal.63  
 
Poroshenko argues that the consequences of Russian intervention in Ukraine are 
potentially dire. Not only do international institutions matter less, but even treaties 
between individual member states are also less significant. Trust between nations is 
eroded, and progress is denied. More importantly, on both national and international 
levels, Russia is refusing to accept the overwhelming consensus regarding Ukrainian 
sovereignty and identity. The argument is that Ukrainian articulations of their identity 
and sovereignty are denied the chance to be legitimized by the adjudication of 
international institutions because of Russian vetoes. Either Ukrainians accept the 
Russian vision for Ukrainian nationalism, or no other interpretation will be 
recognized.  
The European Union similarly framed the issue of Ukrainian identity and 
sovereignty in the wake of Russian interventions in Ukraine in terms of international 
law. Six months after the Russian annexation of Crimean, José Manuel Durão 





European Strategy Annual Meeting. There, he explained that Russian actions had dire 
consequences for Ukraine, Europe, and the entire global order: “The annexation of 
Crimea and destabilization of Eastern Ukraine was a blunt challenge to international 
law and order. It concerns not just Ukraine, but Europe as a whole and the wider 
international community.”64 Unsurprisingly, the EU representative viewed the 
conflict in Ukraine as a threat to Europe, since Russia disregarded the borders of 
another sovereign state. However, the EU leader also made the case that his regional 
organization could serve a legitimizing function for Ukrainian nationalism. In 
framing Ukrainian efforts to join Europe as a European and global concern, and 
deploying international law in the process, Borroso argued that the EU could also 
adjudicate claims of national identity and sovereignty.  
The North Atlantic Treaty Organization similarly used international law to 
legitimize pro-European interpretations of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. NATO 
leadership used both international precedent and bilateral treaties to make these 
arguments. Months after Petro Poroshenko’s 2014 election, the NATO-Ukraine 
Commission explained the role of international law in the current conflict: 
We, the Heads of State and Government of the NATO-Ukraine Commission, 
stand united in our support of Ukraine’s sovereignty and territorial integrity 
within its internationally recognized borders. We strongly condemn Russia’s 
illegal and illegitimate self-declared “annexation” of Crimea and its continued 
and deliberate destabilization of eastern Ukraine in violation of international 
law.65  
The existence of a NATO-Ukraine Commission is itself a statement on the role 
international organizations can play in positioning nations within global communities. 
NATO member states welcomed Ukraine and endorsed its interpretation of events, 





later, NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen would similarly use bilateral 
treaties to condemn Russian actions: “The aggressive actions and provocative 
statements of the separatists are in direct contradiction with the Minsk agreements. 
We call on Russia to stop its support for the separatists immediately, to stop 
destabilizing Ukraine and to respect its international commitments.”66 Through 
Rasmussen, NATO again legitimizes Ukraine’s interpretation of events within its 
disputed borders. Russia was to blame for ignoring international laws and bilateral 
agreements, and its vision for Ukrainian identity was therefore delegitimized. 
 The United Nations, European Union, and North Atlantic Treaty Organization 
all used international laws to legitimize Ukrainian interpretations of their identity as 
pro-western and European in orientation. Individual nations attempted to influence 
these decisions, and Russian representatives were somewhat successful at 
undermining these proceedings. However, in relying on both treaties and international 
laws, pro-Ukrainian representatives were able to garner some measure of legitimacy 
for their claims of identity and sovereignty. The following section explores how 
international institutions constructed the Ukrainian crisis as a symbol of international 
values in defining Ukrainian nationalism. 
Ukrainian identity as a symbol of internationalism 
 International organizations also attempted to define Ukrainian identity and 
sovereignty by framing the current conflict in terms of internationalist values and 
norms. This was done in part by highlighting certain fundamental principles that are 





electoral process, and basic financial institutions were also used to define Ukraine’s 
global identity. For instance, the Minsk Agreements called for holding local and 
regional elections and launching discussions about the “modalities of local elections 
in accordance with Ukrainian legislation and the Law of Ukraine.”67 In calling for 
local elections, and championing democratic reforms, the agreements stressed that the 
Ukrainians were willing to embrace European democracy. Similarly, the Minsk 
agreements call for humanitarian aid in eastern Ukraine. The parties involved agree to 
“ensure safe access, delivery, storage, and distribution of humanitarian assistance to 
those in need, on the basis of an international mechanism.”68 According to this vision, 
the Ukrainian people were not the aggressors, and would not be held responsible for 
the suffering of innocent people. Along those lines, the Minsk agreement stressed the 
need for basic financial institutions: “Ukraine shall reinstate control of the segment of 
its banking system in the conflict-affected areas and possibly an international 
mechanism to facilitate such transfers shall be established.”69 All of these measures—
elections, as well as humanitarian and financial assistance—were endorsed by the 
United Nations. Such logic suggested that nations willing to meet these standards 
deserve to have their national identities legitimized and to be a part of the global 
community. The Minsk Agreements helped legitimate Ukraine’s national identity and 
claims of sovereignty by establishing standards that celebrated Ukraine’s actions and 
denounced Russia’s moves. 
  In his speech to the United Nations General Assembly, President Poroshenko 
continued these themes of international norms as essential tools in defining Ukrainian 





“I would like to take this opportunity to express my gratitude to the international 
community for the considerable efforts in providing necessary assistance to the 
people in need. At the same time I call upon the United Nations and all other 
international actors to continue to pay special attention to this very important issue.”70 
In praising global communities, and stressing the humanitarian aid to those in need, 
Poroshenko embraces core European values of self-determination and human rights 
outlined in the European Union Charter. Ukraine only wants to help innocent people 
survive, Poroshenko reasons, and these are messages that resonate with core 
European values and internationalism. Similarly, he condemns the Russian 
Federation’s actions for defying international norms and values: “I believe that the 
problem of blatant violations of human rights in the Crimea deserves a particular 
consideration within the UN General Assembly.”71 For Poroshenko, Ukraine is 
clearly a nation willing to embrace European and global values; the Russian 
Federation is not.  
Vladimir Putin also addressed the 70th General Assembly of the United 
Nations, and also argued for the importance of international communities. Like 
Poroshenko, Putin was jockeying for the legitimization of his claims for Ukrainian 
identity and sovereignty. His defense of the United Nations would have audiences 
believing that the Russian Federation was ready to lead global communities, while his 
western rivals only undermined them:  
Of course, the world changes, and the UN should also undergo natural 
transformation. Russia is ready to work together with its partners to develop 
the UN further on the basis of a broad consensus, but we consider any 
attempts to undermine the legitimacy of the United Nations as extremely 
dangerous. They may result in the collapse of the entire architecture of 





the rule of force. The world will be dominated by selfishness rather than 
collective effort, by dictate rather than equality and liberty, and instead of 
truly independent states we will have protectorates controlled from outside.  
Sadly, some of our counterparts are still dominated by their Cold War-era bloc 
mentality and the ambition to conquer new geopolitical areas. First, they 
continued their policy of expanding NATO–-one should wonder why, 
considering that the Warsaw Pact had ceased to exist and the Soviet Union 
had disintegrated.72  
 
Putin’s defense of international institutions is by design. He champions collective, 
global action to solve problems, and embraces diplomacy over military conflicts. In 
condemning the expansion of NATO, Putin suggests that alliances between nations 
that stop short of global communities only serve to undermine collective interests of 
the world. NATO prevents the internationalist goals that Putin defends, and is 
therefore opposed to shared values of peace and diplomacy. The Russian Federation 
is the hero in Putin’s narrative, while the west only resists his calls for 
internationalism and shared, global values. This internationalist rhetoric, like 
Poroshenko’s, encourages the international norms to endorse a specific vision of 
Ukrainian identity and sovereignty when adjudicating the current conflict in the court 
of global opinion at the United Nations. 
 Putin was correct in his claim that NATO was eager to support Ukraine’s 
move towards the west. NATO leaders framed the issue of Ukrainian identity in terms 
of its internationalist commitments to shared, progressive values. A NATO-Ukraine 
commission report explains: “Allies commend the Ukrainian people’s commitment to 
freedom and democracy and their determination to decide their own future free from 
outside interference. They welcome the holding of free and fair Presidential 
elections… which testify to the consolidation of Ukraine’s democracy and its 





of democracy and free elections as examples of Ukraine’s commitment to an 
internationalist identity. NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen explains 
that this move towards Europe has forced the Ukrainian people to sacrifice a great 
deal:  
This comes at great human cost to civilians. We express our condolences to 
the Ukrainian people for these tragic losses. Thirty civilians were killed and 
around a hundred were injured in the attack launched on residential areas of 
Mariupol. The attack was launched from territory controlled by separatists 
backed by Russia.74 
 
Here, Rasmussen points out what the Ukrainian people are willing to endure to finally 
embrace a European identity and to control their own borders. Listing these atrocities 
also serves to differentiate between the internationalist, progressive values of Europe 
and those of the Russian Federation’s separatists in the area. NATO leaders argued 
that they endorsed Ukraine’s interpretation of their national identity because the 
Ukrainian people were looking for the same values that Europeans already shared.  
The European Union also attempted to endorse the Ukrainian vision of their 
identity and sovereignty in the conflict with the Russian Federation. This was done by 
defining Ukrainian nationalism as fundamentally European—as part of an 
internationalist vision for global norms. At a 2015 EU Conference on Support for 
Ukraine, Johannes Hahn, Commissioner for European Neighborhood Policy and 
Enlargement Negotiations, explored these themes:  
Ukraine must seize this moment, which despite your many problems, is full of 
opportunity. But our message today, is that you do not have to face these 
challenges alone. The Ukrainian public—and some of Ukraine’s other 
neighbors—need to know that we are all here to help this country become 
stronger, more modern and more self-sufficient. A country that makes its own 





This argument suggested that Ukraine was not on its own, because the European 
Union was ready to help the nation’s leaders and people through the challenging 
process of becoming a functioning member of the European community of nations. 
Similarly, the Joint Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the European Council, 
and the European Commission on the signing of an EU Association Agreement 
explains how Ukraine is now officially on a path to Europe: “The EU is committed to 
supporting Ukraine in its path towards a modern European democracy. The 
Association Agreement does not constitute the final goal in EU-Ukraine 
cooperation.”76 In explaining what being a part of Europe means—a modern 
European democracy—the EU makes its view of Ukrainian identity clear. Ukraine is 
moving west, and while its journey will not be easy, they are no longer in Russia’s 
sphere of influence. This is precisely the vision of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty 
that Ukrainian leaders and many ordinary citizens articulated; the EU clearly 
endorsed it here.  
 Other European Union leaders explained the importance of winning the fight 
for Ukrainian identity. EU Vice-President Valdis Dombrovskis at the Yalta European 
Strategy Annual Meeting argued that Ukrainian sovereignty was critical for Europe: 
“Ukraine should not become a forgotten conflict. The West cannot afford this to 
happen. We must stand up not only for Ukraine, but for the broader values of 
sovereignty and democracy, and for the logic of peaceful diplomacy.”77 For 
Dombrovskis, winning the battle for the identity and sovereignty of Ukraine was 
essential for the ideological underpinnings of Europe itself. If Ukraine fell under 





sovereignty. President of the European Commission, José Manuel Durão Barroso, 
echoes these sentiments: 
Waving European flags and camping under open skies in freezing 
temperatures, the Ukrainian people demonstrated why Europe is important, 
what Europe means and what Europe stands for. The Ukrainian people stood 
for freedom, democracy and rule of law. These are precisely the values that 
are at the core of the European Union. And, Europe will always stand with 
countries willing to engage on this path. This is what we want for Ukraine 
and what our relationship is all about. To support Ukraine to become a more 
democratic and rule-governed country. A more prosperous and modern 
society. Ukraine deserves the same opportunities that were afforded to other 
countries in Eastern Europe after the fall of the Berlin Wall. Just look at the 
evolution of Ukraine and Poland these last decades. In 1990 Ukraine was 
ahead of Poland in GDP and had about the same level in GDP per capita. 
Only 20 years later Polish indicators, both overall GDP and per capita GDP 
are three times higher. And, this transformation happened even before 
accession.78 
 
Barroso argues that Ukrainians are embracing core European values of freedom, 
democracy, and the rule of law, and it was the obligation of all like-minded members 
of the European and global communities to support them in their efforts. Failing to do 
so would betray those same values, even as Ukrainians were fighting for the security 
and shared interests of Europe. This clear endorsement of Ukraine’s vision over 
Russia’s was framed as an essential test for Europe and European values. Yet, 
Ukraine was about to face its own test, when attempting to align its deep national 
values with its internationalist commitments to moving west.   
Ukraine’s identity crisis—national values and international aspirations 
While Poroshenko struggled against Russian military and economic pressures, 
a series of votes in the Ukrainian parliament suddenly threatened the country’s goal 
of European integration. The movement that ushered Poroshenko to power was fueled 





Protesters toppled statues of Vladimir Lenin while chanting, “Ukraine is Europe!”79 
Now, the religious and cultural legacies of the Soviet Union made Ukraine’s western 
move seem nearly impossible. On November 10, 2015, Ukraine’s Verkhovna Rada 
parliament voted down a bill that would have granted Ukrainian citizens’ visa-free 
travel to the European Union because the law contained a provision preventing 
discrimination against homosexuals in the workplace. The European Union had made 
it clear that legislated homophobia would permanently derail any chance of Ukraine 
joining the EU. Despite these warnings, Ukraine’s leaders initially rejected the 
antidiscrimination law over Poroshenko’s pleading.80 An ongoing Russian invasion 
and the promise of long-desired European integration were not enough to overcome 
culturally engrained homophobia. Poroshenko was under attack from the east, and 
moving west was now nearly hopeless. 
Initial resistance to the antidiscrimination bill was fierce. Opponents of the 
law grounded their arguments in nationalist components of both religion and Soviet-
era homophobia. Member of parliament Pavlo Unguryan—a member of Prime 
Minister Arseniy Yatsenyuk’s own progressive, pro-European party—articulated the 
general sentiment among government leaders during the initial days of the debate. He 
grounded his arguments in Ukraine’s Christian identity and history: “As a country 
with a thousand-year-old Christian history, we simply cannot allow this. Today, a 
special status for sexual minorities is simply unacceptable.”81 Opponents of the law 
could count on the popular support of several anti-gay political groups. The 
nationalist Right Sector political party had violently attacked a gay pride parade 





“Fashion Verdict,” explained that his group’s goal was to “sweep promiscuity, 
gambling, sexual offenders and homosexuality from the streets of Ukraine’s cities.”83 
Such attitudes mirror the criminalization of homosexuality during the reign of the 
Soviet Union. The combination of religious discourse and a groundswell of Soviet-
style homophobia from social movements were enough to initially defeat the 
antidiscrimination law. 
Proponents of the bill framed their arguments in terms of ideologies of 
internationalism, grounded in Ukraine’s commitment to Europe and to overarching 
notions of human rights. In response to the initial defeat of the bill, member of 
parliament Iryna Gerashchenko explained, “This is a serious blow to our chances of 
getting visa-free travel to Europe.”84 Serhiy Leshchenko, a member of Poroshenko’s 
block in parliament, was even more direct: “The importance of this law is greater 
than stereotypes surrounding it. And a visa-free regime concerns all citizens. Without 
adoption of the non-discrimination law, a visa-free regime will not be introduced.”85 
Petro Poroshenko similarly reminded Ukrainians that the Revolution of Dignity was 
fought to bring Ukraine closer to Europe. He harkened back to his editorial in the 
Wall Street Journal months earlier in which he claimed, “We have shown the world 
the true face of our nation, one that fights for European values and defends European 
security on its frontiers.”86 Defeating the bill would mean undermining Ukraine’s 
European identity. Member of parliament Volodymr Ariev similarly argued, “Ukraine 
is a European country, not a crass Soviet state where you can still feel the Russian 
influence that invaded post-Soviet countries. Ukraine is trying to escape from a post-





represented a key move for Ukraine away from the legacies of the Soviet Union and 
towards a European orientation grounded in internationalism. This internal struggle 
also took place for the legitimation of sovereignty claims about Ukraine’s identity. 
Glanville explains that this is not uncommon: “Sovereignty is constructed both within 
and between political communities.”88 Thus, the Ukrainians themselves were fighting 
over what their identity meant, and Poroshenko’s vision for a pro-western Ukraine 
eventually won out with calls for European integration, grounded in human rights 
rhetoric. The paradox of Ukrainian identity—wrestling with its Soviet past while 
calling for a European future—was, at least for now, resolved. 
The propaganda battle over Ukrainian identity and self-determination 
 A third theme in the discourse of international organizations was the self-
determination of the Ukrainian people. Whether Russian was intervening in Ukraine 
on behalf of Ukrainians or in contradiction to their wishes was a central marker in 
determining the legitimacy of these events. This was the difference between a 
diplomatic, humanitarian mission and a full-scale invasion of a foreign nation. Both 
the pro-Russian and pro-western sides in the debate argued that the Ukrainian people 
agreed with them. The outcome of this confrontation would serve to help legitimize a 
given interpretation of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. Because of the Cold War 
past between Russia and the US and the rise of international organizations, each actor 
thought they had a stake in Ukraine’s future. Ukrainian identity thus splintered in the 
post-Cold War era as each vied for the right to define Ukraine’s identity on the 
grounds that the vulnerabilities of the newly sovereign nation left it open to outside 





 Russian representatives argued that they acted in the spirit of self-
determination for the Crimean people in the United Nations debate over the Russian 
intervention into Crimea. Vitaly Churchin, the Russian Federation’s representative, 
declared, “We call on everyone to respect that voluntary choice” and that the Russian 
Government could not refuse Crimeans their right to self-determination.89 Churchin 
explained Crimea’s Russian history, exploring the deep cultural ties between the 
peninsula and the Russian Federation. The Crimean people wanted to be part of 
Russia because of this history: “For many years, Crimea had been part of the Russian 
Federation, sharing a common history, culture and people.  An arbitrary decision in 
1954 had transferred the region to the Ukrainian Republic, upsetting the natural state 
of affairs and cutting Crimea off from Russia.”90 This shared history and cultural 
connection meant that Russia was acting in the interests of the Crimean people, and in 
accordance with their will, by facilitating the referendum. Denying the legitimacy of 
Russian actions in the peninsula would mean denying the free choices of a large 
group of people.  
 Churchin next argued that western nations and the current Ukrainian 
government were undermining the will of the Crimean people and denying them their 
right to self-determination. He blamed the protests in Kiev on the “‘adventurous 
actions’ of provocateurs whose actions had led to the reunification decision.”91 From 
the Russian perspective, the Revolution of Dignity was an anti-democratic coup that 
undermined the electoral principles of a democratic nation. The Russian version of 
events is terrifying: 
The central square, the Maidan, had been converted into a militarized camp 





housing the United States Embassy had been captured…from that building, 
snipers had fired upon police and demonstrators, intending to provoke a 
violent overthrow of the Government…. On 21 February, President Viktor 
Yanukovych had agreed to disarm militants, free the building, create a 
national unity Government, and launch a constitutional process that would see 
elections held by year’s end. Yet, the violence continued and the President had 
been compelled to leave Ukraine. Following a reshuffle, a “Government of 
victors” had appeared—national radicals who preached racist, anti-Semitic 
and xenophobic views, and who hated everything Russian.92   
This narrative presumes that the revolution that overthrew Viktor Yankyovich was 
made up of thugs and radicals who opposed basic democratic freedoms. Churchin 
argued that, once in power, these radicals governed in ways that further eroded the 
self-determination of Crimeans: “Their first decisions had been to revoke the status of 
the Russian language used by Crimeans and to appoint governors rejected by the 
locals.”93 The identity and sovereignty of the Crimean people was eroded and 
threatened by the revolution of dignity in this narrative. While those in western 
Ukraine might have seen the events as triumphant, for those in Crimea, they were 
alarming threats to their very identity. 
In Churchin’s version of events, the Russian intervention in Crimea aimed to 
protect the Crimean people and preserve their freedoms. Churchin argued, “Ukraine 
required a true political process that would lead to conditions in which its people did 
not fear for their lives and were sure that they could exercise their rights.”94 The 
alleged western interventions in the region deserved more blame than Russian actions 
in this narrative. He endorsed the parts of the resolution that called for nations to 
“refrain from unilateral actions and inflammatory rhetoric” and suggested that 
member nations “base decisions on the interests of Ukrainians and of normal 





accepted global norms by pushing Ukraine towards the west, in ways that denied the 
Crimean people their right to define their own sovereignty and identity. In short, 
Russia was coming to the rescue of the Crimean people to protect their basic human 
right to self-determination, language, and democratic and electoral protections. In 
centering self-determination in their claims, the Russian delegation was arguing for 
the legitimacy of the referendum, and for their vision of Ukrainian identity and 
sovereignty.  
 The United States was also in attendance for the Crimea debate at the United 
Nations and strongly disagreed with the Russia version of events. American UN 
Ambassador Samantha Power argues that self-determination was a paramount value 
in international relations and among global communities, and the Russian actions in 
Ukraine had undermined these core principles. She argued that the measure before the 
United Nations was about a single issue: “affirming a commitment to the sovereignty, 
political independence, unity and territorial integrity of Ukraine…” and to “make 
clear that borders are not mere suggestions.”96 Power stressed that “Crimea was part 
of Ukraine” and argued “self-determination was a widely welcome value.”97 For 
Power, the Crimean people had chosen to move west, and this included Crimea. To 
deny this free choice was to undermine the self-determination of a nation. In attacking 
the Russian position, Power argued: “Coercion could not be the means by which one 
‘self-determined,” and called for “an electoral process that would allow all Ukrainians 
to choose their leaders freely, fairly and without coercion.”98 The Russian Federation 
was acting in ways that undermined Ukrainian identity by facilitating the Crimean 





because the Russian military forced the hands of the Crimean people. According to 
the United States, Russian claims of acting to defend the self-determination of the 
Crimean people are therefore false.  
The 2015 United Nations General Assembly also featured dueling claims of 
acting in support of the Ukrainian people’s right of self-determination. President 
Poroshenko condemned the Russian intervention as an overt attempt to undermine the 
will of the Ukrainian people. He explains his view of the Russian perspective of the 
conflict: “The goal of this war is to force the Ukrainian people to give up its 
sovereign choice to build a free, democratic, prosperous European state. All this takes 
place against the backdrop of traitorous rhetoric about brotherly peoples, common 
history, related languages and ‘predestined’ common future.”99 For Poroshenko, the 
Ukrainian people had already clearly articulated what their identity would be, and 
how they would use their right to self-determination. They were moving west, 
towards Europe, and toward the international organizations that came with that 
identity, including the EU and NATO. Every action taken by the Russian Federation 
was to resist these choices, and to keep the Ukrainian people under a Russian sphere 
of influence. The Ukrainian people were aware of their shared history, language, and 
culture with Russia, and had decided to move towards Europe anyway. Russian 
actions enacted a Russian identity in favor of a European one. 
 President Putin also spoke of the rights of a people to determine their future in 
his UN speech. He takes the time to define the concept for his audience: “What is the 
meaning of state sovereignty, the term which has been mentioned by our colleagues 





their future.”100 This self-determination is an essential component of national identity. 
However, under Putin’s version of events, it was the west, rather than Russia, that 
was to blame for the erosion of Ukrainian sovereignty:  
NATO has kept on expanding, together with its military infrastructure. Next, 
the post-Soviet states were forced to face a false choice between joining the 
West and carrying on with the East. Sooner or later, this logic of confrontation 
was bound to spark off a major geopolitical crisis. And that is exactly what 
happened in Ukraine, where the people’s widespread frustration with the 
government was used for instigating a coup d’état from abroad. This has 
triggered a civil war.101  
 
For Putin, the entire conflict was the fault of western interventions into the sovereign 
state of Ukraine. The Ukrainian people may have chosen to move west, but this 
choice was a false one orchestrated by foreign powers. Just as Poroshenko argued that 
the Crimean people were not legitimately choosing their identity because of outside 
influence, Putin suggests that the Ukrainian people had been unduly influenced from 
abroad. Therefore the choice of Ukraine to move towards Europe was illegitimate and 
did not reflect the genuine will and self-determination of the Ukrainian people.  
 Putin defends his own military’s actions in Ukraine as acting in the interests 
of the Ukrainian people, especially those in the eastern Donbas Region. He describes 
eastern Ukrainians as being under constant threat, with few political rights, including 
that of self-determination: “Ukraine’s territorial integrity cannot be secured through 
the use of threats or military force, but it must be secured. The people of Donbas 
should have their rights and interests genuinely considered, and their choice 
respected.”102 In this narrative, Putin was intervening in eastern Ukraine to preserve 
the right of self-determination for the people in those regions. Putin argues of the 





country's political system… Such steps would guarantee that Ukraine will develop as 
a civilized state, and a vital link in creating a common space of security and economic 
cooperation, both in Europe and in Eurasia.”103 For Putin, the sovereignty of Ukraine, 
and especially those in Russian-friendly regions, was threatened by the current 
conflict orchestrated by a collection of foreign nations. He argues that the Ukrainian 
people need to choose their own destiny, but also that they have the ability to be both 
a part of Europe and to maintain close ties with Russia. In Putin’s narrative, the 
demand that they must be in Europe or in Russia’s control is a false one orchestrated 
by the west. Thus, for Putin, the legitimacy of Poroshenko’s definition of Ukrainian 
identity is a farce.  
 The European Union embraced Ukraine in part because EU leaders 
recognized the will of the Ukrainian people to be a part of Europe. In the Joint 
Statement by the Presidents of Ukraine, the European Council and the European 
Commission following the start of the EU Association Agreement’s adoption, the will 
of the Ukrainian people was acknowledged: “[The Association Agreement] follows 
the aspirations of the Ukrainian people, who have demonstrated their support for 
closer relations with the European Union, most recently in the parliamentary elections 
last Sunday.”104 This was not a coup orchestrated by foreign powers; the Ukrainian 
people chose to move west, and they continued to do so long after the Maidan 
barricades went down in the form of repeated election results. European Commission 
head José Manuel Durão Barroso also acknowledged the choices of the Ukrainian 
people, noting that the Russian Federation rejected this choice:  
I want to thank the people of Ukraine for their example. They clearly and 





Ukraine's best protection against any attempts to undermine its sovereignty is 
to build a strong democracy and a modern economy…. Ukraine wanted to 
sign, and eventually signed, the Association Agreement and Russia did not 
respect that. It did not want Ukraine to choose its path freely or determine its 
own future. And, this of course could not be accepted.105 
 
For the Ukrainian people, the choice to move towards Europe meant a commitment 
to democracy and a strong, European-style economy. Russian leaders, who wanted 
Ukrainians to stay under their sphere of influence, resisted these choices. Thus, 
Europe’s choice to embrace Ukraine acknowledged their right to self-determination 
the Ukrainian articulation of their sovereignty and identity.  
 Questions of self-determination helped define the international organization 
debates surrounding Ukrainian nationalism. Those choices, and the legitimacy of 
those decisions, were central components of identity. Both Russia and western 
nations and organizations argued that the other side was resistant to the genuine will 
of the Ukrainian people. If the Ukrainian people chose a Russian identity, or a 
European orientation, neither side could accept that this choice was made free from 
influence. Because questions of self-determination are at the core of national identity 
and sovereignty articulations, nations wrestle with their role in global communities 
by adjudicating these conflicting claims of nationalism, borders, and laws.  
Implications of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty in an international setting 
 Themes of international law, internationalism in the form of shared values 
and global communities, and self-determination helped define international responses 
to the Ukraine crisis. The ways in which each organization—the UN, EU, and 
NATO—and each major national actor involved—Ukraine, Russia, and the United 





The overarching role of international organizations in this conflict fluctuated 
depending on their perspective, and the ways in which they interacted with the 
nations involved.  
 Throughout the Cold War, United Nations had long been at the center of 
global sparing between the Soviet Union and the United States. The Cuban Missile 
Crisis, the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, and the Vietnam War among many other 
events were litigated on the world stage at the UN. However, the purpose remained 
the same in global conflicts after the Cold War—to maintain global peace and to 
negotiate global political differences. In the case of the Ukraine conflict, that meant 
deciding whose interpretation of Ukrainian identity and sovereignty was legitimate.  
The Russian Federation argued both that the Ukrainian people—at least those 
in Crimea and eastern Ukraine—wanted closer ties with the Russian Federation, and 
also that such a choice between Europe and Russia was a false one. Paradoxically, 
the Russian representatives both asserted a definition of Ukrainian identity while 
simultaneously claiming that such assertions were foundationally incorrect because 
Ukraine could be both in Europe and aligned with Russia. Analysis of Putin’s 
response to the events suggests that he frequently deployed a tu quoque fallacy to 
navigate this paradox. This argument (which is Latin for “You too!”) is an appeal to 
hypocrisy, asserting that because someone contradicted his or her own argument, his 
or her entire claim is therefore false. The strategy works by undercutting the 
credibility of an opponent rather than defending yourself against an argument, 
appealing to an audience’s need for consistency between words and actions. The tu 





for Russian ones. Here, Putin claims that the United States frequently flaunted the 
decisions of the Security Council, implicitly referring to the second Iraq War. Yet, 
the United States calls on Russia to respect the outcome of United Nations decisions 
on the current conflict.  
Putin’s argument is that the United Nations is only respected when it is useful 
for American interests. While the American and Ukrainian side “won” every major 
debate about Ukrainian sovereignty and identity before the United Nations in terms 
of votes from the international community, Russia’s veto on those same measures 
short-circuited the adjudicatory role the UN might have played in the conflict. The 
measures were defeated by the Russian Federation’s unilateral veto, despite being in 
the clear minority in world opinion. Thus, the UN failed to legitimize any definition 
of Ukrainian nationalism. As Glanville argues, these failures are not entirely 
unexpected as the United Nations—even in a post-Libya “Responsibility to Protect” 
world—often fails to uphold its obligations to both peoples and humanitarian 
interests for structural reasons:  
States variously argued that there was need for Security Council reform, 
agreement to restrain the exercise of veto, and clarification of criteria to guide 
decision making on the authorization of coercive measures, not only to 
prevent abusive misapplication of the “responsibility to protect” but also to 
ensure that the council would indeed exercise its authority, where 
appropriate, to ensure the protection of populations.106 
 
The paradox that has plagued the United Nations since its founding—intervening 
around the world in the defense of human rights and a strident belief in the principle 
of non-intervention—appears to remain intact, even in a post-Cold War world. These 
events call into question the effectiveness of the UN to decide the outcome of 





Whereas the UN attempted to serve an adjudicatory function in global affairs, 
the EU and NATO both had much more specific regional interests at stake. They 
interpreted events in ways that took a clear side between Russia and the United 
States and accepted definitions of Ukrainian identity in line with those 
determinations. This often came with concrete financial assistance, and arguments 
steeped in the rhetoric of self-determination, international law, and the shared values 
of progressive European democracies. The Ukrainian people now have Visa-free 
travel to Europe as part of an agreement with the EU, a dream of the Ukrainian 
people for decades.107 Similarly, the Ukrainian army continues to participate in 
NATO military training and support as the fight against Russian forces in eastern 
Ukraine in ongoing.108 Whereas the UN failed to offer tangible support, the EU and 
NATO not only endorsed Ukraine’s vision of their own nationalism, but also 
followed through in ways impacting the lives of the Ukrainian people. This 
showcases that international organizations must support interpretations of national 
identity and sovereignty in ways reflecting a changing post-Cold War world. 
Russia’s continued influence in Crimea and Eastern Ukraine despite the efforts of 
international organizations to condemn these actions shows the legacy of the Cold 
War. Ukraine is unable to break free from Russia’s sphere of influence because the 
paradox of their identity is also entrenched in Russian memory that is promulgated 
widely on the international stage and reflected in global structures like the United 
Nations; with Russia’s powerful influence in that community, efforts to move 
Ukraine closer to Europe are vetoed, and such moves away from Russia’s sphere of 
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Nearly four years have passed since the Revolution of Dignity, and 
celebration has turned to frustration as Ukraine is still struggling to define its identity 
and sovereignty in the post-Cold War. Ukraine’s leaders are striving to articulate a 
unified nationalist discourse and move beyond the myths and memories of the Cold 
War. Its identity and sovereignty remain trapped between its Soviet past and 
European future, between east and west. Its nationalism continues to be a political 
football between the United States and the Russian Federation, as international 
organizations likewise struggle to adjudicate the dispute or legitimize claims of 
Ukraine’s sovereign identity. Andrew Higgins and Andrew Kramer argue that 
Ukraine’s pluralism has been the nation-state’s undoing: “[Ukraine is a] fragile state 
that is too fragmented by competing economic and regional interests to impose either 
Russian-style authoritarianism or European-style rule of law.”1 No one side can win 
out, even after a revolution brought down the pro-Russian Yanykovich government in 
2014 and presented Ukrainians with a chance to start fresh and define their identity as 
a post-Soviet nation-state. This project suggests that these results cannot be surprising 
because the key players from the first Cold War are fighting a second Cold War 
through a series of fronts: cyber warfare, economic sanctions, diplomatic 
deliberations, propaganda exchanges, and military maneuvers. Many developing 
nations, including Ukraine, are caught in the cross-fire involving Russia, the United 
States, and international organizations, which leave many struggling from the Middle 





This project produces four important takeaways. First, Ukraine has remained 
entrenched in its pre-Soviet myths and memories and its Soviet Cold War history 
inhibiting the nation’s articulation of a unifying post-Cold War identity. Soviet 
legacies of language and corruption continue to hinder Ukraine’s development of a 
unifying national identity. The ongoing battle over a national language represents one 
such cultural legacy of the Cold War. On September 5, 2017, the Ukrainian 
Parliament passed a bill requiring that Ukrainian be the sole language of study in 
schools from the fifth grade on.2 The bill was condemned by pundits as a transparent 
attempt by President Poroshenko’s political party to punish Russian-speaking regions, 
which support President Putin’s interventions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea, and 
curry populist favor with western, Ukrainian-speaking regions.3 Poroshenko soon 
signed the bill into law, attempting to express a more cohesive Ukrainian identity 
based in language. However, the law did not have the desired impact; while Russian-
speaking regions condemned the proposed law, western Ukrainians—many of whom 
spoke Romanian, Polish, and Hungarian—also resisted the bill.4 Because of 
Ukraine’s diverse linguistic heritage, language cannot help unify Ukraine in the post-
Cold War. Requiring the Russian language in schools—as the Soviet Union had done 
for half a century—had a similar divisive impact.5 Thus, Ukraine continues to be 
caught in a paradox between its Cold War past, with its legacy of the Russian 
language, and a nascent Ukrainian nationalism that embraces the Ukrainian language 
only. The failure of Poroshenko’s plan to unite Ukrainians over a shared language 





Ukraine also struggles to move beyond its Cold War past that is defined by 
corruption.6 President Poroshenko’s inability to fully establish an anti-corruption 
court—a key campaign promise—is a foundational problem in shifting to a post-Cold 
War identity.7 Glanville explains: “When a sovereign state proves unwilling or unable 
to protect its own population, it yields its sovereign right of nonintervention, and the 
responsibility to protect passes on to the society of states.”8 Russia uses this rationale 
to justify its actions in eastern Ukraine and Crimea by calling Ukraine a corrupt 
oligarchy that needs saving.9 At the same time, the United States and international 
organizations say Russia is corrupt and violating Ukraine's right of self-
determination. There is a concerted push to end the corruption and yet the Ukrainian 
government seems to make only very slow progress in cleaning up its fraudulent 
past.10 This has invited condemnation from the west—Chapter 3 explored American 
leaders frequently demanding that Ukraine make progress in fighting corruption, and 
EU leaders have also called on Ukraine to do more.11 Russia also condemns 
Ukraine’s corruption, yet also contributes to these issues by supporting various 
Ukrainian oligarchs.12  
Second, Ukraine has experienced a cycle of unrest linked to its pre-Soviet 
history and exacerbated by the post-Cold War paradox. A foundational resistance to 
outside rule defines Ukraine’s identify. That identity is deepened by the Revolution of 
Dignity in many ways mirroring the nation’s Cossack fight for independence in the 
fifteenth century. Taras Chornovil explains: “What is Ukraine’s national idea? It is 
resistance to authority.”13 This resistance to authority can be directed at outside rule 





alliances. In this cycle of unrest, a sitting government predictably stalls after failing to 
live up to the revolutionary promise. Another crisis follows, until the heroes of that 
crisis are themselves removed from power (either by force or the vote) for failing to 
make life better. Such a cycle of unrest happened after the 2004 Orange Revolution 
saw Viktor Yushenko defeat Viktor Yanykovich only for Yushenko to become wildly 
unpopular soon after when his administration failed to live up to his promises during 
the crisis.14 The 2014 Revolution of Dignity is currently repeating this cycle as 
Poroshenko is struggling to meet the demands of the crisis that brought him to power.  
Unfortunately for Poroshenko, his slow progress on fighting corruption and 
his heavy-handed Ukrainian language law invited internal opposition. This internal 
dissension is showing signs of inciting another change of power at a time of great 
fragility in the country’s sovereignty. On September 10, 2017, Mikhail Saakashvili 
and a mob of his supporters forced their way past Ukrainian police at the Ukrainian-
Polish border. Al Jazeera explains his role in Ukrainian politics: “Saakashvili was 
appointed to the Odessa post in 2015 on the strength of his record of fighting 
corruption in Georgia. However, he resigned the post after only 18 months, 
complaining that official corruption in Ukraine was so entrenched he could not work 
effectively.”15 Regardless, Saakashvilli’s return to Ukraine represents a populist 
attempt to challenge Poroshenko from the left, primarily on the topic of corruption. 
Yulia Tymoshemko—former two-term Prime Minister and populist politician—was 
also with Saakashvilli on the border, and recently announced that she would 
challenge Poroshenko in the 2019 presidential election.16 Poroshenko has gone from 





Saakashvilli and Tymoshenko appear poised to head back to the barricades of 
Maidan. The myths of Cossack resistance to outside rule are still strong in Ukraine, 
and contributed to Ukraine’s post-Cold War paradox. 
Third, Ukraine’s polarization has formed an opening for other nations to 
meddle and interfere, challenging its sovereignty while seeking to bolster Ukraine’s 
right of self-determination. Ukraine is accorded such a right of self-determination 
from the United States and Europe so long as decisions cohere with their own foreign 
policy goals. The United States and Russia have kept Ukraine divided in their battle 
over the hearts and minds of the Ukrainian people, while international organizations 
have failed to legitimize either side’s vision for Ukrainian identity and sovereignty. 
Russia in particular has meddled with Ukrainian territory. Poroshenko is under attack 
from his political left in western Ukraine and the Russian government’s invasion of 
eastern Ukraine and occupation of Crimea are ongoing. At dusk on September 26, 
2017, a Ukrainian munitions depot exploded in eastern Ukraine (Kalynivka). Media 
reports outline the damage: “Some 32,000 metric tons of artillery shells worth $800 
million were destroyed in the chain of fires and explosions at the site. By comparison, 
Ukrainian forces are estimated to have used some 24,000 metric tons of munitions 
during the fighting in eastern Ukraine.”17 The attack mirrored a similar explosion in 
March near the eastern town of Balaklia. That explosion was also disastrous: “Some 
70,000 metric tons of munitions were destroyed in the incident, with one person 
killed amid damage estimated at some $1 billion.”18 The Ukrainian security services 
believe that a drone from Russian operatives carrying a thermite hand grenade caused 





The same day as the Kalynivka explosion, the Russian-made film Crimea 
premiered in the peninsula and in Russia.20 This film represents another example of 
Russian efforts to undermine Ukrainian unification. Depicting the heroic Crimean 
people resisting authoritarian rule from Kiev and declaring their independence, the 
film romanticizes the Russian and Crimean visions of Ukrainian identity, steeped in 
Cold War propaganda themes of the Great Patriotic War. Russian efforts to continue 
the ongoing conflict in eastern Ukraine also reinforce the post-Cold War paradox. 
With territory under dispute, Ukraine struggles to move all of its sovereign land 
towards a European alliance. Propaganda efforts like the Crimea film also suggest 
that the Russian government is fighting a battle for the hearts and minds of the 
Crimean people. The Russian Federation’s attempts to draw Ukraine back into its 
orbit either through force (Crimea), terrorist acts (the downing of the Malaysian 
Airlines passenger jet), or through propaganda (the “Crimea” film) limit Ukraine’s 
ability to construct a post-Cold War identity.  
The United States has also attempted to influence Ukraine’s political 
direction. Newly minted U.S. Ambassador to the Russian Federation, Jon Huntsman, 
made Ukrainian sovereignty a priority. As the Associated Press explained, Huntsman 
identified ways to improve U.S.-Russian relations. The “first step,” Huntsman argued, 
was for Russia to return “control” to Ukraine over “its internationally recognized 
borders.”21 Huntsman’s comments came just weeks after the U.S. Senate approved a 
$500 military aid package to Ukraine, including lethal defensive weapons.22 The 
United States is thus making combating Russian actions in Ukraine a fiscal and 





These actions by the Russian Federation and the United States will do little to 
wrestle Ukraine free from its post-Cold War paradox. The United States sending 
Ukraine $500 million in weapons only to have them blown up by Russian drones does 
not help Ukraine settle the conflict. With Russian support for Ukrainians favoring a 
pro-Russian orientation, and U.S. support for Ukrainians wanting closer European 
ties, both sides are emboldened in a battle that will likely produce many casualties in 
its pursuit of victory. This perpetual attempts to meddle in Ukrainian politics helps 
keep Ukraine in a liminal space that is neither fully integrated into Europe, nor re-
integrated with the Russian Federation. International organizations can only watch as 
this chaos invites outside intervention from Russia and the United States, each hoping 
to nudge the Ukrainian people towards their side, or at least prevent other global 
powers from earning Ukraine’s allegiance. This ongoing conflict only weakens 
Ukraine, inviting more interference from global powers, and pushing Ukraine farther 
away from finding a unifying post-Cold War identity. Cold War II has no end in 
sight.  
Finally, the events in Ukraine also highlight the paradox inherent in the 
ideologies of sovereignty: the right of self-determination and non-interference from 
outside forces versus the belief that sovereign nations have a responsibility to protect 
other vulnerable nations. These dueling foreign policy assumptions (or the multiple 
and often competing traditions that plague political thought) foretell a dim future for 
those struggling for sovereignty in post-colonized or post-war periods.23 Once freed 
from aggressor nations, a new battle begins over the hearts and minds of the newly 





the past state of dominance and other super powers and international organizations 
trying to direct public opinion away from the aggressor nations to their side. The 
forces of these historical ideologies make it difficult for not only the freed nations 
struggling for self-determination, but also for the superpowers mired in the battle to 
transition from war to peace and to recognize the sovereignty of nations they once 
controlled. Efforts to re-envision the nation-state are complicated and often filled with 
entrenched obstacles.   
In the end, this study shows the force of ideas in conceptualizing nationalism 
and war. Multiple agreements can be reached to end hot wars and cold wars but the 
ideas that animate them survive and recirculate, inhibiting an ability to re-envision a 
new nationalism based in newly acquired sovereignty and independence. The 
Ukrainian crisis shows the difficulty of reconstituting identity and land in new ways, 
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